Questions after reading “True and Unstable”
Hello Rabbi,
I finished reading your book “True and Unstable” and was left with a number of questions. I would appreciate it if you could find the time to answer them for me 🙂
- In your explanation in Chapter 14, “The Synthetic Alternative,” about Euclidean geometry, you wrote that “How did we know that between two points in our real world only one straight line passes? How did we conclude that two parallel lines in our real world will never meet?” You then explained that the initial tendency is to say that we can perceive this through observation, and you refuted that as well.
I can understand why I really can’t say by observation that two parallel lines never meet (but my intuition is working here), but connecting 2 points by one line? That’s a final and real matter, I see with my own eyes that it’s the only line. - In Chapter 18, “The Philosophy of Intuition,” you wrote that “there are intuitions that seem very strong to us (trust in our eyes, the geometric axioms), less strong (the principle of causality, the law of gravity), and those that seem even less so (everyday generalizations – if a person tells me what time it is when I ask him, he is probably not lying).”
I would be happy if you could provide more examples of intuitions that seem to you to be strong at the same level as geometric axioms. - In Chapter 20, “Simple and Material” and its Derivations, you demonstrated the use of “simple and material” to obtain information about the world, and you always made it clear that given more data, the picture can change, and therefore the use of “simple and material” never gives me certainty, but it does provide a certain level of plausibility that allows me to continue to accumulate knowledge about the world. You repeat throughout the book that synthetic thinking probably starts from the premise that although things can be very plausible, we will always have to be prepared to receive new data that will change the picture.
More than that – it is necessary for things to be uncertain in order to allow me to gain more knowledge about the world.
As far as I understand, this is how you proved (in the first premise) the argument from revelation as a very plausible argument in synthetic thinking.
But I ask this – is it really appropriate to use synthetic thinking for everything? In contrast to the example you gave in “plain and simple,” the events and variables you talk about in relation to the revelation argument are almost completely irrefutable. What explanations can refute the theory of revelation? - More about the “obvious” conclusion – in the graph of F as a function of a, Newton’s second law is proven, and no matter how many more points we add to the world, the law will continue to “hold”. In such a situation, the analysts’ claim that it is possible to pass more lines between the points is true, but ridiculous in my humble opinion (precisely due to the plausibility and synthetic thinking).
But – on the issue of the tests (which you used to demonstrate the “easy and material”), the inference is much more tenuous. There really aren’t many “arrows” pointing in a certain direction. I would even say that it is so tenuous that one cannot really trust the information it teaches me about the world because it is so shaky.
I’m basically asking the same question again – is it really appropriate to use synthetic thinking for everything – only this time in the other direction.
What do you think? What am I missing? - In Chapter 24, “Pluralism, Skepticism, and the Postmodern Condition,” you explain in a simple way that if we can give many correct answers to the same moral question, then what meaning does ethics have at all? There must be some limit. I agree with you, but I encounter a problem that does not leave me, and I will try to explain it from two different directions:
- This intuition about the idea of morality will be the same for everyone in the high resolutions (not to murder), but in more specific matters it will already be a derivative of the place where we grew up (i.e. it is subjective and relative), for example – the issue of abortion. Ultimately, the ethical claims we will have (that we would like to say are valid and argue about) are a derivative of the place where we grew up, i.e. “social construction”. It turns out that only in the high resolutions is there room for synthetic thinking and moral discussions, but in the low resolutions the postmodern concept is perceived by me as the only one that can work.
- You explain that we cannot show that our measures of probability are reasonable, since even about these criteria themselves we can ask who said they were correct. This is precisely postmodern skepticism.
And yet, even though I want to say that my measures of reasonableness are reasonable and I have “reason” to trust them – we see that there is no end to things. The best example of this in my humble opinion is Aharon Barak’s constitutional revolution – what is “reasonable” for a certain group of people is clearly unreasonable for others and vice versa. The concept of “reasonableness” in the entire field of law has become indiscriminate – for everyone, something completely different is reasonable.
- More on the subject of postmodernism as a “social construct.” In your book “The First Place,” you explain in the fourth conversation that all philosophers (and in fact all of them) are “religious” in a certain sense because they have decided what they think before they even enter the discussion (and you explain and substantiate this, of course). So I also see it as a type of “social construct” – after all, people have different assumptions, what other explanation can I give for this other than social construct?
Thank you, Shahar.
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- I didn’t understand how it is possible to see that there is no other line. You can see what is there and not what is not there. This is clear to you from logic and not from observation.
- For example, what I see actually exists.
- For example, if I see additional traditions that turn out to be wrong.
- I didn’t understand.
- 1. Not true. Most things, even in high resolutions, are agreed upon. I also don’t agree that everything is a result of one’s place of birth and environment. This is an unfounded assumption and I don’t agree with it. 2. I didn’t understand. The fact that there are arguments doesn’t prove anything. Intuition may be wrong, and there is no argument about that. There are columns here on the site that discuss the question of whether it is possible to prove anything from the existence of a dispute.
- Different intuitions. Where does your assumption come from that we are all born the same and only the environment is different?
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1. I don't understand, quite the opposite. After all, if I only see what is, then it is clear that what I see is only from observation and not from logic. I no longer see a line – that is objective.
2. I meant theories.
3. Are there not in the Jewish people “customs of error” that originate, as they say, – from mistakes?
5.1. Do we all agree on the place of gender equality? On mixed marriages? On sexual permissiveness? On modesty? On an economic approach?
6. It can be found as a universal phenomenon that people who grew up in the same region tend to have the same “line of thought” in a wide range of areas. This is evident in votes for parliament, in religious lifestyles and in opinions on fundamental/“burning” issues (The refugee issue, separation of religion and state…)
I read your opinion against the claim of ”domination” in everything related to religious education and I tend to agree, but I still added it as a parameter here because it points to the same trend (just as you brought a lot of arguments in favor of revelation and explained that each one can be refuted separately but together they can constitute “strength”)
1. We have not seen is not evidence.
3. We need to discuss how reliable each tradition is. There is no overarching principle here. You asked how one can be empirical and I answered.
5.1 We agree on the majority, and what is not agreed upon is usually not related to morality but to halakha. For example, mixed marriage is not a moral value.
3. I asked about our tradition of revelation. I claimed that I don't really recognize the possible refutations of all the arguments you gave about it, and from that I asked whether it even belongs to call it “synthetic thinking” in the sense that I always have a “hand on the pulse” and am ready to change my mind when my theory is refuted (since in this case I claimed that I do not recognize any possible refutation).
You answered that if we find additional traditions that will be revealed as errors, and I think I did not understand your answer (or did you not understand my question?)
5.1 And I want to say that the assumption that the majority agrees on is an assumption that is not based. After all, if we go from topic to topic, we will find a lot of different opinions and sides, and sometimes there will be agreement in principle on the high resolution (again – not to murder).
But sexual permissiveness?? Economic approach? Modesty?
Even on specific issues like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (actually, in many conflicts throughout history), how can you say that there is agreement?
For many, mixed marriage is a supremely moral value and not at all related to Halacha. And perhaps you could also say that for many people, upholding Halacha is the moral thing to do.
You can certainly say that the vast majority of us are as tolerant as you describe, but do you agree?
This also connects to question 6 – There is a pretty solid connecting line between the different opinions and the places where people grew up/the education they received. What's more, you yourself say that ultimately our consciousness is limited and we must do everything we can *within our capabilities* in terms of ascertaining the truth. I don't understand how synthetic thinking is relevant to the low resolutions.
Sorry for the delay in responding, I couldn't answer until now. Thank you always for the response!
3. I argued that it is possible to refute the claim that traditions are reliable by examining different traditions.
3. But I was not referring to the refutation of traditions in general but to *the refutation of the specific tradition of revelation*
5.1. + 6. In case you didn't notice – I would be happy if you could answer these questions for me as well.
If you consciously decided not to – I would be happy to know at least why…
I noticed, and there is nothing to answer. You say that in the majority there is disagreement and I say that in the vast majority there is agreement. What do you want me to do now: a study that goes through all the values of the world and all the places?
Because I assume that you believe in what you write, and that my question has the power to somewhat undermine what you write – I would expect at least a partial response. After all, I gave a list of topics that I believe that if we delve even a little deeper into them, it seems difficult for us to form an agreement, even at high resolution. Maybe I'm wrong (the truth is that I would be very happy to find out) – But it seems to me worth a serious discussion.
I simply take the ideas you teach very seriously and therefore I also ask seriously the questions I have – Your ideas have the power to restore faith in the fact that there is a point in holding discussions on topics that we seem to disagree on because there really is a way to reach a more reasonable conclusion than another. I encounter difficulties on the way to this understanding that you are trying to promote – So I am surprised that in your answer you are actually saying the opposite right now…
I would be very happy to receive answers/have a discussion on the 2 remaining questions, I understand that you don't owe me anything but my heartfelt wish is that we can find more reasonable answers to the questions I raised.
Thank you and Happy Shabbat
Regarding what was mentioned at the beginning of the thread about two parallel lines. I didn't understand how intuition comes into play here. Isn't it necessary on a conceptual level that two parallel lines will never meet? You wrote in the book that it doesn't come from thinking because thinking can't teach about the world, but here we are talking about a conceptual definition.
How do you know it's conceptually necessary? Intuition.
Once the lines meet, they stop being parallel. Isn't that right?
And where do you get this from? Maybe they are parallel here and meet there.
So there they are not parallel.
Is this axiom supposed to rule out the possibility that the lines will ever cease to be parallel, or does it just say that as long as they are parallel they will not meet?
An axiom is neither a tautology nor a definition. It says that if two parallel lines are at a certain point, they will not meet anywhere else.
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