Regarding your last tour

Hello Rabbi. First of all, I must say that I identify with and agree with most of your observations regarding Rabbi Melamed’s recent polemic. However, I was struck by something that Rabbi Melamed wrote in his “Revivim” column in the Besheva newspaper, on Sivan 2, 1971:

“…This question is not abstract to me. There have been times when I lay down at night and could not sleep because of so many thoughts. Here I am here in the Land of Israel and I think that my people are a virtuous people, and somewhere else sits a Frenchman and thinks so, and somewhere else sits an Arab or a Japanese or a Chinese and he also thinks so. And so do believers of every religion who are certain that their religion is the true religion. And how can I honestly say that our people are the virtuous people and our religion is the true religion?
Of course, I knew the main answer, which is based on the divine revelation that continues from the Exodus from Egypt, the presence of Mount Sinai, and the long history of the Jewish people, including all the great days of glory and the depths of suffering, all of which we learned about in the words of the prophets and sages.
And I was still troubled, mainly by the moral question. Until I settled on the argument that the people who want more than all other peoples to do good for all people and all nations are the people of virtue, and the faith that wants more than all other faiths to respect and cultivate all talents and professions and give them all meaning and divine value is the faith of truth.
“This is indeed the identity card of the Jewish people. This is the culture that accompanies Jews, even if they have moved far away, as long as they are aware of being Jews.”

Allow me to offer my understanding of things and present the difficulty that arises from them.
Regarding the first paragraph, the question is of course legitimate, and I am even impressed by the honesty with which he presents his hesitations, things that even a high school boy would be afraid to say in front of certain people, a person whose entire status and social fortune are based on the matter of belief in the Jewish religion – and yet expresses them openly with a committee. (Although, in the margins, it should be noted that this is not necessarily the right thing to do from a purely educational perspective. I can imagine that a religion whose religious leaders are not so sure of itself, or at least show that this is the case, would not create a who-knows-what impression on the undecided. But this is not critical to our case.)
In the next paragraph, he states that he has factual arguments based on empirical observations that confirm Judaism as the true religion (we will not discuss the arguments themselves). And he is still troubled by the moral question involved (which implies the assumption that choosing one people with privileges is immoral, which of course can certainly be argued with, but that is not our concern). This statement can be interpreted in 2 ways:

• A religion that is immoral is evidence against its truth – which may be considered equivalent to the above factual arguments, and what is disturbing is the possibility that Judaism is not true.
• The moral question is disturbing on an emotional level, and although it is not a question about the truthfulness of the Torah, it is still disturbing, because it cuts across our heart’s desire that God’s will be moral.

The first option
According to the first option, the question should be understood as follows: Since we have an a priori assumption that a true-but-immoral-religion is a less likely situation than the true religion being moral, in the test of plausibility Judaism (if it is not moral) has the lower hand compared to another religion; if an immoral religion is a clearly improbable situation then perhaps even compared to no religion. It follows that in order to uphold the Jewish religion as the most likely choice for behavior, we must say that it is necessarily moral.
At this point, we approach Rabbi Melamed as a posek. According to how he defines the solution to the moral problem

“The faith that desires more than all other faiths to respect and cultivate all talents and professions and to give them all divine meaning and value is the faith of truth.”

This means that in his opinion, in order to be the true faith, Judaism must act as he describes (for the rest of the column, see how this still applies; he notes that it even applies to relationships between a man and his wife, etc.). This must lead to very significant a priori positions regarding his ruling – proven by the fact that he cannot afford to issue a ruling that in his opinion does not meet this condition, which is not at all trivial. It follows that in his opinion, Haredi Judaism, for example, is erroneous a priori (all talents and professions? Not really) but this is just a small example. Can he afford to issue rulings that reduce the perfection of reality? Contraception versus going to work, things that destroy relationships, etc. After all, in his opinion, the moment something like this happens, it makes Judaism incorrect!
The second option
On the other hand, the situation is more complex. Technically, what is at stake is not the Jewish faith itself. And yet, in order to resolve the question, he is forced to make a broad determination regarding the nature of Judaism. True, since it is not the faith itself that is at stake, in principle there is the possibility that he will try to be as objective as possible on every issue in substance and will retract his determination if a ruling is issued that proves his determination in the above column to be wrong. And yet, this raises questions about his motivations and their role.
Although this is understandable psychologically (the mind justifies…), it may have effects on the ruling that are unclear in nature. It should be noted that he conducts all of his discussion within the framework of halakhah . In contrast to the Michist method, as a rule, of examining what halakhah says, comparing it to morality, and preferring morality when necessary, all of his discussion takes place within the halakhah itself. It is true that we are all human and that even a halakhic judge is not perfectly objective, but here it seems to me to be an exception nonetheless. Can a halakhic judge who openly declares such a deep halakhic wish be considered objective?
 
What do you think about that? Do you agree with my analysis? If you do, doesn’t that mean a little concession to the Haredal claims about his identity? And how do you think we should interpret his statements in the column cited above?
(On the side, I would also like to hear the Rabbi’s opinion on the quality of the analysis itself, since I am trying to get to grips with it, largely inspired by your column)
 
Thank you very much.