Question about a point in an interview

Hello,
I wanted to ask about a point that came up in an interview about the trilogy (Yair Sheleg), which was criticized and even clarified in the last column here on the site, but I would still like to ask a few questions about it:

1. In brief, the interview clarified that since we see a contradiction between morality (which is also included in the commandment “Do what is right and good – behave morally”) and halacha, the proper way is to interpret halacha in a way that is consistent with morality. And interpretations were even offered.
   In the clarification column, it was clarified that the interpretation (at least one) is not unfounded, it is not a halakhic ruling, but legitimate. More importantly, it was clarified that the interpretation is not biased, meaning that I do not interpret to reach a result, but a (legitimate) interpretation can be used.
   This is what I understood so far.

   There are a few points about this that I don’t understand:
   It is not clear to me the difference between interpreting in a biased manner, and using an interpretation for a purpose: if the assumption is that I can interpret myself (and not choose an interpretation from a closed and agreed-upon repository), then – if the interpretation is legitimate – I can use it in a biased manner (ostensibly) to resolve a contradiction, in fact from an outside perspective, there is no difference. The only difference is in the aspect of “and the Lord will see the heart” i.e. the degree of honesty of the interpreter (i.e. to what extent his interpretation was detached from the bias) but from a cold perspective the action is the same action. Contradiction – gives rise to a legitimate interpretation – and then using an interpretation to resolve a contradiction.
   If the problem was the lack of integrity in the interpretation, it can be said that the problem itself comes down to the “heart,” and if so, the answer is – trust me, I am not interpreting for the sake of the trend.
   But it seems that the problem is not the dishonesty of the commentator, but rather a fundamental problem of “there is no end to the matter” in that there is essentially no fixed Torah and even its serious (and light) words are subject to change.
   I saw in the comparison column that even Maimonides interpreted, and perhaps also in a sense that caused the interpretation to change the halakha. In fact, many of the excuses in Thos’ questions are also interpretations that cause a change in the halakha. But even if we do not accept the lack of comparison between us and them on the part of the great ones (and I completely accept this lack of comparison), then without a framework of the continuity of tradition that establishes boundaries in the questions “Who can change?” and “What can be changed?” there is seemingly no end to the matter.
   So my question (first…) is: Why is interpretation in the manner I mentioned not a biased interpretation, since the problem with biased interpretation is not dishonesty but a fundamental problem of “giving your words to the classes,” meaning for everyone to interpret and change?

2. Another question about the establishment of “and do what is right and good” as a “general” commandment to behave morally (which it was clarified was not Jewish at all but human). Who firmly established that this is the divine command in the Scriptures, that is, that it is a commandment of the Torah?
3. Even if we assume in question 2 that the Torah commands to behave in the manner of human morality (which changes over time? in place?… also points that bother us, but let’s leave them alone), why don’t we say, with great logic in my opinion, that in a conflict between a general mitzvah and a private mitzvah, the private mitzvah prevails. For example, if I were to tell my son to behave well at school (general) and I were to tell him not to lend the sharpener to a friend (private), would it be conceivable that if he sensed a contradiction (it is not good behavior not to lend the sharpener) he would interpret the private mitzvah (legitimately but for the purpose of resolving the contradiction) in a way that would allow him to eventually lend the sharpener? It is more logical to assume that the general command to behave well does not include an instruction to lend the sharpener (hidden in the private command)
   If so, the question is whether logic should resolve the contradiction in a way that subordinates the private imperative to the general.
4. Even if we assume question 3 (and say that the logic is to interpret the private command in a way that does not contradict the general command), I will still ask specifically about homosexuality (or a similar equivalent): Who determined what human morality says about homosexuality? After all, there is a difference in approaches between conservative and liberal thinkers about homosexuality when looking at the individual and society (and there is no room to elaborate here). Even if we say that the question of morality about the private homosexual is a question that can be answered separately, the question about society is much more complex, and the question of the morality of the attitude towards the individual must often be taken into account when looking at the general (for example: Is it moral for the state to give the poor all his needs?).
   And if so, my question is how do we know what the commandment of “and do what is right and good” includes (after considering the previous questions) regarding homosexuals?

Respectfully