Regarding the sons of captured babies
Hello Rabbi
I wanted to share with the Rabbi a question that has been bothering me for a while. Of course, only if there is time and the opportunity to answer.
For a few months now, there have been thoughts here and there, but lately it has been bothering me more and more. There is actually a religious aspect to the matter and a philosophical aspect, which are of course related to each other, but I would be very happy to separate them.
So one day I was thinking about the concept of a captive baby, about how the halakha sees the transgressions of such a person in a different light, and I wondered what that says about how the halakha looks at our observance of the mitzvot. That is, the circumstances of a person’s life are significant enough to affect something in the degree of his responsibility/blame/free choice. So what does that say about the flip side – the value of observing the mitzvot of someone who grew up like that.
My question is about the details of the concept of a captive infant, which I am not at all familiar with. I would be happy to know what the difference is between the status of a convert and a captive infant. Maybe that will help me understand why they are not the same thing. Also, about the essential difference that there is, apparently, between performing a mitzvot versus committing offenses by someone who is accustomed to it. It is probably not right to compare them, but I don’t understand why.
Maybe I’ll explain a little to the rabbi the thoughts I have in my head and he can point out where I’m wrong in my understanding.
So then I could think that a person born into a religious home knows the reality of secularism, while a baby who was taken captive, in the original context of a baby who was actually taken captive, really doesn’t know any other reality. But then the Rambam comes along and expands the concept to include second-generation children who are apostates, and that’s what mainly confuses me. In other words, not only is a Jewish baby who is taken captive to the Gentiles defined this way, but the responsibility for apostasy lies solely with the father who took an active action of abandoning the faith, while his children who are raised this way are already considered a baby who was taken captive. I see a certain logic in this, because how can you make demands on a child who heard about the Jewish faith from the mouth of a father who is a heretic? He must have instilled in him a distorted view, and it’s no wonder the child doesn’t repent. And since we’re not talking about a child, but about an adult and we still attribute importance to the nationalities and opinions that were instilled in him at home, it’s really puzzling to me! Where is a person’s ability to investigate and search? After such an expansion of the concept, I ask, if we give so much weight to a person’s upbringing even when he is an adult and say that his judgment is not pure, then supposedly even the observant of the mitzvot is not really like that. And anyway, if we were to speak in terms of accidental, it would turn out that we do perform a mitzvot intentionally, but we cannot say that it is completely without external influence. Okay. But if a baby who is captured is forced, it sounds like we are really talking about things that are completely out of his control! On the other hand, he does bring one sacrifice for many Shabbats and many labors. So yes, there is some responsibility here. But, as I understand it, there is one sacrifice because there was really only one sin here. So maybe all my observance of the mitzvot is actually just one mitzvah.
And in fact, the distinction between a heretic and his children surprises me. It is reasonable to assume that even a person who was a believer and an apostate did not come to him from nowhere. A person can claim before the court that he came to this because of poor upbringing and the deception of his teachers regarding the faith. I think it is clear that this is an argument that will not be accepted, because Judaism certainly educates for personal responsibility and does not allow us to blame matters such as education. But then it is not clear to me where the line is drawn. How did the Rambam decide that a child whose parents are infidels is already a given that must be taken into account, but the infidel father would not be able to claim similar things. I feel as if, in fact, the father and the child made the same move, of choosing a way of life based on the reality they knew, although the father’s move is much more extreme but not really different in essence. So how do you decide where the line is drawn? Where is it no longer the person’s responsibility?
Trying to think of the reasons for the “exemption” that a baby who was taken captive has from his sins. Is it completely innocent? And then I feel that even the observant have no right. Is it because it is not fair to punish such a person, and then actually, why should the observant receive a reward. Are not a transgression and a mitzvah two opposite actions but from a completely different family and then the mirror image does not work at all. That is, that a transgression is an attempt to rebel and this actually does not happen when a baby who was taken captive is a sinner, whereas in the case of an observant, it is said that there was an intention on his part to be submissive and to obey. But then it turns out that obedience can occur and receive value even without recognizing the possibility of rebellion. Which does not sit well with me.
In short, I wrote too much. I assume that you can see from my writing that I am really confused. I would be very happy to hear the Rabbi’s opinion on the matter and some order in the halachah, if possible.
Thank you very much anyway!
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There are a lot of questions here and it’s hard to elaborate in an email. I’ll try to explain as best I can within this framework. If you’d like to elaborate, we can talk in person (check with me on the phone below).
First, I will refer you to an article I wrote on tangential topics that address several of the points you raised:
See also the footnotes there regarding the obligation to pay a sin offering for a baby who was captured.
My starting point is that Anos is exempt.
I would also add that rape in opinion is also rape. This is what the Radbaz wrote in a reply (Chad Alef Rana (Kafaz)) regarding a man who thought that Moses our Lord was God, and they asked him what his judgment was. The Radbaz claimed that he was raped because that is truly what he thought. I have now seen a discussion about this here (see the chapter on the Radbaz).
I also assume that a situation in which any reasonable person would reach the same conclusions/actions is rape (even if it is not rape in the deterministic sense). You cannot demand that a person do something that a reasonable person in their situation would not do.
Now I am looking at the Sages who considered heresy/idolatry a sin, and I wonder why. After all, if a person truly believed in this, he is forced and exempt. My answer is that in their time, heresy and aza were instincts, meaning that people did it even though they knew it was wrong (just as people transgress the prohibitions of fornication because of their instincts even though they themselves understand that it is forbidden). What confuses us about this is that the Gemara says that the Sages abolished the instinct of aza, and therefore today this instinct is not familiar to us (as opposed to the instinct of aza). But this means that in the time of the Sages, the instinct of aza was like the instinct of aza that is familiar to us. Therefore, a person who sins in aza is not forced, like a person who sins in aza because of his instincts.
But in our time, when people really don’t believe and not because of inclination, they are complete deviants. In fact, it’s even worse than a captive baby. The situation of a captive baby is a situation in which it is clear to every person that there is a God and that the commandments must be kept, and the whole question is who the God is (that of the Gentiles or of the Jews). So it was also clear that if he encountered Judaism, he would understand that this is what is right and start keeping the commandments. That was the case once (there were no secularists). But today, of course, that is not the case.
It is important to understand that the status of a captive baby or a secular person does not depend on knowledge. A person can know all of the Shas with Rishonim and Achtarim and be a huge scholar and a strictly captive baby. What he lacks is awareness that it is mandatory. He can know all of this like a researcher knows Native American culture. So what good is his knowledge? He is a captive baby for everything. Therefore, a Datlash can certainly be a captive baby even if he knows and knows everything and has received a religious education. As long as he currently does not truly believe in it.
You asked what the value of keeping an inert mitzvah (a baby who was taken away from the Jews). Indeed, it does not have much value, unless this keeping reflects commitment. Inertia does not always reflect a lack of commitment. Thus, the Gemara at the beginning of Zevachim speaks of “stamma lishma,” meaning that there are situations in which a person does not intend to perform a mitzvah, but it is considered an act with intention. A person puts on tefillin and does not intend. I ask myself why he put on tefillin? It is clear that he did so on the pretext that it was a mitzvah. Therefore, even if he did not intend, the lack of intention does not reflect a lack of commitment. But a person who keeps a mitzvah without being truly obligated (and not just a lack of intention) really has no value. As I wrote in the article (and so does the Rambam, Soph. 8, Halachah of the Laws of Kings, which I cited there), keeping a mitzvah that is not done out of commitment to the commandment given to us at Sinai has no religious value. As far as I am concerned, a person who blessed food when he was not obligated and later repented should bless again. He did not fulfill his obligation because his blessing is not a mitzvah. But note, this is only if he was not obligated at all and not if he did not intend (this depends on the law of mitzvot requiring intention, and the poskim disagree on this).
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Shimon Yerushalmi:
With the permission of the Honorable Rabbi, I wanted to recommend whether it is also possible to elaborate on this important and topical matter in the new book the Rabbi is writing.
Thank you very much and best wishes,
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Rabbi:
It’s definitely in the plan. thanks.
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Asks:
Hello, Your Honor,
First of all, thank you very much for your detailed response to my question. Interestingly, I started reading your book a few days before I received your answer, precisely because of this question that was bothering me.
The conclusion I draw from the rabbi’s words is that a person’s opinions are something he is forced to accept, and they are what actually dictate our actions. The understanding that I keep mitzvot out of obligation is also something that was instilled in me and is consistent with my way of thinking.
The rabbi’s words increased my confusion about the meaning of keeping the commandments or committing transgressions. Sometimes I feel like I am programmed by my own thoughts and worldviews, which I did not make a true and objective choice.
If the rabbi happens to have time to answer me, I’d be happy to. Of course, if it’s more convenient, then by phone.
With great thanks,
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Rabbi:
I don’t know what book you’re reading, but if it’s “The Science of Freedom,” I think you’ll find answers to your questions there.
As a rule, a person does not force his opinions, but believes in them. He adopts them as a result of his own judgment. It is true that if he is wrong, he should be seen as forced because he did his best. But this is not because he does not adopt the opinions (they are forced upon him) but rather, on the contrary, precisely because he does adopt them as a result of his own judgment.
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