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Questions about faith

שו”תCategory: faithQuestions about faith
asked 9 years ago

In honor of Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham, to all Rabbis,

My name is X, I studied in Seder yeshivot. Now I am more Reform than Traditional and certainly not Orthodox. I am an active member of the “Hamatarah Emet” Institute for Science and Consciousness, which studies spirituality with rational tools.

A few years ago I corresponded with you regarding the question of the historical truths of the Torah. It is not clear to me how one can be rationally Orthodox without historical agreement regarding the prophecy and miracles of the Exodus. I would like to respond to your words and add my own.

You previously wrote to me as follows and I will respond within the text:

“Once we have agreed that this is a probability, we can now discuss (and not calculate) how probable it is.”
To the best of my judgment, our tradition is more reasonable for several reasons:
1. On revelation at the principle level: Since there are good arguments in favor of the existence of God, it is likely that He will be revealed. Although it is not absolutely necessary, if a tradition reaches me that He has indeed been revealed, there is no reason to accept it. In this we deviate from Russell’s heavenly teapot argument (I explained this in my book “God Plays Dice”).

The philosophical God is a non-anthropomorphic God and there is no more reason for him to reveal himself to you than the God of the universe would reveal himself to you assuming that there is a God of the universe. In other words, there is no connection between the philosophical God and revelation. For example, Hume suggests (in “Dialogues on Natural Religion”) to liken God from the teleological proof to a womb or a nucleus and not to reason. One can find an infinite number of images, but there is no connection to revelation. God from the ontological is the height of perfection. Is anthropomorphism part of this? And we have already argued many times against this proof. Kant also speaks of a God who is “reason” that is not revealed in the imagination. It only enables the morality of the categorical imperative. Is the Torah the categorical imperative? Is Spinoza’s God nature – since when does nature reveal itself? What evidence is the rabbi talking about?

“2. On other revelations: We are certainly the first to speak of the revelation of one God to the masses. It is likely that the others drew from us and even expanded. Therefore, if we have to choose, then I think we have a significant advantage. The entire argument of miracles of a day that you present is based on the later replications, which were made to compete with our tradition and its inspiration, and therefore, in my opinion, is problematic.”

Why did they try to compete? Many of the miracles are reported by pagans whose religion is ancient from biblical times.

“3. Furthermore, I do not accept the exclusive claim, that is, that we are right and therefore others are wrong. For us, revelation has developed in a certain way, and this is the religion that binds us. Others have other traditions (Rashid Kook writes that it is certainly possible that even the miracles of Jesus occurred).”

Why does our revelation obligate us and the revelations of others obligate them? Maybe the opposite? Or maybe theirs obligate us too? So God actually doesn’t know how to decide? Or does he expect us to choose whether to be Jews or Muslims based on non-rational considerations?
By the way, the same question about the Sadducees. How do you know what God’s will is when it is known that the Sadducees held to a different halacha? Why believe that God has instructed us in clear halacha and then reject the Sadducees because we do not know what their halacha was? Maybe God really wants us not to know what the halacha was and to try to approach Him according to the spirit of the Torah? And where do we get it that we follow the majority of people in our generation, as Rabbi Kook suggests in his dear Adar? And is Rabbi Kook a psychologist of God? Where does this confidence come from?

“4. Our tradition does not look like folk folklore, because it is transmitted by people who were intellectuals and were very critical, and even allowed themselves to say things against the current and raise difficult questions, etc. Add the democracy of the tradition (everyone is called to engage in it and study it and express positions, and anyone, regardless of their origin, can assume the status of a wise person)”

But only the priests could pronounce halakha during the time of the Bible.

“None of this exists in other traditions. The prophets fought against the people and against the king and even suffered quite a bit from it. Furthermore, our tradition conveys to us a range of opinions, not just one position. If there was a desire to establish a fictitious thesis here, they would not have done so in such a pluralistic manner. The transmitters of the tradition gained nothing visible from its acceptance.”

Are the contributions and various portions of sacrifices given to the priests (and Levites), who were essentially the authority to control religious practices among the people, not material gain that could explain a personal interest in establishing or perverting religion? And does it matter if they have no centralized land and are scattered among the tribes? Does it really bother them?

“They did not live in particular wealth (although they probably had status in most cases).
5. Add to this the unique history and broad influence that Judaism has had on world culture, which in my opinion indicate that there is something special here.
6. Bottom line, I also don’t think that things are described as they are, meaning that at Mount Sinai we were given every section in a clear mishna. That’s ridiculous. But I do tend to think that there was a revelation and we were given some kind of kernel. The development that was done around it is a later product, and I have no problem with that. Whoever gave us the kernel had to take into account that things would undergo interpretation and development, and apparently did so.”

This is the most difficult question for me. I am willing to admit that there is a God who revealed himself to the prophets and told them that the people of Israel would be exiled and return to their land. For me, this is a prophecy that came true. But how can we know that it was not simply the prophet’s spiritual powers and that he did not invent everything else? How do I know that Moses, our Lord, who, let’s assume for the sake of discussion, really went up to Mount Sinai and all the people heard the Ten/Twelve Commandments, did not write everything from the musings of his heart? And that I know God as a person who cares at all whether his words will be kept? And that I have proof of God’s psychology so that I know that he did not abandon Moses a moment after standing on Mount Sinai? Or maybe he simply mistreated Egypt with the Ten Plagues (if they even existed and are not just legends built on the basis of natural disasters in Egypt). God is such an empirically unknown thing that I cannot base a theory on his will. I have never been his psychologist. Nor was Moses’ psychologist who could invent and write whatever he wanted. The people did not hear the words “so that the people may hear the words of your people and may believe in you forever.” This is only what Moses told us. Or maybe God did not say this? The question intensifies if we assume that the Torah was not written by Moses, but rather by generations after him, prophets and sages. Can they reflect the will of God, who peeked out of the hole a few times? Is it possible to know the will of God?

With great gratitude and appreciation,


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מיכי Staff answered 9 years ago
Hello. 1. You are actually making assumptions about the nature of God, and I don’t know what you are basing your argument on. What I wrote is that philosophically I came to the conclusion that there is a God, an intelligent being who created the world, without going into the nature of this being or any of its characteristics. Now a tradition comes to me that it was revealed as a personal being (in a certain sense), and I do not reject it out of hand. I add that it is natural that if there is a God who created the world, he would reveal himself to say what he wants from us. This is not an argument in favor of revelation if it had not occurred. But after a tradition comes to me about it, this argument reconciles it well. On the other hand, you claim that since God is not an intelligent being but a kind of object (where did you get it from?), and based on this unfounded assumption that it might be true, you decide to reject tradition. This is a strange claim to me. If there is a possibility that my philosophical conclusion will fit with tradition, why adopt an interpretation that contradicts it? For example, someone will come to you and tell you that he spoke about Jacob. You, who do not know Jacob, will tell me that there is no Jacob at all because Jacob is a stone that cannot speak, and this person (whom you also do not know) invented everything. 2. I know of no other reliable tradition about a mass divine revelation. And especially not one that cannot be adapted to the God we are talking about. 3. How do you know for sure that it is not? You are again making assumptions and validating by their force. I argue that if God revealed himself and told us something, then that is probably what he wants from us. And you argue against that that maybe he is working on us or is just confused. Maybe, but why assume that? A strange claim in my opinion. You repeatedly turn things around. You say “and it must be made difficult with difficulty” and I say at most “and it must be settled with difficulty”. A hypothesis is good for settling but not for attacking or undermining. The Sadducees claimed that there is no oral tradition, and the Pharisees claimed that there is. What was received is the tradition that exists, and it is the best I have. Maybe I am wrong, but I have no way of knowing this and I can only do my best. I suppose that God cannot demand of me demands that I cannot meet (to know what He really wants better than the tradition that came to me and was received). 4. Very weak arguments in my opinion. First, I don’t think that only priests made decisions during the time of the Bible. The Bible does not describe in detail the ruling of halakhic law at all. There is spiritual leadership. And this leadership included not only priests (there were also prophets, judges, and others). The authority to control religious practices is not an explanation for the collection of strange instructions that were formed in the halakhic law. Halakhic law as we know it today was formed in the Second Temple and after, and there were no priests or vested interests there. The Pharisees who formed it were people who were not rich at all and had no social status. Their status was a result of their wisdom. And in general, for the priests to scatter themselves and live at the expense of the kindness of others, I really don’t think it is the behavior of power seekers. 6. Excuse me, you repeatedly act as G-d’s psychologist, and then accuse everyone of being His psychologists. I did not base anything on His will. A tradition came to me and I explain it and adapt it to various hypotheses that I have. But you accept the same tradition and reject it and declare it false based on other hypotheses that you have. And are you a psychologist of Moses that you know is a forger? A man who seems trustworthy to people comes and tells them that he has a command from G-d that is backed up by mass revelation and guidance throughout history. For all of this, you decide that it is not appropriate for G-d (based on his psychology) and that Moses invented everything, and then claim that people who hold to tradition are speculative? I wonder! ———————————————————————————————————————- Asks: To the honorable Rabbi, peace and thank you for the answer. I will continue to ask and make it difficult to ascertain the truth as much as possible. A. Why is God philosophically intelligent? We can say that he is intelligent, but in a completely different way than human intelligence. So it is impossible to extrapolate from human psychological laws to those of God, even though both have intelligence. B. Where does the assumption “that it is natural that if there is a God who created the world, He would reveal Himself to say what He wants from us” come from? A linguistic analysis of your words says that God has a nature.. Who imposed it on God? Also the example with Jacob “Someone will come to you and tell you that he spoke about Jacob. You, who do not know Jacob, will tell me that Jacob is not Jacob at all because Jacob is a stone that cannot speak, and this person (whom you also do not know) invented everything.” assumes that I generally recognize the existence of humans with a certain nature. On the other hand, I have never known the nature of God. (But maybe these are just tongue-twisters and you did not mean it.) third. Why, for example, didn’t God reveal himself to the ant to tell it what he wanted from it? At least give it intelligence so it could investigate it on its own? Or to the monkey? Or to the stones? Is it really God’s nature to tell his creatures what he wanted from them? D. “What has been accepted is the tradition that exists, and it is the best that I have” (Toshefa). This is what has been accepted by the people. So what? Why is it the best that I have? Maybe the best that I have is to observe only what is clear according to both the Toshbach and the Toshefa, and the rest is “not to add to, not to subtract from.” And besides that, to observe the spirit of the Torah? Maybe that is the best that is rationally possible? Or to observe the commandments in such a way that one fulfills one’s obligation according to both the Sadducees and the Pharisees? Like tying threads to cover oneself, and wearing tefillin all day, and walking with a blue turban, and the like? Why is ignoring the Sadducees and following the Pharisees the best that is possible? Isn’t that what is comfortable for my friends. (By the way, in high school this is more or less what I did, and they thought I was crazy. It’s hard, but isn’t it the best “for” God’s sake?) the. You wrote: “And you are a psychologist of Moses, who you know is a forger? A man who seems trustworthy to people comes and tells them that he has a command from G-d that is backed up by mass revelation and guidance throughout history. For all of this, you decide that it is not appropriate for G-d (based on his psychology) and that Moses invented everything, and then you claim that people who hold to tradition are speculative? What the hell!” 1. Zarathustra also sounds very credible. Many New Agers today also sound very credible. In Eastern religions, there were also many founders of pagan religions who were credible. 2. The accompaniment throughout history – I agree that the history of the Jewish people is a strange phenomenon that apparently cannot be explained physically-psychologically-sociologically. Apparently some spiritual explanation is needed. But to jump from here to the fact that God wants us to keep the 313 commandments? This is an irrational leap. What is the proof for this? What does this history have to do with the prohibition of Satan? What does it have to do with “love your neighbor as yourself”? If I don’t know how to explain some physical phenomena that require “changing” the laws of physics, and the scientist who discovered these phenomena comes along and says that God caused them to appear and demands that we love each other because otherwise gravity will collapse, will we believe him? Then there would be “futuristic” prophets. I’m willing to accept that. But from here to the commandments – the road is long. With thanks and best regards, ———————————————————————————————————————- Rabbi: Now, five notebooks have been uploaded to my website in which I explain these things in more detail. You might want to check out the fifth notebook there. It is also written relatively briefly and does not address every detail, but it is certainly difficult to exhaust the matter here. A. When you see a complex entity, the accepted assumption is that it was made by an intelligent being. The details are in my notebooks. There is no such thing as intelligent in the human sense or in the non-human sense. I have not gone into the nature of its intelligence. I don’t know if you have read the notebooks, but I explain it there. on. The term “natural” is a colloquialism. Perhaps it would be more accurate to write “requested.” If God wants something from us, then it is only requested that He be honored and inform us of it. third. Because he doesn’t want anything from her. And the reason is that the ant has no choice, so what good would it do for him to inform her of his will if she anyway does what her nature makes her do. Imprinting her nature is the divine command to the ant. D. As mentioned, in my opinion, I have no better way to assess what God wants. Assuming that He gave the Torah, He had to take into account that we would do as it was interpreted. Regarding the Sadducees, I already wrote to you that they assume that there was no oral Torah and therefore they interpret it themselves. That sounds unlikely to me. the. 1. If all of this sounds credible to you, listen to them. They don’t sound credible to me, and by the way, it has nothing to do with belief in the Jewish God (I just don’t have any faith in New Age). 2. I didn’t jump. I brought this up as another supporting argument that joins the rest. You present it as if I said that Jewish history is a sufficient reason for religious commitment. It has nothing to do with loving your neighbor as yourself. This argument is brought up to show that there is something unique here, and it joins the claims about revelation and receiving the Torah and a special role. I learn you and loving your neighbor as yourself from the given Torah and not from our history. This is the mockery of my words. If any scientist sees anomalies that indicate a deep understanding, and this is joined by other indications, I will certainly seriously consider his words. ———————————————————————————————————————- Asks: The central clause is clause C. The rest are trivial and follow it. Experience also shows that God does not reveal himself to every object in the world to tell it its purpose, and the assumption that God is supposed to announce the purpose and that he has purposed something at all and that he thinks in terms of purpose is not a proven or implied assumption from the world. According to the teleological proof, there is also a trend in the creation of the world (and I am not arguing about the question of whether there are supernatural forces that intervened in evolution or in the history of the Jewish people), but there is no command, no “intention”, no “intention”. A robot also has a trend, but no intention, and it cannot express a command. The assumption that God has designated a purpose for man is baseless and deserves to be cut with Occam’s razor. The claim that he reveals the purpose is another claim without proof that does not meet the theological-rational-comparative question – why does God not reveal himself to every object in the world that he created and what has changed man? It seems illogical that if God wants to reveal to His creatures their destiny, He would reveal it only to the people or to humans. ———————————————————————————————————————- Rabbi: A robot has no intention and therefore really has no discretion and cannot do anything. A robot is not the cause of anything in the world, since everything it does is only because there is an intelligent being who created it (the programmer-engineer). The engineer is the one who created the things that the robot creates. The example you brought to contradict is in itself excellent evidence for my statement, that without an intelligent being in the beginning, complex things do not come into being. This is essentially the second law of thermodynamics. ———————————————————————————————————————- Asks: Thanks for the answers. You enlighten me. Interesting – how do you define free choice? Is it randomness versus determinism? In both cases, revelation would seemingly change nothing about your view. Because if we are deterministic, we are like the ant, and if we are random – then our response to revelation will also be random. I would say that precisely if we are deterministic, we can change following revelation in cause and effect relationships. Revelation is a cause for changing behavior just as thought changes behavior. But then we return to the question of why God did not reveal himself to the ants? Thanks again, ———————————————————————————————————————- Rabbi: I dedicated an entire book to free choice (in Israel it is called: The Sciences of Freedom). There I defined all these concepts very well. These are quite delicate issues and it is difficult to get into them here. For example, choice is not randomness and of course not determinism either. There I elaborate. I have already explained that he did reveal himself. He imprinted in them what he wants them to do. There is no point in commanding them if they have no control over what they do. Is there any point in commanding a stone? ———————————————————————————————————————- Asks: I will try to get the book in the UK. Regarding the Sadducees- You wrote: “As mentioned, in my opinion I have no better way to assess what G-d wants. Assuming that He gave the Torah, He had to take into account that we would do as it was interpreted. Regarding the Sadducees, I already wrote to you that they assume that there was no oral Torah and therefore they interpret it themselves. This sounds unlikely to me.” It seems that they had a Torah that was their own, but it was closer to the Toshbach than to the Pharisees. If you do what you interpret – then why do you limit yourself to the interpretations of the Sages? (And if “he had to take into account that we would do in it what was interpreted in it” maybe you will interpret it with your mind like the Karaites (who are neither Pharisees nor Sadducees?)) Why don’t we try to restore remnants of the Sadducee interpretation that they claim to have accepted in tradition. Tradition that is close to the text. For example, it is known that not all Sadducees fought on Shabbat with devotion. If it were open to anyone who wanted to interpret it however they saw fit – there would be no uniformity. As stated about tefillin all day long, tzitzits with a veil, tzitzits with a blue thread, etc. and we will try to build a Torah that is produced by the Pharisees and Sadducees together? On the contrary, if I understand correctly, most secular research claims that the Sadducees precede the Pharisees and the main claim is that they are the successors of the priesthood, that they were the moralists of the Torah, and the Pharisees constituted innovation and reform. With thanks, ———————————————————————————————————————- Rabbi: If they had a Torah that was verbally correct, then we are back to the question of why to act according to the methods accepted as halakha. And here I repeat that my assumption was that God Himself understands that we should act as we understand, and halakha is a mechanism that determines what we (as a collective) understand. The tzaddik method was rejected by halakha, and it no longer exists today. So, as far as I am concerned, the collective decided in a different direction. ———————————————————————————————————————- Asks: Ok. I agree and further study is required on my part. In any case, it seems to me, to the best of my understanding (and further study is still required), that the Torah as transmitted by the Sadducees is in the nature of a law from Moses at Sinai and not something that can be changed over time. Part of the Torah as transmitted by the Karaite, for example, claims to have “the burden of inheritance,” which is a tradition from Moses our Lord. In any case, I don’t understand why you assume the method of collective change (represented in Rabbi Kook’s precious Ader) as an attempt to “bridge” between Sadducean and Pharisaic halakha. Perhaps according to the Sadducees, the collective is not decisive? Even among the Sages, this method is only mentioned very late in Rabbi Kook’s work. And by the way, if your entire argument about the Oral Torah is because God needs to take into account that we interpret the Torah according to our own opinion, then why don’t we just be Karaites and that’s it? And if you are afraid that we won’t be able to interpret because of the multitude of interpretations, then commit yourself to the halakha of Moses of Sinai that you will regulate the interpretations (including the halakha of Moses of Sinai that must be heard by the sages), and this reinforces what I wrote that the root of the Second Temple sects was the halakha of Moses of Sinai and not a casual human interpretation. ———————————————————————————————————————- Rabbi: This halakha of Moses from Sinai did not reach me. Do you think I am supposed to decide on my own that the CBS was like this and then act in this way? That seems strange to me. When a tradition comes to me that attributes some halakha to Sinai, I adopt it as a working assumption. But I do not invent that any extinct approaches were halakha of Moses from Sinai and now act according to them. To the same extent, I could decide about any creature that has ever lived and say from them that it expresses some halakha of Moses from Sinai and I should act in this way. ———————————————————————————————————————- Asks: Regarding the question of whether God, who is the intelligence that created the world, has also been revealed – I will begin by examining your book “The Sciences of Freedom” by Ha-Ha. In the meantime- I hold human morality. (Utilitarianism. In short – from my experience with pleasure and suffering I experience the value in pleasure and the “negative value” in suffering, and I experience from pleasure and suffering that it is appropriate to increase pleasure and reduce suffering in the world. But I am not arguing about this right now because there are a thousand and one human moral systems.) Let’s say God assigned me a destiny and revealed it to me in the Jewish-Orthodox tradition. Why should I consider destiny? What moral value does it have? If my mother gave birth to me so that I would be a murderer, is it moral for me to be a murderer? If God had feelings, I would consider it appropriate to listen to him so that he would feel good. But this is about intelligence, with no connection to emotion. And furthermore, God who reveals man’s destiny – there is no reason for him to talk about reward and punishment. After all, this is an appeal to free choice. This seems to be an appeal to the deterministic component of man who reacts with fear of threat. Therefore, there is both a question about the Torah as a revelation of destiny to man and also an opening to the question – is the Torah a revelation of destiny or deterministic programming of the human mind – (And again we return to the question with the ant or perhaps we ask why God does not reveal himself to the lion and scare it emotionally so that it will not devour him because it is immoral, but man does. Is it God’s nature to reveal himself as He revealed Himself to man?) ———————————————————————————————————————- Rabbi: In my books on the science of freedom, I do not deal with the nature of God and revelation, but with free choice. Regardless of belief in God, I disagree with you about the identity of morality with utilitarianism. See my book The Science of Freedom for the discussion of Kant’s categorical imperative. Regarding the question of why one should consider one’s destiny. It is indeed a noble question, and I will try to demonstrate why it nevertheless seems unimportant to me. Take as an example a person who asks you the following question: I know that murder is bad, and yet why not do what is bad? The answer to this is that the concept of bad means that it is forbidden to do it. If you are asking this question, you probably did not really understand that this act is bad or did not understand what the concept of bad is at all. If there is someone who has no moral intuition at all (not that he just disagrees with you on certain moral questions), you will never be able to explain to him why he should be committed to morality. The commitment to morality is something that should be self-evident to those who understand it and are endowed with it. Anyone who does not (assuming there is such a person) is blind to it and you will never be able to explain it to him. People who lack moral sense (such as damage to the amygdala, or the loss of the ability to empathize) are usually considered a type of sick person. To the same extent that someone who does not understand that the destiny imposed on us by God is binding probably does not understand the concept of God or destiny or is not endowed with this religious intuition. I cannot explain these things to such a person. But my feeling is that as with morality, so here too, there are many who do understand all of this, but intellectually they ask themselves why should I uphold what I feel, and when they do not find an answer, they abandon this commitment. What I explain to them is that the fact that they have not found an answer is because there is no need for an answer. If it is clear to you that this is so, then it is so. This is a fundamental principle and there is no need to look for answers outside of him. Just as I cannot explain to a person who is born blind why I have faith in my sense of sight, and yet his questions will not arouse my doubt and undermine this faith. God did not create us for morality arbitrarily (as in the example of someone’s mother creating him to be a murderer). He told us that this is what is right for us and for the world. This is not an arbitrary decision but relevant information (after all, you yourself wrote that you accept that the halakhic path is correct, and our discussion is only about the contractual obligation towards it). Therefore, there is an obligation to do this, unlike the destiny that is arbitrarily imposed by the mother. She also does not know everything that God knows, and therefore there is no reason for me to trust her and do everything she imposes on me. Reward and punishment is like any educational process. You want children to do well, and yet you don’t leave everything up to them, but also use reward and punishment. Fear of a threat is not deterministic, but a weight that is added to judgment when making a decision. This is not a denial of freedom of choice. See my books above. ———————————————————————————————————————- Asks: A. I accept the idea that someone who understands what is bad cannot ask (logically) why it is appropriate not to do what is bad, including the long paragraph you wrote. Perhaps I didn’t get to the bottom of your idea of ​​”destiny.” on. You wrote “God did not create us for morality arbitrarily” – are you saying that the purpose is to be moral according to criteria that exist even without the purpose, or that the very divine purpose constitutes morality? (Forgive me for the autopomonian approach…) third. I did not claim that I accept the halakhic path as correct. I am investigating and seeking truth. In the meantime, without pretense that I know everything, I do not feel obligated to halakhic law at all. I prefaced by saying that I am quite reformist. I believe that the Torah was written by humans. Some with higher insight and some less, and some with “supernatural” powers. Theoretically, this does not contradict divine validity and does not require it, but I have no reason to believe that the Torah has divine validity. Sometimes, in moments of confusion or clarity, I feel that the word of God is heard in my soul from morality or mercy, and this sometimes also integrates with the instructions of the Torah, but I cannot explain it philosophically now (even to myself). And this is perhaps what is said in the Midrash, “The voice of God is with power” – according to the power of my understanding. D. I agreed that it is correct to say that intelligence created the world. But is this intelligence moral? “Who has directed the Spirit of the Lord, and who has instructed him in his counsel?” (Isaiah 41:13)? Is there a morality that directs divine intelligence? You have proven to me that there is intelligence, because the world is complex. But is intelligence moral? It has not been proven. the. If I judge God according to my human morality, I will condemn him immediately. Not for the Holocaust. For the fact that my ear is itching a little right now and I don’t like it, or because a mosquito bit my brother and it hurts. God created pain and suffering in the world and that condemns him according to human morality. He also did not create infinite happiness. That also condemns him. Or is he not omnipotent? But that is a different issue, which I am not sure is the direction you are referring to. ———————————————————————————————————————- Rabbi: on. For some reason, I accidentally entered the word “morality.” What I meant was “God did not create us for the sake of the law arbitrarily.” In other words, the imposition of a destiny is not just arbitrary, but rather a consequence of this being the right thing. Therefore, the example of a mother who imposes a destiny to be a murderer is irrelevant. And this does not depend on Euthyphro’s question of whether goodness is the result of God’s decision or vice versa. third. You wrote that it’s clear to you that this is the right thing to do. This is a quote from you, and this is what I wrote. D. Who claimed that this reason is moral? How did it get in here? You can read about that in the fourth notebook, but that’s not our discussion here. the. God did not create pain and suffering in the world, nor finite or infinite happiness. But as you wrote, this is a new and different discussion. It will be detailed in my book that I mentioned. ———————————————————————————————————————- Asks: (I haven’t read your words in the book about the categorical imperative. In my opinion, it makes sense, but it cannot be implemented purely rationally. The question is which rule am I raising for the judgment of reason. Perhaps “it is permissible to lie” is an unacceptable rule according to reason, but the rule “everyone whose name is so-and-so and who is now writing an email is permitted to lie.” is an acceptable rule.) ———————————————————————————————————————- Rabbi: So read there. I’m not talking about the content of the order but about its logic. The discussions you brought up are ancient and not important here and there is no reason to enter into them in our discussion. ———————————————————————————————————————- Asks: You wrote, “That is, the imposition of the designation is not just arbitrary, but because it is the right thing to do.” As you said – a person who does not know what evil is will not understand why it is worth avoiding. So I am trying to understand the use of the word “right”. Is it because God is the thing upon which everything is based, and there is no God but His intention (“Ana Nafis Kibbith Yahvet” “… Torah and Hodsha B’Rich He is one, He is one”) that He is the absolute truth, and therefore His intention is the absolute truth? I’m not even sure if I understood myself. Maybe because I still don’t have a sufficient understanding of the concept of commandment in the context of free choice. ———————————————————————————————————————- Rabbi: What I meant was that when God commands, people have a clear sense that they are obligated to obey and that it is the right thing to do. Similar to a moral command, once you understand that this is what He requires of you, you understand that it is also your duty (there is no room for further question: it is indeed good, and yet why do it?). And so now that I consider in my mind how to act, I choose to do what He commanded. The term “right” here is the same feeling that accompanies hearing the command from God. If you have such a feeling, you know it. If not, then it doesn’t. It’s a bit like hearing the voice of your parents. We have a feeling that it’s the right thing to do, and not just because of morality. But because they can’t do everything and don’t know everything, it’s clear that we won’t accept their words completely and will consider each time whether to carry them out. Not because the obligation doesn’t exist, but because the content of their commands isn’t always right (because they are human beings who can make mistakes). That doesn’t exist with him. ———————————————————————————————————————- Asks: You remind me of the awe of the sublime and the love of God at the beginning of Mesilat Yesharim (the five parts of the work). As if without understanding how, the divine speech evokes in us a multitude of images and colors. Even though God is so distant. Intelligence without emotion. I feel that He is cold. Everything is artificial. As if God could be measured in a physical laboratory. Do you have any idea how to emotionally assist me in the rift between these images? And I also have a fear that divine authority will oppose my human morality. I am currently studying Milgram’s experiments in social psychology. Perhaps the understanding that God is a “king” with authority and like a “parent” as described in the above-mentioned “Sayselat Yesharim” – that we fear and are ashamed of him and perhaps also love him – will actually overturn my human morality. In which I am certain from the experience of pleasure and suffering. My morality is from the “phenomenology of pleasure and suffering” I feel the “phenomenon of what should be increased” and the “phenomenon of what should be reduced” in pleasure and suffering. Humans do terrible things when they submit to authority. Even if they are certain of their values. ———————————————————————————————————————- Rabbi: I feel like we’re repeating ourselves. I’ll try to address your comments here and I suggest that if there’s nothing new, we end it here. I gave as an example the sense of morality (to which you are also obligated, as you write all the time, and here too). It is not an image, a feeling, or an experience, but an insight, that is, a binding perception. Just as someone who experiences the moral command understands that it is binding (and not just feels or imagines it). It is not just that he has a desire to fulfill it. It is not an emotion or an image, but an obligation. After all, with regard to morality, whoever does not fulfill it I judge and condemn, that is, it is not a question of responding to some desire or image. It is a binding claim, and it is based on the insight that accompanies the understanding of the moral command. When you understand that this is the command, it is clear to you that it must be obeyed and fulfilled, and whoever does not do so is wrong. From here I tried to demonstrate my relationship to the religious command. There too, it is not about an image or emotion but rather an insight that accompanies the acceptance/understanding of the command. I explained that this insight is that such commands must be obeyed. And it doesn’t matter whether they are warm or alienating, whether I like them or not. Of course, if you don’t find this insight within yourself, that’s a different discussion. But if it exists within you and you are just wondering why it is binding, I tried to explain that you shouldn’t be afraid of it. It is binding because it is binding. There is no need for explanations of fundamental principles. Just as there is no need for an explanation of why morality is binding and why the appearance of the eyes reflects reality. We simply understand it and that’s enough. Therefore, I see no need for emotional assistance. If at all, then it is philosophical assistance (clarifying insights). As far as I understand, many people experience this insight, but because they feel it is unfounded, that is, a kind of illusion, they abandon their religious commitment. To these people, I say that seeking an explanation for why it is binding is a mistake, like a parallel search for the question of why morality is binding or why the eyes do indeed reliably reflect reality. This feeling, which is very widespread, thinks that even if we have such an insight, it is a non-binding illusion unless we have found an explanation for it, that is, we have based it on another principle. And what will we base the other principle on? In the end, we are always left standing on our basic insights, and by definition we will have no explanation for them. Does that mean that they are arbitrary? Absolutely not. It means that they are self-evident and do not require an explanation that would base them on other principles outside of them. First, on a factual level, I don’t see that religious faith and commitment trample on morality. Unfortunately, it doesn’t always improve it, but I don’t think religious people are less moral than others (and probably not more. Again, unfortunately). In any case, if your problem is that religious obligation will overturn morality as you wrote, it seems to me that the conclusion that follows from this is completely different. Commit, and when it is contrary to morality and you cannot find justification if you think that morality prevails over the religious command, then do not comply. What is the problem? Why does this fear lead you to abandon religious obligation? To the same extent that you fear the suppression of morality, do not be a Zionist (because that too may overturn morality), and do not walk the streets and do not go to work and do not be in the company of people (after all, you may hurt them). All of these activities endanger morality just as much as faith, and perhaps more so. Do you think the solution is to disable yourself from all human activity? I disagree with you. You need to do what you think is right, and at the same time, note that you still remain moral. That’s all. This reminds me that after Rabin’s assassination, many pointed out the dangers of religious belief. And I was always puzzled by this nonsense, and not because there is no danger in religious belief. Of course there is. There is danger in every belief. Only those who believe in nothing (not in God or in any other value) do not endanger anything (ideologically. Practically, this is the most dangerous type in my opinion). These critics actually expect that even though I believe in God and am committed to Him, I should stop it because it is dangerous. But if there is a God, then there is, and if there is not, then there is not. And if it is dangerous, then we must deal with and try to prevent the dangers. But throwing away faith because it is dangerous sounds absurd to me. This is of course contrary to pragmatist views, the true is not subject to the useful. The true must be decided on philosophical grounds, and the dangers must be tried to be overcome. The true and the useful are independent.

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