Rambam and Platonism

Regarding your first words, the ideas. After all, you claim in your articles that we are only making infinite progress towards the good measure, how can it be defined objectively. After all, it is only from our point of view and not in terms of truth, so this definition of correct behavior will always be subjective. And once again, why not simply say that values are relative?
Regarding the famous ones, I meant that the division as I understand the Rambam is dichotomous between concepts that can be clarified, such as physics and physics, and concepts that help us understand them, such as the commandments and morality.
But you also link here (if I understand correctly) the Rambam's intuition and claim that just as the Rambam decides on issues of the ancient world, which our intuitive mind tends to say that the world is renewed, so he also helps us decide on moral questions, but what about the shemita at Mount Sinai? I agree with everything you said about the analysis of intuition and that it should be subjected to criticism, but why associate it with any field?
Is all of this related to your perception of the commandments as law?

These intervals are difficult for me (I no longer remember the discussion).
Why not say that what we see is subjective and relative? Because we do. The same goes for moral values.

I didn't understand the second part. If you want to continue, please detail the claims that were made and what you want to comment on.

I will try to elaborate and ask in detail
1. Is it possible to deny the existence of the forms and entities of the ideas of morality alone and remain with the other forms only? (horseness, divinity, etc.)
2. Is it possible to give validity to a relativist idea, is it possible to argue that there is an idea that is entirely concerned with relativity alone?
3. What is your opinion about Maimonides? When he claims in eight chapters that there are commandments that are more understandable by reason and therefore the perfect person does not desire them, unlike the transgressions about which it is appropriate to say the words of Chazal in praise of those who have the inclination, seemingly all this contradicts the rule that there are well-known and well-informed commandments. From the second division of well-known and well-informed I understand that there is nothing that is not understandable by reason. The rational commandments belong to the intellectual part, where lust does not belong (although you mentioned several times that an infidel would be ideologically influenced to try and claim that there is no such thing, but this is a discussion at the level of claims and proofs) and the rational ones, which deal with the relationship between humans and society. This is how I understand the concept of rationality. According to this, a. It does not belong to say that there are true ideas and forms apart from the correct relativity and the correct action that must be done in each period, and apart from rationality (which, if I understand correctly, is the persistence of the Aristotelian soul). b. It is apparent that the words of the Maimonides in the eight chapters that I mentioned were hidden because it is better not to lust at all or that it is better to have lust in the right dosage, but it is clear that his excuse for the philosophers' question there does not work that way. All of these commandments should be of the same type.

1. Possible. And possible not.
2. I didn't understand. An idea that says everyone should do what they want? So what do you need an idea for? With friends like that, you don't need enemies.
3. I don't remember him saying that a person doesn't desire them. Adultery is a well-known prohibition for everyone and a person desires it. So is theft. If Maimonides says so, I'd be happy to quote it. It seems absurd to me.
I've already written that I don't think it's right to distinguish between famous and intelligent women from Shema'yot and Sha'lyot. Famous women are not Sha'lyot. They are understood after social consensus has been created (like not walking naked). And they certainly aren't Sha'lyot. Sha'lyot are commandments that are not social conventions but instructions from God, and they have a reason, but it's not so obvious to us. Beyond that, I also found an identity between moral and rational commandments. Morality is a subset of rationality. There are immoral assumptions through which various commandments can be explained.
After we clarify these questions, we can move on to a discussion of the ideas.

2. I meant that the idea itself changes all the time and is never fixed.
3. Regarding the words of Maimonides in 8 chapters, chapter 6, “And that the evils that are evil among the philosophers are those that they said that he who does not desire them is better off”; such as shedding blood, stealing, and plundering; and some of our sages called them “rational.” But the things that the sages said that the one who rules over his soul is better off and his reward is greater are the Shema commandments, and this is true because if it were not for the Torah, they would not be evil at all.”
From Maimonides’ dichotomous division at the beginning of the teaching on the sin of the first man and his words on the two tablets of the Covenant (the first two commandments are the rational ones and all the other commandments, like the rest of the Torah, belong to the professed ones), it follows that he adopts the division of professed and professed ones only. I understand that the famous ones bite in every part of the commandments are the rational ones, because now the conclusion is that they are social norms, for example, you shall not murder, to a certain extent. And in general, just as it is better not to desire to murder, as he wrote in 8 chapters. On the other hand, it is better not to cling to the other extreme of murderous non-violence, the Rambam outlines the middle path.
In other words, it is difficult to be convinced by the Rambam in chapter 6, who says that rationalities are not social quanta. Robbery, fraud, murder, and all the examples there are subject to different interpretations in each generation. You shall not murder is supposed to function as the best middle path with our murderous and non-murderous qualities. The Rambam emphasizes this in Moshe 3:34 and says that the Torah will fit the path of the majority. His intention is that most of the Torah commandments have a general middle path, but there will be details that will be corrected. In fact, I was convinced by some of those who claimed that the ideal person even abandons the middle path since emotions are irrational according to the teachings of Maimonides and Aristotle (according to the first chapter of Maimonides out of eight chapters, as well as Aristotle's words, I don't have a good quote right now, but I can get one) that the consideration that the ideal leader faces is solely a purely intellectual consideration (personally, I don't hold this opinion, I think that emotional reactions such as fight and flight, etc., as well as Freudian transference, can teach us many scientific and intellectual things, but the principle is correct in my opinion).
In short, I understand that morality is a subset of the famous ones.
I would love your response

2. The idea depends on the circumstances. Obviously.
3. I don't see the Rambam here saying that lust does not belong in intelligence. Where did you see that? I see no point in re-entering the discussion about the division between famous women and intelligent women. It has already been discussed in detail after the column that dealt with them.
This discussion jumps from place to place and I really don't understand where we are going and why.