prophecy

Where is the toss?

Doesn't the rabbi mind being called an Epicurean because of his words here?!?
Of course, if God is above time, this solves the problem. In other words, the answer says that indeed the Almighty does not know before we chose, but knows after our choice. That is, on a logical level, choice precedes knowledge.
But on a chronological level, knowledge precedes choice. And this is the famous answer of the Tovit (I think).

And there is the well-known answer that we have no idea what it means to know God, so we cannot ask questions about a concept that we do not understand. We must always start by defining the concept and only then can we ask questions about it. But since the concept by its very nature is not defined, we cannot ask questions about it.

But for some reason the rabbi does not accept these answers. Such syndromes are characteristic of those with lust, not of married and adult rabbis.

To our injured rabbi.
First, I suggest to those who fear the dangers of enlightenment not to enter here.
The solution that God is above time does not solve the problem in any way. This is a fatomi mille in a nutshell. It
At most answers the question of how God obtains the information about the future choice, but the question of knowledge and choice is the opposite: assuming that He obtained the information, how is it possible for us to have free choice.
Things are clarified in the books on the science of freedom, and you can see briefly here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%A8%D7%91/
The solution that God's knowledge is incomprehensible to us also does not solve the problem. When I say that God knows, I mean the term knows as I use it. If I don't understand the term, I won't use it. Therefore, when you say that God knows, it means that He knows in the sense accepted by us. And if you mean some different knowledge, then He does not have knowledge in our sense, and once again we have repeated that it is not possible to have foreknowledge of an event of My choosing.

I don't know if I am married (or married?), and I do know that I am quite old. But what can I do, I really don't get the answers. Maybe this is a characteristic of those who are lustful, and maybe I really am lustful. But even if you tell me that I am lustful, it doesn't answer my arguments. On the contrary, you have proven to me that I am just lustful by explaining to me where I am wrong.

Regarding the question of whether I will read Epicorus, that is the last thing that bothers me. See here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%90%D7%95-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%90%D7%A0%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A1/

Y,
Yevamot n עבר, d”h ‘tדע’.

Wikipedia states: ”Regarding prophecy, Leibowitz argued that if prophecies were to determine what will happen in the future in a factual manner, – they would be devoid of religious value, just as all history is devoid of value. In his opinion, prophecies are not promises but demands presented to man regarding the future, even though they are supposed to be in the style of a description of what is to come. Following the article in the Tosafot: “The prophet does not prophesy except what should be if he were not a sinner”, Leibowitz will say that “No prophet prophesies except what should be”. Therefore, according to him, even if certain prophecies in the Bible did not come true, this does not mean that the prophets of the Bible were not true prophets”.

Are his words identical to the words of the Tosafot, or is there a certain change here?

There is much more here than a certain change. Leibowitz, as usual, uses the sources for illustration only. He does not intend to rely on Thos. Thos says that the prophecies are not promises but assessments, and Leibowitz says that they are just a whip to promote values.

Are you still answering questions here?
Regarding the matter of – I think there is a misunderstanding of the Tosafot in Yevamot, and I assume that the other sources as well.
It is clear at least from the Tosafot that he intends to answer the question of “If he had not sinned, would the prophecy not have been fulfilled? Surely it cannot be?”
In other words, he has an assumption that it is clear without a doubt that prophecies are fulfilled.
And his answer is that this specific prophecy – is a prophecy about “what would have happened if he had not sinned” – but with certainty what would have happened that way. Not an “estimation” or something like that, but rather this is a special prophecy in which God tells in advance what will happen under a certain condition. (The prophet does not prophesy – referring to the specific prophet in the story, who is unnamed and the Gemara calls him “prophet” – not to every prophet and every prophecy. Of course, paraphrasing is just a dirty game.)

If so, I think Tosafot proves exactly the opposite.
It's really cool that Tosafot gets involved here with free will, but the assumption that is clear to Tosafot is that God knows what will happen and the prophecy must come true. It absolutely must. And if so, he has to sort it out with free will that would have supposedly caused the prophecy not to happen – then he gives a complicated answer, that this prophecy is special and it spoke of what would happen in the future if Hezekiah did not sin.
But it is clear to Tosafot beyond a shadow of a doubt that God knows what will happen – whether he will sin or not, and whether he will sin. But the prophecy itself – What he told the prophet – in this case was “if he does not sin”, but in the end he sinned and prayed and ”by chance” it turned out that the prophecy was fulfilled even though it did not speak about this case.

It is clear that Tosofot's answer is bad. But on the other hand, it is clear that Tosofot thought that God knows the future, and his prophecies always come true. He was unable to give a good answer to the contradiction, but he believed in both sides.

In any case, your answer is not clear – what are “evaluations”? After all, the amount of choices – not including the specific sin of Tosofot – that were made from that prophet to Josiah is enormous (who will marry whom, names, and countless other parameters that affect the future). Are you saying that God only knew all of this in his "hearing," but really, really well? And all the other prophecies that came true (according to the Bible)?

I disagree. First, the same argument can be made with respect to any prophecy about an event of one's own choosing. Therefore, even if Thos is specifically talking about this case, he should say the same thing with respect to any prophecy about an event of one's own choosing. Second, Thos's formulation seems to me more like the formulation of a blanket rule: "The prophet does not prophesy except what would have been if he had not sinned." He is talking about any prophecy about free will, and as mentioned, even if he does not, it is clear that he would have to say the same thing with respect to any such prophecy.
Therefore, from Thos it follows that God does not know the future that depends on choice.

It is impossible to conclude from this Tosafot that God does not know, but that He does not predict a person's chosen action without an implicit condition dependent on the future choice. Perhaps the one who claims that prophecy is made for the knowledge of *man* and cannot conflict with the choice, and hence the constraint of the Tosafot (and this is what is meant by the Maimonides' words that on the one hand answer X to the question of knowledge and choice, and answer Y to the question of choice and prophecy “and he will serve and he will see”).

But the things in themselves are of course true, regardless of the Tosafot.

It is not at all clear why this issue has aroused so much opposition here over the years. When in reality the debate is not about content. After all, whoever answers that his knowledge is above time or that his knowledge is not like our knowledge (whatever that means) agrees that he does not know *now* (a term that exists only within time) what *will* be, in the accepted meaning of the word “knowledge.” So what are they arguing about?

I never understood what Leibowitz found in this Tosafot. It is known and agreed upon by all that prophecies of evil can be nullified as a result of repentance. Only prophecies of good are permanent and only in them can true prophets be tested (there are almost explicit sources for this in the verses of Jeremiah 28:7-9, but there are also contradictions and slanders such as Jeremiah 18:7-10).
The Tosafot there, in general, says that that prophecy ‘Behold, a son shall be born to the house of David, whose name is Josiah, and he shall sacrifice upon you the priests of the high places’ is the type of prophecy that can be nullified, and the meaning is that the main point of the prophecy is not for the good of the people (but for the bad of the priests of the high places), and even if as a side effect there are benefits for a certain person (that Hezekiah will continue to live), this still does not establish the prophecy as a ’prophecy for good’ that cannot be nullified. Just as Jonah's prophecy about Nineveh, which was evil for sinners, was annulled because they repented. A fairly minor innovation of the Tosafot. And the entire innovation is only according to Dr. Akiva, but the Rabbis, on the contrary, have it been proven in the Gemara that this prophecy really could not be annulled even if he sinned. And did R. Akiva and the Rabbis have a dispute about great things about prophecies? No. They simply disagreed on this particular shade of prophecy (whether it is considered a prophecy of evil or a prophecy of good).

Incidentally, it should be learned that the prophet does not really see the future, but only what is likely to happen, from the fact that sometimes the prophet presents two options: do this and it will happen this way, do otherwise and it will be different. In other words, the future is not determined except by man, and it is also possible to prophesy about a future that will not happen at all. Jeremiah Chapter 38, 17-23 tells Zedekiah that if you surrender to the Chaldeans, it will be well with you and your soul will live, but if you refuse to go out, such and such will happen to you. This means that he cannot see the future itself, but only what will happen (and then, in the calculation, if Zedekiah currently has two options, that is, the ability to choose, then why would Nebuchadnezzar not have the ability to choose, and so how can one predict with certainty. Except that all prophecy is a high statistical probability and nothing more).