Questions following the discussion on Alma

Rabbi David Enoch, how does he explain that there are thinkers who saw an obligation to serve God for His sake?
Ostensibly, he should say that they were wrong. And perhaps they were theistically confused.
But on the other hand, if it appears in one of the objects, then it is evidence of the existence of God.

Another question is that if there are many people, naturally you are among them, who do not see any interest in some fact floating in the air that tells them not to harm other people. And do not see this as a source of authority. On the other hand, when they hear the name “God” then it constitutes for them some kind of better stopping point.
Doesn't this complicate his position?

I saw that you hadn't answered yet 🙂
So I thought I'd add a third question,
How, epistemically, according to him, are we aware of moral ideas, since from his perspective it's not a causal connection. I couldn't understand how he explains this.
This topic is tangential to the question of the epistemic coordination between man and the world, and here it's about a higher level between man and the metaphysical world.

A request for the planned article: Explain thoroughly the difference between Maran Shalit's position and Enoch's position. I watched the entire video and was unable to understand the difference (beyond the difference in terminology).

Attaching more requests
A. A question of clarification – Is attaching the validity of morality to God Almighty a direct intuition, or is the intuition only that there is a moral obligation, while attaching it to God Almighty is merely a theoretical theory (in a term that I know from you – ‘standing on the unknown’) in order to understand the meaning of the feeling.
B. A question regarding Nafka Mina – Would someone who attaches the validity of morality to God Almighty not feel any dissonance at all if in his opinion the Judge of all the earth commands him to do something immoral? That is, is a mitzvah that brings into conflict with morality, in terms of human feeling, exactly the same as a mitzvah that brings into conflict with another mitzvah (for example, do something that is reprehensible and do not do something). Hence – Can someone who feels such dissonance, that is, he still feels the moral obligation in all its force and has death in his heart, conclude that he probably does not attribute the validity of morality to God Almighty?
C. I heard the interesting discussion and there you used an example of a consequential categorical imperative (to pay taxes and enlist, not to pollute the environment, etc.). Is this example exactly (so it seems) or could you have just as easily used a simpler example such as not to hit without a good enough reason. [That is, – It seems to me that someone who assumes that there is an intelligent source for the validity of morality will certainly assume that the same intelligent factor will also demand the categorical imperative, because it leads to a morally desirable result, etc. It is difficult to think of what would cause an intelligent factor that demands the moral law not to demand a categorical imperative. Therefore, those who do not accept the categorical imperative apparently do not assume an intelligent agent that gives validity to the moral law. But those who do accept the categorical imperative – Do you think this particularly confirms the claim that they assume an intelligent agent, or is there no distinction between this and an immediate moral law such as not to hit without a sufficiently good reason? And those who manage to accept ‘not to hit’ without a legislator must apparently also accept a categorical imperative without a legislator. ].

K, I don't see why you need to explain other people's positions. Let them explain.
The same answer to your second question: People's positions shouldn't make his own position difficult. So they're wrong as far as he's concerned.

A. Simply put, this is a theory that is created after the intuition that there is a valid morality. But this is not accurate, because this theory itself is based on the intuition that without a legislator, the law has no validity.
B. I answered this in the discussion. From my point of view, a transcendent factor is needed for there to be a valid morality. If God is not moral in your opinion, the conclusion is that there is no valid morality. But my argument is only the hypothetical argument of if-then.
C. In my opinion, there is no difference and every moral value requires a transcendent factor that gives it validity. What I draw from Kant is not the content of the categorical imperative (do what you would like to be a general law) but only that morality is founded on a categorical imperative (i.e., a moral action is only an action that is done out of respect for a moral imperative, whatever it may be). I used the content of the categorical imperative regarding taxes and voting in elections only to make it difficult and to demonstrate why, in my opinion, the existence of an ethical fact is not enough to motivate people to action and/or create commitment.

B. I didn't understand. I'm asking whether you have a different feeling about conflicts within halakhic law than you do about conflicts between halakhic law and morality. It seems to me that no one feels problematic about wearing a shatnaz with a tzitzit, because God permits, then there is no prohibition against wearing a shatnaz. And so it should be with eating a forbidden food for the purpose of protecting one's life. But there is a problematic feeling about sacrificing someone as an oleh, even though if God permits, then the moral problem also disappears on its own, and this (in your opinion) is not really a conflict.
C. It is clear to me that in your opinion every moral validity requires God. What I still don't understand is why you used the relatively complicated example of taxes and not the normal example of beating.

B. Why wouldn't he feel dissonance? He would, and it is probably God's will that he feel it. The moral obligation is not nullified, but merely postponed (in the essential sense, not the formal "postponement" recognized in halacha, which also does not express dissonance). Even God Himself is, so to speak, in dissonance. But it is clear that the dissonance is not necessarily a hesitation about what to do, but merely an internal mental tension even if it is clear what to do.
C. Because in the example of beating, it is easy to understand that people will obey the command even without God. The example of a non-consequential obligation is much sharper in that there is no chance that they will obey it simply because there is such a fact.

B. You are not testifying to us that between fundamental law and morality, man is in conflict and it is not obvious what he will decide. That is, even if he is certain that this is the law. And why would he not apply rules of interpretation such as the Latin term you mention and I forgot its name, which rightly says to prefer the particular (i.e. the law, such as punishing Sabbath desecrators in front of witnesses and warning) so that it is not completely nullified.

Could you please explain to me more what you mean in parentheses, that deferred law (do not do what is reprehensible) is formal, while deferred morality is substantive? Let's say there is a dead person for whom it is obligatory to go and bury him and the person instead goes to wave a lulav, is he fulfilling a mitzvah and fulfilling his obligation or is it like waving a lulav on Hanukkah?

The simple truth is that it's all emotion.
Apparently the truth doesn't make a living.

It can certainly be used. I just noted that even in a place where there is no hesitation about what to do and the halakha is increasing (for example, in a situation that I called a substantial-structural conflict), there is still room for tension (dissonance). The rule is lex specialis.

You return to the practical hesitation, and that is precisely why I noted that tension exists even without it. This is of course not exactly like waving a lulav on Hanukkah (even if it is permitted), but let's assume for the sake of discussion that it does. When there is a mat mitzvah, I do not need to feel sorrow for missing a lulav. I did the will of my Creator and that is the essence of the mitzvot (they also have some spiritual consequences, but that is His interest and not mine. And maybe when I have to not fulfill it, then the consequences are achieved anyway. See my answer on citric acid on Passover). But in the moral case, at least when I hurt someone (in the categorical imperative there are also situations without problematic consequences but perhaps indirectly), there is definitely room to feel sorrow for what I was forced to do. And even in cases without results, there is a place for it (perhaps because of the indirect results, but I feel that maybe even without that).
By the way, everything I wrote here is a possibility. Some will also feel sorrow for the lulav, and I assume it is because of the spiritual results. Such an approach should certainly not be ruled out either.

Thank you. I think I understand, but I need to think about it some more.

[He who feels sorrow over the lulav should seemingly also groan with sadness all his days that he does not have the opportunity to recover losses (meaning that he does not have the opportunity to find losses that have already been lost) and how unfortunate is his fate that the house he bought already has a mezuzah and he did not get to put one up. Or is there a difference between a deferred positive mitzvah and a conditional mitzvah when the conditions are not in his hands?
(I remember that I think they quote from Reka regarding who if someone who transgresses Chazal and blows the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat is fulfilling a mitzvah from the Torah. We ask the Holy One what to do and He will of course say not to blow. This apparently means that there is no mitzvah to blow the shofar at all (as on Chanukah). If we say that the Holy One commands to blow the shofar, then it is clear that every person will go and blow the shofar and what does it matter to him and the Sages. Anyone who believes that there is something to such blowing (if someone transgresses and blows the shofar and on the same day the Sanhedrin annulled the decree, does he have to make amends again) perhaps takes a middle path and understands the commandments as natural forces and not as legal instructions, meaning that even if the forces are balanced to the right, there is still significance to the existence of a force to the right. This seems strange to me) ]

I saw the discussion with Enoch, and there are two comments:

A. As mentioned, Michai takes it in place of “a very thin God” because that name works for him, but as said, it is too easy in this case. Therefore, philosophically, Enoch's method is preferable to the method of “a God who does not oversee”

B. If we follow Michai's approach of “a very thin God”, the question of evil in the world is amplified a billion times towards that God. On the other hand, in the case of “a God who oversees” the question of evil is much smaller (everything is intentional).

I know Michai's words about “natural evil”, and they are really weak philosophically, so there is no point in referring to them.

Tirgitz,
Indeed, Rek”T in the report, as I think in the campaign for celebration (which the Maga disagrees with, although in my opinion not on this point).
Indeed, there is room for regret over losses that did not reach you, but there is also room for division. Here it did not reach you at all. But “sorrow for you and sorrow for me”, as the poet says, is not a matter for intellectual clarification. Everyone will decide what they are sorry for.
I agree with the analysis that sees the basis in the perception of the commandments as a type of reality and not just the fulfillment of the word of God.

Informaza, I understand that this is a collection of (unfounded) statements and not a question. I just didn't understand why you expect any kind of response if there is no question.

Mickey, regarding the question of evil that is getting stronger for those who support your method, this is what you wrote about natural evil:

“If you accept the assumption that God thought we needed a nature with strict laws, then the question arises whether there is a system of natural laws that would operate exactly like the laws of nature in our world, but without the bad effects (disasters, tsunamis, epidemics, etc.). If there is such a system of laws, then we can ask why God did not create a world with this system of laws. But it is possible that there is no such system at all and therefore He did not have the option to create a world without disasters and natural evil.”

How can a person who accepts the concept of God (perfect), allow himself to say:
“Therefore He did not have the option to create a world without natural disasters” ???

As a believer, I have no problem claiming that God sometimes chooses to let the laws of nature that He created do their thing, but this is not due to His limitations, but by choice, and for reasons that man/animal did evil and therefore deserves punishment (everything is measured).

You claim that the perfect God creates laws of nature that do so much evil, because He is unable to do otherwise. This is the best He can achieve.

In my humble opinion, you believe in a ”limited God” or in other words, you do not believe in God, but in a kind of alien. And excuses (unfounded of course) of “this is the best there is and therefore He is not limited” simply do not make sense to me. Forgive me.

And if we continue and insist, we will say that in your opinion, in addition to the fact that God is limited, it also turns out that He is not good –

He has the power to prevent a tsunami when such a bad thing is created by the strict laws (you yourself admit that he can intervene in nature), but he does not do so.
So not only does he create natural laws that sometimes create chaos that indicates an imperfect creator (tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc.), but those same laws also harm innocent people, and in addition he does not respond to the suffering it causes, even though he has the ability.

It turns out that you believe in an alien who is not good.
The ’ perfect and good is certainly not.

I apologize, but to me it is very simple – the negative of providence weakens any positive argument against G’.

I can't connect the sentence to the sentence here. It has nothing to do with my method regarding providence or lack of providence.
You are asking about my argument itself, but you clearly didn't read your question. I will briefly refrain and if nothing new comes of your question I will not answer any more.
A. The inability to do something hidden is not a disadvantage in any capacity. That is my argument itself.
B. His decision to let the world operate according to laws has its own reason, and it probably outweighs his desire to interfere with the laws and prevent evil.
That is my argument. What are you asking? What should be added beyond what I have already explained several times. Firmness is no substitute for substantive arguments.

A. An argument I don't accept, because we know there are perfect creators. So why isn't God a perfect creator?
B. The problem with this argument is that you are reinforcing the evil issue on D’.
The evil issue is much smaller for those who accept “active providence”.

A. How do you know that there are perfect creators (in the sense that their product has no flaws)? Can you also share this information with me?
B. Nice statement. But statements are a matter for an ad in a newspaper and not here. Maybe I'll start charging money for ads…