Refutation according to Karl Popper
Hello,
According to Karl Popper, a theory is considered scientific only when it can be subjected to the test of refutation.
In one of the columns, you talked about “Platonic” scientific theories – scientific theories that do not discuss the physical world in and of themselves, but rather discuss an imaginary world in which there are no additional forces at work. You argued that in order to make predictions about the physical world, you need to combine several “Platonic” scientific theories.
My question is, are “Platonic” scientific theories considered scientific according to Popper? How can a “Platonic” scientific theory be refuted?
For example, gravity. Even if there are two objects that do not approach each other, it can still be argued that in a “platonic” way they are attracted to each other, but there is another force in the world (whether we know it or not) that pulls one of the objects in the other direction.
In a normal laboratory experiment. In any experiment on any theory, refutation can be postponed by adding ad hoc assumptions.
But sometimes ad hoc assumptions are correct. Before magnetism was known, the claim that an object does not fall to the ground because of an additional magnetic force acting on it was an ad hoc claim. Popper strives for certainty in his principle of falsification, but even the refutation ultimately comes from intuition about whether there is another ad hoc assumption that I do not know, or whether my theory is wrong. You have no sure tool to decide that. Of course, the more refutations there are that force us to invent ad hoc assumptions for them, the weaker the theory will be, but its refutation will always involve intuition. And if we use intuition when refuting, then why not use it for the proof, and claim that the intuition of the principle of induction is also correct. In other words, Popper did not really provide a solution to the problem of uncertainty - he replaced one uncertainty with another uncertainty.
Indeed true. No one talks about certainty in science. See the column I just posted (588) where I comment on that.
So, what value is there in Popper's falsification criterion?
If I understand you correctly, then the falsification principle should actually be formulated as follows: "A scientific theory is a theory that can be weakened, to the point where intuition sees it as falsified."
But the same criterion can also be formulated the other way around: "A scientific theory is a theory that can be confirmed, to the point where intuition sees it as proven."
No theory can really be proven or disproved due to the problem of induction and ad hoc assumptions: they can only be weakened and confirmed, and from there, falsification or correctness can be inferred.
So why is a scientific theory defined only by the ability to refute (weaken) it and not by the ability to prove (confirm) it? Both are processes that involve intuition, and both are uncertain.
What value is there in only addressing the refutation? Is there a theory that can be confirmed but not weakened?
Thanks 🙂
All these questions have been discussed exhaustively in the philosophy of science, and some of them were already addressed by Popper himself. It is indeed true that there is no way to prove or disprove a theory category. There are always possible ad hoc rescues. The theory is completely falsifiable. Ad hoc rescue is a modification of it. But these are gibberish. Science does not deal with certainty or the unprovable. Beyond that, science is not just observation but also other components of reason (rationalism).
Thomas Kuhn went further. In his opinion, this is a sociological process, not a philosophical one.
I agree that its physical realization can be refuted (if that is what you meant by pure theory), but this will not refute the "Platonic" theory(s) on which it is based.
If science is not about the falsifiable, then why do we continue to adopt Popper's definition as a criterion for what constitutes a scientific theory?
Is there a more precise definition for your understanding of what constitutes a scientific theory?
Almost no one today adopts Popper's definition. It is only a call for direction and a general framework for scientific discussion. There are no precise definitions and there can be none. That is precisely why we still speak Popper's language.
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