Questions about the cosmological view

I understand.
In fact, the cosmological argument implicitly assumes two additional things:
1) The accepted assumption is that every material thing has a cause. We learned this through experience (with pure reason in the context of physical causation).
2) Only material things exist in the universe.

As a result, we conclude that an object that does not have a cause is not material.
Since only material things exist in the universe, the universe as a whole (at the singular point) cannot be the first cause, since all its details are material, and there is nothing in the whole except what is in the particular.
Did I understand correctly?
If so, how do we have the assumption that non-material things do not exist in the universe? (Maybe so, and then they, or the universe as a whole, could be the first cause that does not have a cause outside of them, since it and they are not in our experience).

On the contrary, such things definitely exist. God, for example. I have already answered about the universe as a whole in the notebook and here as well.

So instead of “in our experience” we could say “material”.
Does all the argument prove is that the first cause is not material?

I would phrase it a little differently: it proves that there is a primary cause that is not material.

Indeed, that is the intention.
So as far as I understand it, it is not a personal entity.
Has this view alone removed Russell's claim about the heavenly teapot? Can we say that we expect revelation from someone when we do not know whether he is necessarily a personal entity? (And can he be revealed and commanded)?

Yes. Whether it is a personal entity or not – you cannot know. What does seem to be is that it is intelligent (since the world it created is intentional and special). Therefore, when a tradition arrives that this entity has been revealed (and is personal) there is no reason to accept it. And with that, the teapot argument is removed.

I would be happy if the Rabbi could define the difference between a personal entity and an entity that is not one.
I only now notice that between the two extremes: the mechanism of the law of force, etc., and a personal entity, there is a middle ground - an entity that is not personal (this requires explanation, especially in light of the fact that the slave is intelligent).

I'm not sure this is an average. The concept of a personal entity is indeed not well defined. Simply put, it refers to someone and not something. Physical force or a stone are entities that are not personal. But there is intelligence that looks like something personal (unless it is personification).
It is possible that personality includes, beyond intelligence, the ability to conduct relations and dialogue with other entities (for example, to want things from them, to love and be loved, etc.). But I don't know how to clearly distinguish between these two concepts (although I'm not sure they are the same). For example, a computer supposedly thinks, but it cannot be seen as a persona. The problem is that in my opinion it doesn't think either. See column 35.

There are actually three possible levels of the first cause in reality:
(1) a thing in our experience (2) an entity (3) a personal entity
The cosmological argument proves that the first cause is from (2) and above.
If the argument only proved that there is a first cause, and it is in our experience (1, and possibly above), would that also answer Russell's argument?
I just want to understand what exactly the point is that answers the argument.

And what if the argument proved that there is a second entity from the end? I don't understand the question. I explained what the argument proves, and it clearly neutralizes the teapot. What's the point of engaging in hypothetical questions about what would happen if the argument proved something that cannot be proven and that it does not prove?

Because it is not entirely clear to me how the fact that there is a first cause that is not material advances us (significantly) to the point that the jug argument is rejected. After all, we have only proven the existence of a first non-material being.
My question was that according to the same logic, even if the existence of a first material being were proven in some other way, Russell's argument would also seemingly be rejected, and such a thing is difficult to accept, since we have only proven the existence of a first cause.
So, in the Rabbi's opinion, the main thing that answers the argument is the conclusion that that cause is not material?

I can't understand what needs to be explained here.
Tradition claims that there is a God. It is common to think that there is a non-material being other than the world itself. Russell claims that this is like saying that there is a heavenly teapot, that is, an argument without any basis, an invention, and therefore must be rejected outright.
The physico-theological argument shows that there is a first cause and that it is the Creator. Beyond that, the argument shows that it is probably not material (since material beings have causes).
Therefore, now when someone comes and says that God (= a non-material first cause) was revealed to him, or simply that he exists, this should no longer be rejected outright on the strength of the teapot.
If the claim of tradition was about the existence of a material being, then it would be enough to prove that there is a first cause even if it is material.
We are grinding water.

I will try once more to explain my words (which seem to me to be a very serious challenge to the sequence leading to the witness argument) and if I fail, I will continue with the following question:
If we return to the heavenly teapot. Let's assume that the existence of teapots in the world was not known at all, and now the existence of a teapot on Earth has been proven. Does this advance me in any way towards trusting the testimony about a teapot in the sky? Of course not.
Although I have proven part of the way, but not the significant part, the existence of teapots on Earth does not justify trusting the testimony about their existence in the sky.
Similarly, in the case of Didan, the fact that the cosmological view does not speak of a personal entity greatly reduces the strength of the view in the context of “median to theism”.
After all, the Rabbi always uses the chain of punches:
There is a God - He probably wants something - it cannot be the moral - therefore I expect revelation.
But if God is not a personal entity, the chain (which is very strong in my opinion, by the way) is broken. There is no will for God at all, and there is no expectation of revelation from such a God (who cannot be revealed).
We have indeed proven the existence of an immaterial first cause and called it God, but as long as it is not personal (and has a will and the ability to be revealed), calling it ‘God’ is merely sharing the name, and to claim that it makes revelation more plausible to the point of rejecting the pitcher argument seems puzzling to me, now that the chain has been broken.

I will also try one last time because everything has already been explained to the hilt.
You repeatedly ignore the fact that the teapot argument is a fallacy. Therefore, my task is not to prove the existence of God but to neutralize the fallacy, and for that it is enough to show feasibility. The physico-theological argument not only shows feasibility but also proves the existence of an object that is a serious candidate for the traditional role of God.
And now for your example (I will not go into this here, which is not similar to what Didan is discussing). When I showed that there are teapots on Earth, I neutralized the fallacy about a heavenly teapot, because I showed feasibility. Although I did not prove that there are pots in heaven, but that is not the goal. In our context, I neutralize a fallacy and do not prove. And certainly it is true if I showed the existence of teapots at all, without showing whether they are in heaven or on earth. Then certainly the fallacy was neutralized. This is exactly the situation with respect to God. And that is enough.

Okay, now without regard to Russell.
So when we claim the chain that if God exists, He probably wants something, there is a kind of doubt here, doubt whether He can will (personally) and doubt whether He wants.
So where does the sentence come from: “If there is a God, He probably wants something”, supposedly the ’probably’ indicates that He is also a personal entity.
Otherwise why is it probably? Most options say that He does not want (is not personal, personal and does not want)
The rabbi thinks that it is more plausible to say that the entity is personal than not? Is it because it is intelligent? (Cannot conceive of a format for an intelligent object that is not material and not personal).
(By the way, supposedly according to the rabbi, Russell's argument does not begin because we know that there are jars on earth).

“Wants” is used here in a very general sense. It is not meant to work like ours. It is a claim that if someone creates something, they probably want something from it. A perfectly reasonable assumption regarding anything that exists.
A doubt like yours can be raised against any generalization in the world. For example, I saw several bodies with mass fall to the Earth and from there I generalize to all bodies. But now there is doubt whether I saw correctly, and even if so, perhaps it only applies to bodies in Israel, and even if so, perhaps it only applies to bodies of the type I saw. So one should not generalize from here to all bodies. Formalistic arguments of this kind are only confusing, and it is a shame to engage in them. This is common sense and not mathematics, just like science.

(Also about Russell – not true. If I had any doubts about the existence of jars at all, because the concept of jar includes a contradiction or just something unfamiliar or unlikely, then indeed the existence of jars on Earth would be relevant. But Russell is not wondering about the very existence of jars but about the existence of jars on Mars (the problem is how they got there and not that the concept of jar is problematic). Such a question has no relevance to the fact that there are jars here. This is one of the reasons why I wrote to you that your example is not similar and not relevant)

In general, this discussion feels unnecessary to me. You are using too formalistic thinking and ignoring common sense. You will not get anywhere with it. If you want to complicate a logical argument – it has no value, at least in such contexts.

“If someone creates something, they probably want something from it. A perfectly reasonable assumption for any being.”
Also for an impersonal being? (something and not someone).
How can you say “want” about something like a machine (an impersonal being)?

I'm still waiting for your definition of impersonal. It's about a person who did something complex, so it was probably done out of some plan. Is it impersonal? So please define the concept for me.

The rabbi is supposed to define the concept, I first encountered this concept in a notebook:
“This is actually what the cosmological argument teaches, that there is some object that is the primary source or cause of everything that exists here. Whether and to what extent this object is personal is another question”.
To my understanding, the ‘impersonal’ is a kind of machine (non-material), which is the first cause that created the world, without any real will of any kind.
If we return to archaic philosophy: the world came out of G-d without His intention and without His will and without His knowledge.

Incidentally, the rabbi mentioned that this entity is intelligent, because it created a sophisticated world.
Isn't this a mix-up with the physico-theological view? I'm only talking about the cosmological one.
The barrier of “an entity that can create a sophisticated world like ours” Also belongs to the cosmological view.

Hello Yair. I wrote that I am not going into the question of whether He is personal, and this is precisely because the definition of the matter is difficult. The cosmological evidence shows the existence of a source for reality. And the physicotheological evidence indicates that He is a planner and intelligent (personal?). There is no point in making a distinction between these two pieces of evidence. The distinction is merely didactic.

I understand, thank you.
Now I want to ask about the ’infinite regression’.
The parable of the &#8221turtles all the way down” in my opinion is very convincing. It is difficult to think of anyone who would (really!) accept such an answer, or would prefer it to an answer that gives ‘first turtle’, or solid ground.
But I have some intuition, which I have not yet been able to establish well, that gives the feeling that there is some fundamental difference between this story and an infinite chain of causes. Does the Rabbi think that the two cases are completely parallel?
I will try to explain the matter:
When asked: “What does the world the first turtle the second turtle, etc. stand for’…” We are sure that there must be some link that connects to a ”stable anchor”, so an infinite chain is not acceptable to us as an answer.
We can look at the matter this way: Let's take an infinite spiral of turtles, converging inward.
We can point to any given turtle and say: “It stands because it is connected to the turtle in front of it”, but the question that arises is: What holds up the entire structure of turtles?
Or: In fact, the parable of the turtles assumes that this chain never reaches stable ground, so we can also present
the turtle chain in the following way: It is an infinite chain, *equivalent* to some ground. Each turtle stands thanks to the link in front of it, but it is clear that such an infinite chain will fall all the way to the ground, since none of its links are connected to stable ground.
What is not true about infinite regression of causes: there is no “physical” necessity for there to be a first cause (at least not in a clear way, as in the parable of the turtles), the infinite chain of causes has no “where to fall” (if we ignore the problematic nature of concrete infinity).
I hope I explained it well, and that I am not talking nonsense.
In my opinion, if the rabbi does not see a difference between the two matters, and can explain it well, then most rabbis will not accept infinite regression (just as they do not accept the matter of the turtles).
PS: If the rabbi publishes the notebooks as a book (or even here on the site), I recommend writing at the beginning a recommendation for the reader to read the book more than once. From my experience, I see that when I read the notebooks I thought: “After reading I will probably be convinced and have a neat proof in hand, why faith is more rational than atheism”, and then when you read, there are a lot of new concepts that make you delay understanding what is written, and not see the overall picture, whether you agree with it or not. And when you finish reading, there is a feeling: “I read and was not convinced, so apparently there is no good proof”. Only on the second reading do I see that I actually do agree with the things (or most of them).

Hello.
Maybe I can't explain it better, but I think you explained it well. It's exactly the same as the turtles. What's the difference?
When you say that the entire chain of turtles has to fall somewhere, it's a double misunderstanding: 1. There is no such thing as the “entire chain of turtles”, since concrete infinity is a fiction. 2. And even if there is such a thing, it doesn't fall anywhere because there is no place outside of it (after all, it is infinite).

I am speaking on the assumption that there is a concrete infinity (I do not feel qualified to decide such mathematical matters), therefore only section 2 is relevant.
“There is no space outside it (after all, it is infinite)” – It is not clear to me why there is no space outside it. After all, the size of each turtle is, for example, half a meter. Below it is another turtle, but on its sides there is space. If we place the chain of turtles in a way that is parallel to the ground, at a height of ten meters from it, then on the side of the chain there is free space, through which it will fall.
And does the chain of turtles fill the entire universe? After all, infinity is only in length, but the width is the width of the turtle.

But this is a false assumption.
The fall is down and not sideways, so there is nowhere to fall (think of a one-dimensional space. After all, this is the correct metaphor for a chain of explanations. There is no other dimension in the space of explanations). You are taking the metaphor too literally.

Good.
What does the Rabbi think about the question of infinite regression, which cannot exist, because then we would not reach the present? (It would take an infinite amount of time for that).

What does the Rabbi think about the fact that it can be said that the Julian world is ancient.
And our entire universe (starting with the Big Bang) was created as a result of the “mining” of the quanta from the Julian matter.

Therefore, there is no need for an external creator, but the Julian matter is the creator and is ancient together with the laws of nature?

Y
This is also not a completely accurate way to present the difficulty (I think that is how the Duty of Hearts presents it in its chapter on uniqueness). It is not that we would not arrive, but such a chain has no beginning. There is no minyan to begin the process and therefore it is impossible to talk about arrival or non-arrival.

Kobi,
I wrote in the third notebook what I think about this. Ancient laws also need an explanation. The quantum theory that caused this formation needs an explanation (why it is the way it is). I explained there that unlike the principle of causality, the principle of sufficient reason also applies to ancient things. We took it from there.

Assuming that the Joule substance is not a sufficient reason for a creator. So is it really possible to hang the creation of the world without a creator?

Second, I did not understand what the law of conservation of entity you wrote is.

Third, it is not at all certain that quantum theory requires an explanation - after all, it is chaos. And perhaps a law of nature requires an explanation, the chaos that is embodied in quantum theory does not require an explanation.
So why hang it on the subject of Didan?

1. I didn't understand the first question.
2. The law of conservation of entity is a borrowed expression, and the meaning is that things are not created out of nothing even if all the charges are offset. The formation of opposite pairs (opposite charges, opposite masses, etc.) causes the conservation of charges (because the total mass is still 0 and so is the total charge), but it still contradicts common sense. Because something is created even though it did not exist before.
3. Quantum theory is not chaos. It is a well-defined theory that has predictions. It is not arbitrary chaotic formation and behavior that has no rules.

Regarding the principle of sufficient reason.
1) What is the source of this principle?
2) What is its meaning? How can something have a reason that is not chronologically prior to it?
3) The rabbi also wrote, “Suppose we are walking in the forest and discover a large glass ball with intricate and beautiful colorful paintings inside. We wonder who created this ball, and who brought it to this particular place? Would we accept the answer that it has always existed and is placed here? And suppose a voice comes out of the sky and tells us that this ball has indeed existed since time immemorial and has always been placed here? Is this a sufficient explanation? We still ask ourselves why there is such a ball here and not another? And why here? In other words, even though the ball is ancient, we would look for a reason for it.”
I really don’t understand. How can one ask about an ancient ball: “Why is it in the forest and specifically like this?” Or: What possible answer can be given to such a question? After all, no one brought him to the forest or created him! So there is no answer that can answer the question, and therefore the question is probably wrong and the principle of sufficient reason falls apart.

1) You must be a yeshivah in Becher, because you are looking for a source for a philosophical principle. Do you want a verse? Or the LBM?
Its source is the explanation. If you agree, the principle exists, and if not, then it doesn't.
2) I explained it there. There is no point in distinguishing between a reason and an existence. There needs to be an explanation of why reality is precisely this way and not another. Usually, explanations will contain beings who are responsible for this reality, but the reason is not existence. The existence may be the reason.
3) Not true. There must be a reason why this sphere is precisely here, at least if it is a special sphere. For example, the laws of nature, even if they are ancient, their uniqueness requires a reason. Why are they precisely this way and not others. The reason could be that God wants them to be this way, even if they have existed since time immemorial.

1) Indeed. But after a month of in-between times, no impression remained 🙂 . So the meaning of the word source was an experience or assumption of pure reason.
Can the Rabbi give some everyday examples of ”sufficient reasons” that are not reasons?
3) I don't understand what is meant by “God chose that the ancient laws be this way” He never chose that, at most He chose not to change the ancient laws at any time. After all, they are ancient(!).
Maybe everyday examples will help me understand.

How can there be examples from everyday life, if all the objects in our experience are not eternal and have a cause. This is an a priori explanation, that if you see a special set of laws, even if it is eternal, you still have to ask what is the reason for these and not others. By the way, as David Hume showed, the principle of causality is also not a result of experience and observation or from everyday life, but an a priori explanation. So if you accept it, there is no reason not to accept the principle of sufficient reason.

Regarding causality, the logic is clear to me, it is simple logic from experience that only because of philosophical skepticism does pure reason need. Regarding sufficient reason, I have no idea what the explanation is based on because there is not even a single example of such a thing. And the concept of “reason” for an eternal thing that was never created and determined is not clear enough.
I have been searching for reasons all my life, I have never searched for reasons.
Is there any other answer to the world's reason?
Is the only sufficient reason that exists in the world God towards the universe and its laws?
I really don't understand the comparison to good old causality.

Causality does not emerge from experience in any way. This is our a priori explanation. It has nothing to do with skepticism. The skeptic will say that because it does not emerge from experience, there is no such thing. But the fact that it does not emerge from experience is also agreed upon by those who are not skeptics (except that they accept causality from explanation even without an empirical source).

I gave you the example of the laws of nature. If you do not agree with the explanation – then no. No wonder you did not look for reasons, since the things in your experience do not distill reasons as I explained. There is no point in repeating this over and over again.

A child is born. I see that his cause is his mother and father, what a priori explanation is needed?

Another thing:
Why is this even called the “principle” of sufficient reason? After all, the Rabbi said that the only thing that needs to hold this principle is the universe as a whole and only if it is ancient, and the only sufficient reason that exists is God.
And the wording is: “For everything that exists, there must be a sufficient reason that explains it.” What is “everything”? What is the sufficient reason of the table in front of me?
Moreover, apparently the argument with the sufficient reason is this: There is an ancient world. There must be a reason for everything. We call the reason God. This seems to be the most extreme assumption sought (what is not true in causality, where it exists, exists in everything in the universe).

Y Hello.
You don't see any reason. You see correlations. A day has already insisted that it is impossible to see reasons. I have extended this in my books (Two Carts and Unstable Truth and the Sciences of Freedom) and I don't have the strength to repeat it again and again.

The only thing that raises the question of sufficient reason is a primordial thing. But reason can be for other things (where the reason is usually the reason, although not entirely. For example, when a person establishes a factory, then that person is the reason for the factory, but the reason is the product and the value that comes out of this factory).

The argument as you presented it does not have any of the requested assumptions. But I beg your pardon, this discussion has exhausted me to the core.