Regarding lesson 7 in Halacha and Morality
Peace to my dear Rabbi Michi.
I heard your seventh lesson ‘On Halacha and Morality’ on YouTube. (And maybe I’ll start with respect to Aksania and say that this series of lessons of yours is blessed and for me it is like water in a desolate desert. You wonderfully present all the methods with beautiful explanations and quite fluent words) and I wanted to get to one point.
That the Hazon Ish brought evidence from the new teachers in the town there, that the old teachers cannot say to the new ones, “You have decreed that I will live,” etc., and from there he brought evidence that halakha prevails over morality in every situation.
And you have reached the conclusion that it is not accurate because it is not exactly Halacha, but rather it is the opinion of the Sages… and the Sages did not speak about actual Halacha and morality in a way that conflicts…
So I wanted to comment that it is true that it is not Halacha and Musar, but it is the essence of Halacha and Musar.
What is the religious view that prevails over the moral view?
So a real religious imperative … isn’t that so?! (which surpasses moral reasoning)
After all, beliefs, as they belong to the contingent realm, are both legal and moral beliefs… and the commandment (ostensibly) does not belong there. But to a more objective place.
If so, it seems to me that according to the above explanation, the Hazon Ish was correct in his words (in the sense of: ‘in total two hundred mena’) on the macro side.
What does the rabbi say?
–
And DA – you explained your sixth method in Halacha and Musar there in a fantastic way, I must admit that my intuition and my hasbara are very connected to your method* (of course in the absence of your conclusion, that Musar is superior to Halacha [that the Rabbi proceeds from an unnecessary assumption that since both come from an objective source, it follows that they are equal… and it is not! For the A”D in their objective noumenal ideas there can be a division, and the ‘command’ is a higher level in the world of metaphysics {especially since the current morality is contingent, and it may be that moral data is missing from the equation}] And DA, to be clear, I am a very emotional person and try to be moral. And it pains me to say that Halacha is superior to Musar, but that is how I understand it from the sources at least.)
* And it’s nice that it’s conceptualized for me now. So my thanks go to you 🙂
For the teachers, this is a case of argument against argument, and the question is which argument is stronger. Apparently, for the Sages, the argument of competition in Torah study outweighs the argument of animal rulings of the old teachers. This has nothing to do with the question of whether or not halakha prevails over morality. Furthermore, the argument here is not an interpretive argument (which shapes existing halakha) but an argument that innovates new halakha. So it is just like the moral arguments.
And two, incidentally: 1. The commandment does not belong to an objective level, because even the commandments depend on the interpretation of the sages. 2. Morality has nothing to do with emotion.
Regarding the superiority of halakha over morality, since both are the will of God, both are equal until proven otherwise. I did not say that it is impossible for halakha to prevail, but I am arguing that if one claims that halakha prevails, one must provide evidence for this. Incidentally, the Talmud and the Poskim also see situations in which morality prevails.
What kind of evidence can be given for such a claim? Halachic. It seems from this that you mean that the Halachah is always the supreme decision, but without evidence, there is an assumption that the Halachah itself gives way in difficult cases. Or are you referring to evidence from the Bible (the words of God and prophecies) about the will of God as a whole, and if there is evidence from the Bible that Halachah takes precedence over morality (let's assume it is overwhelming), we will accept it?
First, if it is impossible to provide evidence for this, then it is self-evident that you are wrong. After all, the burden of proof is on you.
Secondly, the evidence from the statements of the jurists is in the form of “according to your opinion”. If the law prevails over morality and the jurists themselves say that morality sometimes prevails, then it does prevail (sometimes).
Incidentally, Rabbi Elyashiv's opinion was that where opening a classroom in a residential apartment causes a decrease in the value of the apartments, the apartment owners can prevent this even though it involves Torah study.
This has nothing to do with it. This is about causing a financial loss to my property, and in particular, it is not important that the loss be here and not somewhere else.
The first one is fine. The second one apparently doesn't fit the context. All I have to know is if there was an explicit prophecy that the halakha prevails, would that be evidence? Or is the maximum authority of revelation the halakha, and then the prophecy itself might be questioned as to whether it is the will of God that we will not actually obey.
Both are beautiful and good. If there was a prophecy in simple terms, yes. Although it must be discussed from a non-heavenly perspective.
It is not God's will that we not obey His words. Neither in law nor in prophecy.
As I looked again, I fell for two innovations that I didn't know existed. One is that the halakha has the authority to say that it is rejected from morality. This is not at all self-evident. Although the halakha can, within its own domain (the halakha), reach the same goal of rejection from morality by establishing appropriate laws, this is only a de facto realization of rejection and not rejection itself. It is possible. And the second innovation is that a case where the halakha itself within itself "considers morality" is an example of the halakha's rejection from morality.
I understand, thank you very much Rabbi.
By the way, Rabbi, I have a slight innovation to add. A consequence of your words, that in the halacha, which was given from Sinai, the moral consideration (of the interpretation) will not enter. Do I understand correctly? (And apparently, the fact that more things were given from Sinai and not just everything is the interpretation of the sages.. Chinese halacha is a reinforcement).
When there are two interpretive options for a certain law, there is no reason not to choose the one that is more in line with morality. Just as a time of need is a reason to follow the lenient view (or the lenient side), morality is also a reason to lenient.
There is an insight here that I find amazing 🙂
Perhaps the reason that instead of there being two options for halakhic interpretation.. a more moral one. and a less moral one. Choosing the one (the moral one), perhaps it is the evidence itself for your method 🙂
That morality has an objective value with God, so choosing this moral alternative is not a “calling for the scoundrels,” but rather the stricter halakhic option, since morality originates from God.. So there is a doubt here between consideration x1 and consideration: (morality)x2+y.. and it turns out that x2+y is more correct, towards the person who serves his Creator. (Because both x [halakhic] and y [morality] belong to the divine sphere).
I hope my meaning is clear. This is a charming innovation/explanation in my opinion for this phenomenon of ruling. (And it also quite validates your method from a ruling point of view, and not just intuitively)
The hour of stress is simply a practical consideration. It is not a consideration that helps to conclude that the truth is on a particular side, and especially if the gist of the law is as lenient. Instead of two options that are equivalent from an interpretative-halakhic point of view, considerations such as the ways of Noam can decide (as proof of the halakhic truth) apparently according to everyone. If the novelty here is that a ‘moral’ hour of stress is also (only) a practical consideration (and not a consideration that reveals truths), then it seems that there is no fundamental revelation of the halakhic here, but only a permit.
T, you are a real joy breaker, but you are absolutely right. Indeed, in my opinion, there is a complete separation between morality and law. The decision in favor of the moral option is not because this is the correct interpretation, but because there is permission and it is appropriate to act in this way in practice, such as in a time of need.
But still, this must be qualified. In Barach”sh Barish B”k (as I think on Karnei Barzel) he wrote in the name of the HaGar”h that when there is doubt in interpreting the Torah, one must certainly take the side of the homrah. And the explanation of the matter is that the Torah itself, when it wrote a doubtful text, understood that we would go to the homrah because of the doubt, and if that were not its intention, it would not have done so but rather clarified its intention. Therefore, it is clear that this was probably its intention in the first place. This is said only when the doubt is in the interpretation of a verse (and not when there is doubt about what to do in practice).
If so, according to this, it is possible that the ruling is the lowest in the matter under discussion. When there is doubt about the interpretation of the Torah in which one side is the more moral, it can be said that the Torah knew that we would decide this way and if it left it in doubt, it probably intended us to do so. If so, then the moral side is also the more correct interpretation.
I understand. Although even in a solid general like the Makshinan material, there are discussions about whether it is a certain or doubtful doctrine.
Haha, yes, I completely broke my fast. It's not bad, the seal of God is truth.
And by the way, I probably didn't give enough thought to the previous rabbi's answer. I asked if instead of exemplifying it from Sinai, since it is objective, it would exceed the (moral) interpretation just as it exceeds the (religious) interpretation.
Such a one is holy. Oh, and that's all.
The rabbi replied, "Where there are two possible interpretations, there is no reason not to choose the one that is in accordance with morality." I really liked the response, it got me out of my response above. (Which turned out to be unsuccessful in retrospect) But as I delve deeper into your response, I realize that I didn't understand the poet's true intention.. (On the matter I asked about, of course)
Is it possible to give interpretations of the law that we received from Sinai?
Exemption from payment of "in bundles", a classic example.
Is it because of some disagreement that it is immoral, (let's say we break an object worth a fortune and damage it) that we can give a moral interpretation that will obligate the owner of the ‘compelling’ cow? ?
In a logical interpretation, I understand the Rabbi's apparent words, but in the Sinaitic Kabbalah, I do not.
I'm not talking about games. If there is a reasonable interpretation and it is more moral, then yes.
‘Gamirinan Lia Masina’ This is from generation to generation, I don't know if it belongs to a better interpreter than the Masora in such a law
And I mean of course the exemption/payment for bundles is ‘half damage’. As is known from the issue in the book there..
By the way, regarding interpretive doubt, or deductive doubt, it is reasonable to discuss whether it is epistemic or ontic, but it seems more likely that it is ontic doubt (but I don't remember it being mentioned in the posts) and we are discussing doubt. Right? (I prefer to join in the celebrations instead of another activity)
Nothing passes from Sinai without interpretations. It is not a question of interpreting better or worse than the tradition. A tradition has come to us and we must interpret it.
Ontic or epistemic in this context means whether both interpretations are correct (in a weak way?) or only one is correct and we do not know which. But I do not see a difference here.
It depends on the answer to the question whether the interpretive ruling is the *cause* (reason), or whether it shows the reality that exists in the verses from time immemorial.. (sign), if the interpretive ruling is a reason, then it seems to me that there is truly an ontic doubt here. Whereas if it is a sign, it is an epistemic doubt..
That is how it seems to me. And from what I remember, the Rabbi's opinion is that there is interpretive freedom (accordingly) and therefore it is a reason.. and therefore it seems to me that according to him it will be an ‘ontic doubt’.. But the Rabbi will come and maybe he will pat me on the face 😉
Oh, excuse me, the rabbi responded without me even hearing.
I thought both interpretations were correct as you explained in both, and it is not decided which weight prevails. And this is a decision that, since it is not in heaven, then even heaven does not know. Is this called a vague one? Let it be vague. As for the question of whether a doubt is also a "certain doubt" I am not thinking of a nefkam at the moment, but if it is correct, it should be said (I will check in the evening to see if B'sha'i discusses this there)
Nfm”m to provide an interpretive solution that is also a prohibition on the other hand read..
Risha's ruling, not intended.. What is the ruling on Hai Gavana? Will Rabbi Shimon allow such a solution to be implemented.. or not? (Or is there also a prohibition of enjoyment here? [As the sages have already said, stolen water will be sweetened] that they enjoy the act itself [from the mitzvah, especially {and if you make it difficult for me to enjoy the mitzvahs, or to enjoy the given water? I will tell you, ‘they are, it is psychologically fun for me to feel that I am fulfilling a mitzvah, especially when it is at the expense of fresh water!’] which is a prohibition of the Torah… God forbid)..
Or will we have to wait for the third writing to decide between them?
(I'm kidding of course.. I don't want to bore you but it's an idea that would amuse me, I don't have to respond of course)
By the way, Rabbi Narali said that there is a Mishnah in Avot that supports your view of Halacha and morality: ‘He would say, Whatever the spirit of the people is comfortable with, the spirit of the place is comfortable with.
And whatever the spirit of the people is not comfortable with, the spirit of the place is not comfortable with.’ (Actually, human pleasantness is a category that has a direct bearing on Heaven)
Mishnah 10 in the third chapter
Ibait Ima read: And you did what was right and good.
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