Piety in Uncertainty
In the SD
Hello,
I wanted to consult with you on the issue of how correct it is to accept the religious framework in a situation of faith doubt.
Because we have no certainty about anything, not even in sensory perception, then if we nevertheless quantify the doubt of faith on a scale of numbers, I understand that we have three sides:
A. A person who believes between 0%-50%, B. A person who believes exactly 50%, C. A person who believes between 50% and 100%.
So my question is, how right is it for every type of person to accept the religious framework? Since the religious framework is very binding and rigid, is it right for a person who believes close to 50% in the religion’s willingness to enslave and accept the burden of commandments? And what is right for someone who believes, for example, 70%?
Maybe he only needs to accept 50% of the religion? Maybe he should only observe the easy commandments and not the hard ones? Etc. Maybe he should observe everything, but still not be the most pious man in the world, but rather be more consistent, etc., etc…. to alleviate the doubts of the rabbis from the voices of B.S. and B.H., etc.
It sounds like this is a really difficult decision, and on the other hand, betting on either side has serious consequences for the other side as well (for example, if the religion is 30% correct, this person is going to get kidnapped….)
Sorry for all the jargon in a simple question, but I couldn’t express myself better.
I would love to know if the Rabbi knows a rational way to bet on the game and how much.
Thank you.
N.
I don’t think the 50% limit is essential here. In this sense, Pascal is right, that the expected profit and loss play a role here. For example, you don’t take a very large risk of 50%.
But it seems to me that here the consideration is not only of cost and loss but of the truth. The importance of doing the truth is similar to the cost or loss. Assuming that it is the truth and you did not do it – you acted wrongly. If it is not the truth and you did it – it is not terrible. Not in the sense of the cost but in the sense of proper and correct behavior.
Either way, I don’t think there is a probabilistic or other criterion here. A person has to decide for himself how much probability he needs to commit to the system. It is true that in difficult mitzvot or at a very high cost (such as leaving a gentile to die on Shabbat, according to the methods that this is the right thing to do. I disagree with this), there is room for disobeying if the certainty is low.
I didn't understand then what actually? 🙂
For example, on a personal level I believe that Judaism is indeed a reasonable option overall, is it safe? I really, really don't think so. Although I have no way to quantify my understanding of the number line.
How should I behave in a bet?
I agree that if I bet on Judaism, I bet on several additional levels besides the world: from the ontological level of our existence, on the values that guide us at the level of normative actions, and on our future as hope. (These are the words of Professor Rosenberg as a metaphor.)
But still, doesn't the rabbi have some magic formula for how to choose the right action?
To be honest, on a personal level, religion doesn't bother me at all. It feels much fuller to me than the empty cart, although I suppose that in terms of purely material pleasures, the secular approach is more “pleasant”/”pleasant” but since I'm so used to living without them, I don't feel a lack towards them at all…
But still, is it possible that I'm stuck in the naturalistic fallacy? That I think that because I give X percent to the correctness of religion, this is a sign that it is *worth* to observe the words of religion? If so, perhaps my very assumption that the rabbi can answer the question shows that I secretly believe in the correctness of the norms for choosing probabilities, or is it just an arbitrary decision if the amount of percentages cannot be linked to what is right to do…
No. I don't have a formula. But the fact that there is no formula or percentages doesn't mean that it is an arbitrary decision. Most of our decisions are not quantified in percentages and formulated logical argument, and yet I would not treat them as arbitrary.
It has nothing to do with the naturalistic fallacy. “correctness” Religion is not a fact but a judgment. It is not about factual correctness but about commitment and proper conduct.
It is true that there are no percentages does not mean that we are talking about an arbitrary decision, but to carry out something without a premise already sounds like a very arbitrary decision…. So I would like to know why the fact that we have a certain probability that something is true makes us believe that it is appropriate to follow it. (It does not feel like an axiom to me).
I did not understand the conclusion, does the “correctness” religion not draw conclusions on the factual level, such as whether there was a Mount Sinai status or not? So it is a matter of work. Only the status itself creates a normative understanding for us.
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But if so, I will now ask a completely opposite question: does not every normative doubt, when there is no other norm against it, not require following it?
For example, in a hypothetical situation in which, from his point of view, there is a 30% chance that the Mount Sinai event occurred, and the remaining 70% are empty in terms of norms, as in the case of atheism and nihilism, then wouldn't the default be to listen exclusively to the 30% of faith? After all, the very assumption that given any event I have a reason to follow its ethical meaning is related to the neutrality fallacy. So here too, even if there is a slight inclination towards the religious side, then exclusively it is appropriate to follow it, when I have no other norm that opposes it.
Although here it can be said that this is the question of whether such a norm exists or not, I do not think this is true, because if we have certainty that the Mount Sinai event occurred, then we will accept the claim that we should follow it, which reveals that we already have the religious norm, and the only question is what it is, so that in the event that there is no other claim, then for any doubt we should follow it.
I don't know what needs to be explained here. If I feel (=understand) that something is true, then for me it is true until proven otherwise. You want an explanation of why it is true, and then you can ask again why you believe this explanation.
I didn't understand anything from what you wrote later.
Based on your answer, I think my question was misunderstood, so I will rephrase it in a different style.
The rabbi certainly agrees that in order for a person to take on the burden of the commandments (the normative-religious dimension) he needs a positive reason why he should keep them.
The reason is of course the claim that God made the Mount Sinai status (a view from the factual level) and therefore one must listen to Him (intuition on the normative level).
Because the chance that there was a Mount Sinai status (and with it the normative obligation) is not certain! Rather, let's say 50%. The question arises how much certainty is needed to move from the factual level to accepting the commandments.
Three options can be said here – A. This is an arbitrary decision. B. This is an axiomatic decision. C. It is based on a combination of prior assumptions and considerations of expediency.
Because, in my opinion, the only option that correctly reflects reality is C’ I would love to know if the rabbi has an answer to identify exactly which assumptions are hidden in C (and remember that our knowledge of the situation is not certain at all)..
———–
Now we will continue to analyze option C,
To the extent that we understand that the level in which option C deals is an inference process that is “correct” and ”objective”, it is appropriate that if we have a normative consideration to act in a certain way and we do not have a consideration that contradicts it, it is appropriate to act accordingly.
Therefore, if we think that the chance that God commanded us a commandment is 0.01%, and we have no counter-consideration on the normative level, except for the doubter's claim that 99.9% He did not command, but this doubter's claim is empty on the normative level (because it does not say that it is appropriate to abstain from religion).
We have no reason not to accept the 0.01%. Because this is not a counter-consideration on the normative level.
I think I understood well and answered what I had to say about it. There is no formula and I don't know how to give you quantitative indicators. If you don't believe, don't do it.
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