Prayer for a miracle
I understand that your problem with the issue of prayer, and its implications for God’s involvement in the world, stems first and foremost from a certain assumption: the Sages forbid praying about what has already happened, because it is “vain prayer.” You tend to understand the concept of “vain” not as a halakhic prohibition, but as a factual assessment – that is, such prayer simply will not be useful. In other words, there is no normative prohibition here in the laws of prayer, but rather a statement that God, the Blessed, does not intervene in these cases.
Here I would like to comment on this assumption: You yourself wrote that there is no doubt that God can intervene in nature, since He created the laws of nature and can also enforce or violate them. In addition, you do not rule out His miraculous intervention in the past, nor do you rule out sporadic intervention in the present.
So why not say this: Technically, God can certainly intervene, but on the subject of prayer there is a set limit. This limit is either halakhic-normative in the laws of prayer, or it is indeed possible to interpret the word “false” more in your direction, which is a factual statement – that prayer simply will not be helpful. But the intention is: it will not be helpful because the Sages understood theologically that God may not want to intervene or does not want to be approached to intervene in nature in such a case. But certainly “false” should not be interpreted as if God, in general, cannot intervene, since we have already assumed that the One who created the laws of nature is also capable of changing them.
Once this assumption is accepted, the other problems are no longer essential. The Sages do indeed prohibit praying for a miracle, and you are right that the deterministic reality of the laws of nature makes any intervention in nature a miracle by definition. However, since God has the ability to perform miracles and intervene in deterministic reality, the central issue is to define when He will do this and when He will not, and this is exactly what the Sages did: they set halachic limits or offered theological insights for when prayer can have an effect, because He may intervene and save. In the matter of 40 days after the birth of a child – this is a limit at which, according to the Sages, there is room for prayer, and after which there is no more.
To explain the difference between before and after 40 days, one can use the concept you brought up in the laws of Shabbat regarding “pseudo-ontic doubt.”
It is said in your lessons on Shabbat law that, supposedly, even on a bench, as in a fly box, the chances of a scratch can be statistically calculated, and why divide them into ontic doubt versus epistemic doubt? Except that, in relation to a scratch, to the layman, due to the complex statistical calculations, it looks as if there is a doubt, and therefore, halachically, it is considered a “doubt in reality,” and by your definition, a “pseudo-ontic doubt.”
Similarly, it is said here that 40 days before the fertilization of a child (and in our scientific knowledge: the moment of fertilization), this is a situation that can supposedly only be seen realistically in complex statistical calculations – and therefore it is a “pseudo-ontic doubt” that allows for prayer.
I mean, the matter of when one can pray is a halakhic boundary determined by the person (God can change nature in any case), and this boundary is determined by his ability to diagnose situations of “gap” and doubt from his perspective. And since from the perspective of the person, he lacks the ability for statistical calculations, there are still “a few possibilities” here – he is allowed to pray. Even though it is essentially a miracle (which God can do).
After 40 days, the situation is perceived as certain, and therefore it is forbidden to pray.
Indeed, as you wrote, the difference between 40 days before and after is not a matter of a hidden miracle versus an obvious miracle, because the sages did not have ultrasounds, and even after 40, in relation to the sensory possibility – in their time – the matter was still considered “hidden.”
But the boundary is not in sensory frustration, but rather deals with what we “see” at the level of intellectual knowledge we have accumulated, regarding the moment when it moves from a state of ontic doubt to pseudo-ontic doubt.
In the time of the sages, within the limitations of their knowledge: 40 days after birth, this is the time when we moved from a state of pseudo-ontic doubt, because it is “obvious” to us – according to scientific knowledge that there are several possibilities. To a state of ontic doubt – even in our human eyes, reality has already been determined.
And in our time, the same idea only with respect to the moment of fertilization.
An issue that perhaps needs to be resolved is why did the Sages define this as a prayer for a “miracle,” as opposed to the previous 40 days, which is also a miracle?
This is a semantic question,
And perhaps, as it is written, the concept of “miracle” in relation to prayer does not refer to God Almighty and His abilities, because He can do everything, but rather to us, to define for us when it is perceived by us as humans as a change in nature, and this is in the reality of ontic doubt, after 40 days – and it is forbidden to pray. And before 40 days – it is permitted.
Conclusion: Every essential prayer is a prayer for a miracle. God can perform miracles. And He does perform them. Chazal taught us that He performs them or wants us to turn to Him to perform them in practice, only in our case – limited humans – the situation seems to be ambiguous (although it is not, because everything is deterministic). That is, God intervenes in the world, there is something to turn to Him for to change the deterministic reality, albeit with certain reservations.
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Well, I won't force you to read it 🙂
The goal wasn't to argue specifically against your position on the involvement,
but rather to respond to your 'group' in analyzing the issue in blessings, mainly.
Some of your arguments in it suddenly sounded to me solvable in the face of other ideas you've brought up elsewhere.
This is a summary of what I wrote:
1. What is the prohibition in praying 'falsely' about the past?
It doesn't seem to mean that God cannot change what happened.
Even according to your position, the one who created the rules can change them.
But apparently because the halakha has determined: if the thing has already happened (for example, the sex of the fetus after 40 days) - there is no point in asking for it.
This is a norm in the halakha of prayer.
Or even a factual-theological statement by Chazal about G-d: He would not want to intervene.
2. Explanation: “Pseudo-ontic doubt”
What remains to be explained is why they set such a limit of 40 days? (which they saw as the moment of sex determination).
So first of all, right! Since the world is deterministic, even 40 days before (or fertilization in our time) is technically a miracle.
But we said that G-d can perform miracles. And if He intervened in the world, then He will.
Chazal’s division refers to man:
Before 40 days/fertilization – from the perspective of man, this still seems like a “pseudo-ontic doubt” (because it is difficult to do statistical calculations) – therefore, it is permissible to pray.
After 40 days – the reality has already been determined from his perspective, and therefore it is a vain prayer.
4. In our time
Today too it is the same idea, only that the limit depends on our knowledge (today: from the moment of fertilization).
That is: the test is what seems to us as humans “open” or “closed”, not what God can or cannot do. Because He can always do. Even miracles.
5. Conclusion
Every prayer is essentially a request for a miracle.
The sages teach us that God is willing for us to ask Him for this only in situations of “ambiguity” from our perspective, not when it is already clear to us that reality has been determined.
As mentioned, the fact that he can intervene is clear. We are talking about the halakhic prohibition of asking him to intervene. You are mixing them up again.
As for your argument, you are essentially repeating what I said and saying that indeed everything is fixed but suggesting that in a pseudo-ontic doubt, even though in practice it is really fixed, it is still permissible to ask God to intervene. In other words, you are suggesting that if people (mistakenly) think that this is an open situation, then there is no prohibition to ask.
A few comments, the last of which is the most important:
A. I commented that even if it is already fixed, there is no obstacle to asking God to perform sex change surgery in the womb now, or to revive my family members from the cremation and kill others in their place. There is no problem at all here, not even a pseudo-one.
B. In our current situation, where early pregnancy is no longer a pseudo-ontic doubt, the halakhic law is changing. Perhaps it is permissible to ask God that when I drag a bench over not very flat ground, a crack will not form. And after all this, whether it is permissible or forbidden to ask, I highly doubt that you will be granted an answer.
C. The point is that your starting point is that the issue must be reconciled with reality, even if only narrowly. But this stems from the fact that you apparently assume that the sages were aware of this and therefore it is impossible for their words to contradict reality. But this assumption is not reasonable. The sages thought about science as they did in their time, and people back then thought that there were truly open situations (and not just pseudo-open ones). Therefore, there is no reason to interpret the sages as you say, but it is clear that in their opinion it is permissible to pray for a situation that is truly open. The innovation of transferring the permission to pseudo-open situations is probably not their original intention. So why adopt it? Just so that an incorrect halakha remains valid?! Therefore, in my opinion, this proposal does not make sense.
I agree with what you wrote J.
This is definitely the issue that felt open to me.
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