Regarding the debt owed to the latter
Shalom. The Gemara in B.M. (10) says that a person is caught in a situation where he owes money to others, but he did not buy it because he did not borrow any money to deserve it in order to owe money to others (and according to most of the Rishonim, even when they appointed a messenger). If so, why does the Gemara on page (10:) say that there is no mission to commit a crime, but in a situation where a person is obligated to do so, it would be beneficial, such as in a courtyard or a woman or a slave who I sent to steal? But how can this be beneficial? Apparently, you do not owe others a greater debt than this. And according to Haran’s method, the mission of the owner of the wealth is necessary for the mission to work. So why does the Gemara not say that sending a messenger to steal will not work according to the law of the owner of the wealth, and it does not have to reach the issue of mission to commit a crime? I would be grateful if His Honor could clarify the issue. Thank you.
If the animal’s owner intends to gain for the owner a prohibition, it seems that this would be useful under the law of theft but not under the law of seizure. After all, if you stole the object, it is stolen. This is a fact and therefore does not depend on the question of whether it is “useful” or not. The question of whether something is useful exists only where you are trying to act according to the halakha and not when you want to steal. Even if I sent a monkey to steal from you for me, it is “useful.” The same applies to the agent of the owner of the wealth.
Yes, but if a debtor seizes a debt, he is not acting according to the halacha, for the debtor did not buy it. So why doesn't the Gemara explain that the seizure is not useful because it is a misdemeanor.
And another question regarding the issue of the severance (sign Kpav) brings up the Nubian who says that it is impossible to send a messenger to expel a woman in a legal case because she owes money to the latter, and his words are hidden from explicit interpretations. But as for the matter of explanation, what is the difference between sending a woman to expel a woman in a legal case, which is okay, and seizing a debtor, which is not okay?
The discussion is whether he bought or not. Do you want to assume that he didn't buy and then cancel it because of a messenger saying something is a crime? The question is whether it is defined as a crime.
Divorcing a woman in a marriage is fine (in principle. I'm ignoring for now the Hadar that made it a crime) because all the power is in the hands of the husband. The woman is not a party with rights in this matter. Therefore, it is not considered a debt to her descendants. I can send a messenger to forbid my property from others even though it is a debt to her descendants, because all the rights in the matter are mine. On the other hand, in the concept of a marriage, there are also rights to others in the debt and therefore it is a debt to her descendants.
Thank you very much, Rabbi. One last question regarding the issue. Rav Yohanan believes that a finder is a find for his friend, and the first questions are difficult. After all, that same Rav Yohanan believes that a debtor is seized in a place where he owes others, but he did not buy it. And apparently, please, let me hang up and explain to the head in the name of the Rabbi that since in a finder, one must seize the finder for his own life, then it is permissible even though he owes others. And the head in Gittin wrote that the reason for a finder to seize the debtor in a place where he owes others, but he did not buy it, is that the messenger does not have the power to appoint a messenger when he owes others on the way. And if so, what is his excuse? Help, then if the problem is with the messenger, what do I care if the messenger has a finder? The disadvantage is with the messenger. Thank you, His Honor, and sorry for the trouble.
If a messenger has a Migo, then his ability to act is not based on the messenger and therefore no appointment is needed. It works like a “franchise”.
But the method of the head that wins from the law of mission thus leads to the conclusion in Kiddushin
Although there has been much confusion regarding this investigation of Zakhin on behalf of a mission. The question of Didan has nothing to do with the question of Zakhin on behalf of a mission. Lit Man DeFligh says that someone who acts according to the law of “Zakhin” does not need an appointment. Although if it is because there is an implied appointment, then here it really should not work, but I spoke to the method that does not need an appointment at all.
I learned that this is the body of the Toss system (and therefore also the head) that there is no division between making a messenger and making a messenger, because even without making a messenger, it is considered that there is an appointment here and there is no difference between the two laws, while the wicked also believe that winning is on the basis of a messenger (as explained in the Hadith in Gittit 9. He will return), but the roots divide between a messenger with an appointment and a messenger without an appointment.
So here is the evidence that this is not true.
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