philosophy

Rabbi, sometimes it seems like you presented “intuition” as if it were a single piece: if we are forced to rely on it on one level (for example, logic or everyday induction), then we must also accept it on other levels (such as metaphysics, God or cosmic causality). But perhaps there is a fundamental difference between different types of intuitions?

It seems that basic intuitions – such as the sun will rise tomorrow, or that the floor will hold me when I stand on it – are part of our existential-experiential structure, almost inevitable, and therefore difficult to challenge. In contrast, metaphysical intuitions – for example, that the world must have a first cause – do not stem from everyday experience but from a distant abstraction, and are even very vulnerable to psychological biases such as teleological tendency or cognitive bias.

So, why not claim that there is a spectrum of intuitions, and not everything falls into the same obligatory category? That is: we can accept the inevitable intuitions that structure our very ability to think and live, but reject or at least suspend the more distant and speculative intuitions, which are not really necessary for our existence.

In other words: why accept the dichotomous picture of “total skepticism or acceptance of any intuition whatsoever”, and not propose an intermediate position, which, like sophisticated empiricism – accepts the necessary minimum but no more?

I am certainly not claiming that intuition is a single piece. What I am claiming is that someone who rejects intuition outright (i.e. does not accept products of intuition as acceptable) will have to reject it in all areas. Someone who says they have a different intuition than me, but accepts in principle the validity of intuitions, is a different argument that I did not discuss.
I will also note that this has nothing to do with the question of necessity. Either you accept intuition or you do not. The fact that you must accept something does not mean that it is indeed true. Just as even if God is the only basis for valid morality, this does not mean that one must accept the existence of God. It is possible that there is no God and then there really is no valid morality. The desired and the actual are two different things.