Refutation of the Physico-Theological Argument

In my opinion, the Rabbi is mixing up the various pieces of evidence.
After all, if we examine the cosmological and teleological evidence, we will discover that the entire teleological evidence only stands on the basis of the cosmological evidence. After all, if the world is its own cause, then the teleological evidence does not begin at all.
In any case, the correct understanding of the combination of these pieces of evidence. is that the power of the cosmological evidence is to discover that there is an entity Y that is its own cause and in a teleological way (deterministically, for example) led to the creation of the world.
While the physico-theological evidence is only powerful in characterizing the entity Y, i.e. whether it is an intelligent entity or not. Indeed, I agree that this argument is based on a probabilistic consideration that reveals to us what type of entity is most likely to have caused the world before us to be as it is, or in other words, what is Y?

Therefore, when we already know that there is an entity Y that is its own cause. Here and only here can the physico-theological evidence come in and tell us which characterization of entity Y as an entity that led to the existence of the world is the most reasonable.
I argue that the reasonable conclusion from the physico-theological evidence is an entity that acts in a forced and necessary way to create the world. Because only in this way can we arrive at the probability that given that Y exists –> the world will be created – is 1. If Y has free choice then we do not know what the chance is that he will indeed choose to create the world, since we are dealing with a free being!!!

Also, it is important to emphasize again that the fact that Y is a “complex” entity does not mean that it is not its own cause. Because the assumption of the cosmological evidence is only about objects in our experience, not about objects that are not in our experience. And I argue that perhaps Y is indeed “”complex”” but it is its own cause. And the assumption that it is complex comes directly from the physio-theological view. And I will refrain from reaching a regression of explanations. It seems to me that this is simple and understandable.

(P.S.
Therefore, if the Rabbi pays attention to some of the formulations of the physio-theological view, they presume that God is the most perfect and best being and that the best thing is, among other things, to create humans, and when there is no obstacle to the best being creating the best thing, the probability that it will choose to do so is 1. But the Rabbi did not mention all these frills.)

I don't accept any of the arguments here, and I've already explained why. You're essentially arguing that the alternative that the entity that created the world is its own cause but a deterministic mechanism. I don't see why that makes more sense (the argument that if it has a choice it can do other things too is just a fallacy. There could also be other deterministic entities that would create other worlds). If it's a deterministic mechanism, there's the principle of sufficient reason that wonders why it is precisely like that. Saying that it is its own cause is not an answer but a step back. On the other hand, if I don't argue anything about God and just say that he chose to create the world as it is, that's an explanation.

I think the Rabbi is wrong here.
Of course, in my opinion, I agree that it is possible that the teleological-involuntary entity could also create additional worlds. But there is a huge difference in this particular point between my claim and the assumption of a free-willed entity.
Whereas with a free-willed entity, I do not know what the chance is that it will choose to create a world like ours. (You claimed that) a deterministic entity that is planned to do so is certainly 1. (You claimed that Berry).
So it is true that it may create additional worlds in a forced manner, just as the free-willed entity might create them, but that no longer interests me. Because my probability is that given entity Y, what is the chance that it will create the event before us. And here it is significantly better.

Your claim that if it is a deterministic mechanism, there is the principle of sufficient reason that wonders why it specifically created such a world and not another, is also incorrect. Because I have already stated that the physico-theological argument is based on the cosmological assumption that we already know that there is an entity that is its own cause and is not the type of things in our experience.
*And only* after this understanding, the physico-theological argument comes to characterize this primary cause by statistical calculation. And as I have argued throughout my responses here, the claim that the primary entity is “deterministic” is statistically significantly superior.

Also, I did not understand the words of our Rabbi who wrote at the end of the response that while he does not claim anything about God and only says that he chose to create the world as it is – this is an explanation. (Compared to my assumption that it is not an explanation.)
A. Why is this an explanation and this is not an explanation. B. Why do you not claim anything about God if you assume that he acts in a voluntary way, then you are characterizing him.

As I explained, you cannot assume that the mechanism creates a certain world and then claim that the probability is high. It is like explaining a special result of a die by the existence of an invisible entity that creates exactly that result. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that the die is unfair. It is an ad hoc explanation, and it has no value.
In other words, I can also assume that this entity is free, but its values dictate precisely such a world (because this is the optimal world for its needs. Incidentally, many claim this), and again we have arrived at a probability no less high than yours. You are simply hiding the problem within your mechanism. Therefore, the claim about a deterministic entity is really not preferable in any respect.
On the contrary, I would also say from an explanation that an entity that is its own cause would not be deterministic (after all, even we, its simple creatures, have a choice, so our creator who gave it to us would not have a choice?!).

As I understand it, the physico-theological view does not need a cosmological one in any way.

True, I characterize it as a free entity (probably). But you dictate the whole thing: According to you, it is a mechanism that is deterministically forced to create a world like ours. A machine for producing a world like ours (only once, of course).

By the way, I'm not sure that if the entity is deterministic it makes any difference to us. Why does it matter?

I agree that I am supposedly hiding the probabilistic problem within the mechanism itself. However, I think that when you assume that an entity exists at will, you are talking about 2 probabilistic considerations:
1. What is the chance that such an entity does exist. 2. What is the chance that it will choose this.
On the other hand, when I talk about a deterministic mechanism, I am talking about only a single probabilistic consideration: 1. What is the chance that such a mechanism exists. The second part in my case is already included in the first. Therefore, my claim does have priority.

By the way, I do not understand how your dogma is different from the claim about God explaining the existence of the world in the same way that a special result in a die is explained by the “existence of an invisible entity that creates exactly this result.”….

Also,
You wrote that, in your understanding, the physico-theological evidence does not require the cosmological. But the rabbi mentioned many times that the division between the evidences is incorrect. (I think he even used the word didactic).
Because if we do not use the cosmological evidence and its ramifications from Leibniz, then the question of who created God will return even more forcefully, which in other words claims why not stop the regression on the world. So as long as the rabbi does not use the Big Bang as an escape (which is also scientifically incorrect - because even though they say that the world and time were created from quantum fields, they do not claim that these quantum fields were created!) he must arrive at a cosmological principle that will help him not stop at things of the type in our experience.

You wrote further that I characterize the entire mechanism and therefore my explanation is weaker. But I can also argue that in my opinion there is only a deterministic mechanism (to increase the statistics to create a world identical to ours and so on). But it is possible that He also creates other worlds and perhaps many times and so on. So that we will be equal in this part of the argument.

Regarding the last line, I completely disagree, it seems to me that the basis and foundation of the pillar of religion is the belief that the world was created *voluntarily* and could not have been created. As I think even Rabbi Kook mentions that the image of God in man is the choice and so on. Does your opinion mean that God does not have free choice?

You are again hiding the probabilistic problems within a mechanism and a vague definition. There is no difference between the possibilities. You divided the probability that there is a being and the probability that it will create such a world. This is an arbitrary division. In short, if you look at the entire process, it is the same. In other words: the probability of each stage changes, and now the probability of the first stage contains the probabilistic problems of both stages.

The connection to the cosmological view is incorrect. Who created God is not a relevant question because he is his own cause. Otherwise, we would be back to infinite regression. This is also stated in the physical-theological framework itself.

I do not know what the basis of religion is and where you derive it from. It is not clear to me the importance of him having a choice. Although, as I wrote, I tend to think that he does indeed have a choice from a consideration in reason.

I'm not sure that's true, but it's possible that in the absence of information about the statistical distribution, they can be treated as equals.

Here it's already a mistake. Because it's true that even within the framework of the physico-theological discussion there is a stage that stops regression called the cause itself. But the difference is that the rabbi didn't notice that from the physico-theological perspective there is no reason to stop the regression here except for God. And that's why in the notebooks and responses it seems that the rabbi always used the assumption why it's not reasonable to stop it for our world by the cosmological perspective that revealed to us that there is a primary cause different from the world and that the world was created, etc.

I don't remember using it in my notebooks, and I don't agree with it and don't see a need for it. I don't see how the cosmological view is superior to the physico-theological in this context.

I will copy your words,
“But again the answer here will be the same answer (i.e. as in the cosmological view). If we continue this further, we arrive at an infinite chain, or in fact at the conclusion that this information is ancient (eternal). It has been around since time immemorial. Where was it? After all, we have already seen that according to modern physics, our universe is not ancient. So where was this information? The place where it was would be called God. Who or what created it? Nobody.”
As can be seen in the paragraph here, the Rabbi uses the Big Bang as proof of faith. (Although it is not scientifically true, as I have already written, science does not mean that the quantum fields that caused the creation of the world were also created.)

We will continue with the next contradiction in paragraph 2:
” The assumption that complexity does not arise spontaneously, or that there is no ancient complexity, is true only for our universe and the beings within it that we have experience with. We should not apply this to other beings. On the contrary, there must be some for whom it is not applicable, otherwise we inevitably fall into infinite regress. Just as we saw in the parallel discussion in the notebook on the cosmological argument. Even the second law of thermodynamics, which is part of physics, is not applicable to beings that are not a part of physics, and the intuition underlying it is also not relevant to transcendental beings, and cannot be applicable to them (if we want to avoid infinite regress).”
Here the Rabbi contradicted what he mentions to the Hadiya in the first reply in our discussion now. As you wrote “The claim that a complex thing is distilled from a component is not related to our experience. It is a probabilistic consideration (of entropy).”

We will continue to see the use of the cosmological basis of evidence in the last paragraph – 3,
“This can be formulated more precisely: God has always existed and therefore the principle of causality does not require us to assume a prior cause for his complexity. There was no change in entropy over time. This complexity was always present”
Here the Rabbi is already using the assumption and conclusion of the cosmological view that the world has not always existed, and since God has always existed, the principle of causality can be stopped with him and in any case we have found a good place to stop the physico-theological view as well.

I am not using the Big Bang theory, but the fact that there was a Big Bang. No one is addressing the question of whether quantum fields were created or not, so I don't know where you get your physical claims from.

The claim that a complex thing was distilled from its components is a probabilistic claim, assuming that it was indeed created and is not its own cause. But at the end of the chain there must be an initial link that is not such, otherwise we are back to the problem of infinite regression.

This is not a conclusion of the cosmological view any more than of the physico-theological view. And you did not bring here a statement of mine that the physico-theological view is based on the cosmological one.

I think we are repeating ourselves. The positions have been clarified, and the voter will choose.

If the Rabbi agrees that from a scientific point of view the quantum fields were not created, then it is not clear how the Big Bang advances us in the question of breaking the regression. After all, the only thing the Big Bang shows is that there is a change in entropy over a defined time.

Here, this is not accurate, because there are two types of regression arrests. 1. Brute fact – as a vague initial source. 2. That there is a primary factor that is fundamentally different from the other factors so that it is not at all in the matter of the question.
The regression arrester of the cosmological view is found in 2. On the other hand, the regression arrester of the physico-theological view is under 1. In any case, there is no reason not to stop on the world.
The Rabbi wrote this explicitly at the beginning of the discussion:
” The claim that a complex thing is distilled from a component is not related to our experience. It is a probabilistic consideration (of entropy). The cosmological argument depends on the objects in our experience.”
In any case, there is no reason to stop at the world rather than at God. Unless, we know that the world is not its own cause (following the cosmological evidence) and therefore we have no choice but to stop at God.

That is true, indeed I did not make a direct statement that the physico-theological evidence is based on the cosmological one, only an allusion to it, but it was said in passing. And it was in line with what you said that the separation between the evidence is artificial and, I think, in the context of this question.

I don't agree with a single word, and everything has already been explained.