Questions
K. Hello.
C. Address your questions to me.
I don’t know what book this is about, so it’s hard for me to answer general questions about it. I’ll briefly address your questions, as much as this platform allows. I’ll just say that these questions are addressed at length in my Quartet, Two Carts, etc., which was also published to a good extent, and also in my Emet and Unstable Books, published by Yedioth Books. And now to your questions.
1. We are supposed to seek justifications to the point where it seems obvious to us (evident). Although even if there is a feeling (intuition) that something is obvious, it does not exempt us from thinking about it and criticizing it. For example, if it makes no sense, then even though I have a feeling that it is obvious, I will conclude that it is an illusion. But if there is no problem with this assumption, then I adopt it until proven otherwise.
But adopting such an intuitive assumption is not an arbitrary act. It is the result of idient insight or a kind of intuitive recognition. Note that there is no other alternative, since any argument that would justify a claim is based on fundamental assumptions. In the end, you are forced to arrive at claims that you have no justification for in terms of more fundamental claims.
Suppose someone intuitively believes that there is a celestial teapot around Jupiter. I would discard this intuitive feeling, since I am unlikely to have any information about it and therefore it is clear to me that this feeling is an illusion. I have no way of connecting with what is happening around Jupiter.
Therefore, even if we point to a premise, this does not exempt us from justifying or preventing contradictions regarding it.
So too is the assumption that our senses are reliable. If their operation is truly based on the assumption that they accurately reflect reality, the question arises, since we have no way of knowing this. Therefore, this assumption requires substantiation. If we are talking about thinking, that is, processes that happen inside us, it cannot be coordinated with the outside world, unless I have some indication that this is what is happening (or that it is a divine action).
2-3. The question of how to perform the ididit vision is similar to the question of how to see with the eyes. We simply use some faculty that is ingrained in us, and that is it. There is no point in asking about it. Do you expect me to explain this vision to you in terms of the senses? It has no explanation in terms outside itself.
The question of how philosophers explain to themselves the foundation of their doctrine is an excellent question. That is something that should be asked of them. You yourself said that you did not find an answer to this in your searches, and for good reason. To the best of my knowledge, there is no answer. See a review of all the answers in Hugo Bergman’s book Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, Chapter 9, which remains in the Tza.
By the way, in the first book in the Talmudic Logic series, we developed a complete formal theory of non-deductive inferences. This is essentially the synthetic toolbox.
Whether the ideas/objects are conjugate or not is the debate between Plato and Aristotle. It doesn’t seem to me to be very important to discuss.
All the best.
S”D
Thank you very much,
As I understand it, you do end up accepting an initial axiom of something between – judgment or “idiotic insight” or “intuitive recognition” – without reason or reason, as a regression stop.
And only starting from that initial factor do you begin to check to what extent the concrete beliefs sound reasonable or “logical” to you. And this is according to the initial judgment for which or towards its content there is no further justification for you. For example, you will not ask why what seems reasonable and logical to us is indeed so. Because this is the initial factor and then otherwise we will again fall into regression.
This is an interesting claim because sometimes it can be seen and read as if the person is composed of a sequence or a list of axioms, as if the statement “that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts”. But on the other hand, by prioritizing the judgment to the rest of the list of axioms “that follows” you are able to develop a less fundamentalist approach and refer to the specific intuitive feeling and examine how plausible it seems to you. Then as a result you are allowed the freedom not to accept any axiom whatsoever but only if it seems to you.
1. So I wanted to ask, is this approach really the “necessary” philosophically or is it possible to think of the other approach that accepts the “list of axioms” and the feelings without any further reason. Because ultimately, as I understand it logically (?) it should not be fundamentally different from your initial factor. And this can fit and work much better with the approaches that do not accept the possibility that we have an ideational capacity.
Anyway, if I continue with your description, then you gave 3 examples and I would like to focus on the relationship between them.
First you gave the intuitive feeling that a celestial teapot exists, you chose to reject it because you do not believe that it is likely that we can be aware of something like that out there in space.
On the other hand, you gave the intuitive feeling that our sense of sight is reliable. And you did not write a justification for it even though earlier you did see a need to write that we need justification for sensations.
I assume that the justification you will give is that you will point out that there is a mechanism that allows us to see (let's say eyes + brain), but first of all it is clear that the average person or expert does not know enough to explain how this mechanism works on the physical level even before the psychophysical problem, and in particular that over the years there have been many approaches to how this mechanism works in general and in retrospect it is reasonable to assume that if these approaches are correct then our senses are not reliable at all… Furthermore, even if you claim that it is enough to point out the existence of the mechanism we will still never know if it is reliable at all, since we have never received feedback from outside the sensory system about the sensory system itself…
But we must say that the strongest evidence is only that it seems reasonable to us that our sense of sight is reliable and that is it. And if someone is looking for justification then it is enough at most to point out that there is some mechanism that justifies this.
But then, if a person “believes” Truly and sincerely, and has a clear axiomatic experience that a heavenly teapot exists. Just as his eyes are reliable. And this sounds so reasonable to him, then even if he does not know how to substantiate it, it seems to be enough. After all, it is no different in the end from the system of evidence. And if you argue that at the very least one should point to a mechanism (or something else) as justification.
2. We ask why? - One should point to a hypothetical mechanism for justification, if one cannot really prove it. Isn't this an assumption that is itself arbitrary? Moreover, every axiom starts from something understandable and has not been distilled into something more understandable to explain it.
3. We also ask that to the extent that we seek justification, then what is the relationship between seeking justification and creating justification. Because we can always convert “seeking justification” into creating an ad hoc mechanism that will sort it out. For example, just as for the perception of sight we assume that there is a mechanism of eye + brain, so we can create the idea of heavenly tea + spectator ideas as a justification for its existence (Rabbi Michael's approach). Or something like a kind of teapot force as a paraphrase of the force invented by Newton following the fallen apple. Or aliens as a paraphrase of believers in God. Or we can construct the “unknown” entity (as opposed to Hosea who mentioned La Rucha) in which lies the “true and ultimate justification” whatever it may be, and this is in other words like simply not going into this issue because we have no need for it.
And so if each of these possibilities is coherent enough to save our belief in the heavenly teapot, or if we even need to point to any mechanism (as question 2).
After clarifying the three points’ In my opinion, I can turn to and address the third argument you mentioned regarding the coordination of our thinking with the world (is it even justified, if so is it enough to point to a possible mechanism, or is it even possible).
Just in a side note to conclude this part, I will add that I think the argument of a heavenly teapot is not a good example at all because it simply does not seem to us a priori as a reasonable axiom, but if you really experienced it as a real axiom “with all your soul” then you would indeed seek justification for it and already find something coherent for it. Just as if you encountered an alternative healer by birds, you would not reject it just because you are a rationalist but rather accept it because you are open and rational. If necessary, you would add healing powers and create a bird healing power and if a graviton or cypherton is also needed to carry this alternative power, and if this is indeed necessary for your theory, then you would produce one of these.
I think it is better for now to focus on these questions, as you suggested, so that I can understand the relationship between skepticism and justification and when it is possible to stop the search for another explanation. And only then to examine the option of a world of ideas if it is even necessary to posit such a world.
It is only important for me to add that to the best of my knowledge (and Wikipedia's knowledge) the division between Aristotle and Plato is not whether the ideas are coupled to the material world or not, but whether they exist at all... and that all modern empiricism was built on the basis of Aristotle, even though he was not one. A slightly subtle point… and I also wanted to mention that for you, the discovery of the world of ideas was something sensational and the fact that you wrote a whole quartet about it only strengthens my claim that at most we need only create a mechanism for justification as in question 2…
Anyway, thank you very much for the detailed answer and patience, I appreciate it, sorry for the length, I simply understood almost nothing about the beginning.
Regards
Hello.
I didn't understand your opening discussion. As I explained, I test everything, including initial assumptions. But if I have an intuition about some claim that is not suspect, the assumption is that it is true. I explained that there is no other option, since every argument is based on basic assumptions. I didn't understand what alternative you want to test against my claim. Just accept things arbitrarily? Would you accept someone's intuition about how many rocks there are on the moon? He has no source for that, and there is no reason to trust such an arbitrary feeling.
The justification for trusting the eyes is not knowledge of the mechanism that operates in them, but trust in the one who created them. On the contrary, recognizing evolution as an arbitrary mechanism that built them should weaken our trust in them. The intuition that we should trust the eyes could not stand if we knew that they were created arbitrarily. This is because the probability that an arbitrary mechanism would be reliable is zero.
2. You need to point to a possibility that would justify your intuition. For example, the possibility that you passed by Jupiter without noticing, and then perhaps your intuition can be accepted. Without that, it is a mere illusion.
3. I have no problem with ad hoc justifications, when they establish a strong intuition of mine, and when they themselves are not refuted. See the commentators of the Mishnah in Avot “He judges all men fairly”, as well as in my article here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%93-%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%AA%D7%A2%D7%A8%D7%95-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D
The debate over whether ideas exist is the debate over whether they are associated with tangible objects. According to Aristotle, ideas are categories, that is, characteristics of objects in the world, and not entities that exist in themselves. According to Plato, there is redness and horseness, according to Aristotle, certain objects in our world have the properties of being red and being a horse.
Thanks, but I don't think I understood.
On the one hand, you seem to be saying that what seems logical to you, you will accept (at least as an assumption).
And what seems illogical to you – doesn't make any sense, seems suspicious, you don't accept and assume that it is probably an illusion.
Of these two things, it is likely that your criterion is simply what sounds reasonable and what doesn't. And this is a principle that it seems to me that everyone accepts because the idea of an intuition that sounds/seems reasonable to you and you can no longer justify it is therefore a basic premise for you.
Not because you feel something intuitive that you will immediately accept it. For example, many people feel a sense of fear at night but don't think it is reasonable, so they don't accept it.
But my problem is that I didn't understand, that afterwards, you do try to continue looking for justification for what seems reasonable. (Although you agree that what seems logical does not require additional justification, we cannot justify what seems reasonable to us, whether it is really reasonable… and at the beginning you write that you do agree that this is an initial stopping point.)
For example, regarding the sense of sight, it was reasonable according to the principle we found earlier, that because it seems to us that the sense is reliable, even though we cannot really justify it. So let's just assume that this is a basic premise and accept it. But on the other hand, here you turned to an external justification like God and added that if we assume that this is an evolutionary process, then it should actually be undermined (and you can add more to it).
But this is my original question, why do you add this part? Why is it not enough to say that this is a basic premise and that's it??
2+3. Even if we assume that this additional justification needs to be added,
Again, we ask, is this additional justification only within the framework of the essentials that we can posit that the basic premise is reliable. But anything logically valid can enter. Or do we need to be aware of that factor. (From your language in 2 ” the possibility that you passed by Jupiter without noticing” means that we don't need to be aware of it).
But if it is indeed just a logical possibility, then it sounds like this whole justification process is completely futile. After all, we can add an infinite number of possible justifications to each option, just as we can add countless possible interpretations to each option.
If only because of the demonstration from the theorem that our eyes are reliable because Descartes' demon actually loves us but deceives the rest. If so, it justifies our eyes, for example.
But it seems to me and I think to you too, a completely stupid game.
In any case, from your sentence
3. You wrote “I have no problem with ad hoc justifications, when they establish a strong intuition of mine, and when they themselves are not refuted”
You add that the justification should seem reasonable to you, but that was my criterion for accepting the premises. So why do we need to create a justification that appears to be not refuted instead of simply accepting the premise + the clear knowledge that for each such premise we can create countless excuses to substantiate it. Why then do we need to actually substantiate it?
Furthermore, your statement “when they themselves are not refuted” will be true in relation to your thinking and your level of familiarity with the world, before you thought or found justification at all. Therefore, if you assume, as you do, that a person needs to find justification, and after all, a baby does not have justification because he does not yet know what sounds to him to be refuted or what does not, then you will never be able to know whether your justification is refuted or not. Because it uses based on prior knowledge. But this knowledge, according to you, is not reliable, because it was not justified in the first place.
–
Aristotle is a new and interesting discussion, but I think it is better to save it for later.
I just didn't understand whether he thought these properties were objective or not. According to how you describe it, he thought a bit like Kant (categories in the world).
This is already ongoing and we are repeating ourselves.
I explained that in the sense of sight if the assumption is that it was created by chance there is no logic in believing it. Therefore it requires further justification.
In everything else I have lost you.
So let me finish.
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