Regarding the moral value of caring for one’s family

Peace and blessings, dear Rabbi Michi, I watched one of the podcasts you participated in recently (I think that already in 2015 it can be officially announced that you have become the world champion in debates in Israel. You deserve it. . . You are truly an intellectual personality who is exceptional in our generation), and I heard you claim that in your opinion there is no value in the country.
The host, for his part, replied to you that the Greeks claimed that there was value in caring for the family, and from there it expanded to become value in caring for the tribe – and from there he wanted to conclude that there was a normative value in the state (of the Jews, interestingly, which was secular, by the way). You evaded the conclusion by uprooting the axiom and saying that there is no value at all for a person to care for his family. It is simply a person’s interest to care for his family, but it does not stem from a normative value. You came off a bit utilitarian on this issue.
I ask you, do you insist that there is no value in a person taking care of his own family? If we measure according to Kant’s categorical imperative, the conclusion will certainly be the opposite, and I think that as a Kantian you are also supposed to accept the conclusions of the categorical imperative.
Let’s take, for example, the question of whether a person has an obligation to care for his son. I once had an argument with a man about this. He argued that actually caring for another child is no less moral than caring for your own son.
I replied that the reason I believe I have a moral obligation and duty to act for my son more than for the son of a stranger is twofold, purely substantive considerations. First, Kant’s categorical imperative holds – do what you would wish to become a universal law – that is, the measure of what action is essentially right is a bird’s-eye view of what would happen if everyone acted in the same way, would the world be better or worse? After the conclusion of the equation, it becomes clear with certainty which action is moral and which is not. Again, not from utilitarian considerations, but only as a method for calculating a moral formula. And for our purposes, regarding a person’s moral obligation to care first and foremost for his son more than for others; if all the people of the world neglected their responsibility to care devotedly for their son, what would happen to humanity? Oh, oh, that’s right, an especially tragic outcome. In the pessimistic scenario, babies would not survive the infancy stages at all, and humanity would destroy itself within a few generations. And in the optimistic scenario, if it were shown that babies would survive, there is certainly no doubt that their education would have been spoiled and negligent, and those little ones, when they grew up to be adults, would have created a generation of slaughtered and miserable people, with mental disorders and enormous childhood deprivations – and even in this optimistic scenario, I do not recommend that anyone live in such a cursed world. You understand for yourself what the conclusion of the categorical imperative of the downer is, very true – it is a moral obligation for a father to be a guarantor for his own son above all, and he has no other person who can fill the parental slot. This is one
I think this argument is very valid in a Kantian Deontic methodology, and you do belong to that school. And just as the categorical imperative obliges a man to take care of his son, so it obliges him to take care of his wife and also his parents. So I think the one-valued conclusion is that yes, the conservatives are right who claim that there is value in taking care of the private family.

Regarding the transition from the private family to the tribe, that’s a more analogical and less necessary conclusion. But I think that’s also a valid conclusion. Do you agree?