Regarding the ku of a total of two hundred mena in the Gemara and within the analysis of a regular ku
Hello Rabbi, 2 questions:
A-I have heard you on various occasions mention the ‘Belgian Pirka’ for a total of two hundred years. Does the Talmud use such a Pirka? Or is it a Pirka on the logical level and not on the logical-Talmudic level… (and if it does, where?).
B-When setting parameters for alpha and daughter, when you prefer ‘alpha and 2 alphas’ to ‘alpha and daughter’ you are making a qubit of two hundred parts (‘in general 2 alpha alphas’), seemingly it can be refuted according to the Belgian argument (i.e., you need an alpha to be binding, and if there are 2 alphas, either it will not be binding (the Belgian one) or it may be binding with something more serious and I cannot bind it like a single alpha (such as not binding floggings for fear of binding death)).
Thank you very much and all the best for your holy work in the field of virtues required by the Torah…
Hello and thank you.
Just because you can find a refutation doesn’t mean it’s old. I didn’t claim that a resume of a person who is completely fit for a position is always refutable, but that it can be refuted. It’s just like any regular resume.
The Talmud also does this, at least according to some opinions. For example, according to those who apply the principle of no punishment from the law to a ku’ah of at least two hundred mena (if one is liable for the opening, not the mining). The ku’sam explains that one who transfers all his sons to Molech is not punished, even though one who transfers some of his sons to Molech is punished. When they plotted, not when they did it (they killed him, not killed him).
In our algorithm, it is not appropriate to parse this because we do not identify the alpha and beta parameters. Without their identification, it is impossible to present a parse, even though it may be possible (that the presence of beta prevents alpha from operating). As long as a parse has not been presented, then of course the CQC stands because the default is that it is indeed more serious. As mentioned, my argument is only that a parse is possible.
Thanks for the answer, just this, do you deal in one of the books (or future books) with identifying the parameters (or is it left to the discretion of the judge/scholar)?
And there is no penalty from the law proving that because of fear of a minor falsification and the material is indeed unfounded (or at least the obligation arising from it is unfounded), right? I am not a penalty “that maybe” there is a falsification…
At the end of the book we comment on identifying the parameters. This is certainly left to the discretion of the learner, but our method helps him with this.
Regarding the fact that there is no penalty from the law, anyone who applies this to a book of at least two hundred mena assumes that there could be a dissection of this as well.
Hello Rabbi,
There are about two hundred references to the subject in the context of punishment by law in the case of Israeli courts, and you may find the subject interesting. Below is a quote from the disciplinary verdict in the case of Judge Poznansky-Katz (link: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/18002081-44.htm):
“35. There is no place to examine the relationship between “transfer from position” and “suspension” as the relationship between “full” and ”part”. In this context, it should be noted that in the recent past the Supreme Court discussed the question of whether the Rabbinical Court is authorized to recommend sanctions for “inciting” While these are not listed in the law (in HCJ 5185/13 Pluni v. the Grand Rabbinical Court [published in Nevo] (28.2.2017)). Justice Y. Amit held the opinion – which is consistent with the accepted position – that this authority, granted to the rabbinical courts, can be learned from a simple and material fact or from the interpretive rule “in the generality of two hundred parts” or “the whole including its part”. He noted that “it is difficult to imagine that we would recognize imprisonment, which violates the fundamental right to liberty, but would not recognize voluntary social pressure resulting from the expulsions we have just endured” (paragraph 6.a. of his opinion). In contrast, President M. Naor ruled on this matter as follows:
“On this point, I disagree with my colleague, since in my view, the fact that there is a more severe sanction in the law does not mean that there is an implied authority to impose a less severe sanction. This is especially true in the case of sanctions that violate fundamental rights. According to the principle of legality, the authority is permitted and authorized to take only those actions that the law has authorized it to take. Insofar as it concerns an action that violates fundamental rights, the authorization for the action must be clear and explicit, whether it concerns an infringement of freedom or an infringement of fundamental rights… In our case, the Darban Tam regulations embody a significant infringement of protected and important fundamental rights of individuals, including freedom of occupation and human dignity. Therefore, an infringement of these rights must be by virtue of a direct and express authorization in the law, and cannot be inferred from inference, a fortiori, or any other rule of interpretation.”
(CJC 5185/13, paragraph 12)
I also believe that the fact that a law authorizes a judicial or disciplinary body to impose a “severe” disciplinary measure does not imply, by its very nature, that it has the authority to impose any other sanction, even one that differs in its purpose and essence, simply because it is ostensibly a less severe sanction. It should be remembered that, in addition to the common purpose of every punishment and every sanction, different punishments and sanctions have different purposes. In addition, the comparison between a “severe” sanction and a “less severe” sanction is sometimes not so simple. In other words, it is sometimes difficult for us to determine the level of severity between different sanctions, punishments or disciplinary measures. Let us illustrate the difficulty: Although everyone will agree that a ten-year prison sentence is more “severe” than a fine of 100 NIS, it is not self-evident that a two-week prison sentence is more offensive and “severe” for any person than a fine of 100,000 NIS. In any case, the issue should not be viewed from the perspective of absolute values, as if the types of punishment were arranged on a scale of punishment with a categorical and clear “severity” rating. Moreover, I am willing to recognize the existence of the rule that “the whole includes its part.” But it must be remembered: we are dealing with an interpretive rule, and nothing more. This is not a decisive rule, or in sports parlance a "tiebreaker", but rather one of several different types of rules. In this case, there are many interpretative reasons that, in my opinion, certainly when accumulated together, override the said rule, overshadow it and overwhelm it.
Yes, a friend of mine who is a judge sent it to me when it was written. My article on the subject is even mentioned there in the ruling.
I think this is a good example of why a two hundred-word argument can also be refuted.
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