Review of the trilogy
A friend sent me a review of the trilogy that was recently published: https://mishgiotnakeni.wixsite.com/mishgiot-nakeni/post/ביקורת-על-הטרילוגיה-של-הרב-מיכאל-אברהם General Introduction I have finished reading the trilogy and I must say that the work is not serious. There are many jumps, skips, inaccuracies and errors. MA sold us a set of books that are neither convincing nor comprehensive. As I wrote and have already said: the author is an interesting person, but his intellectual courage often turns into arrogance and hasty conclusions (or errors or insufficiently reasoned claims). And again, he is not one of the people of the Bible, i.e. he is not one of the people of the covenant. MA says that he does not care about what the sages of the past said, but he peppered the words of the Rishonim throughout the entire second book. But the word of God (the Torah) does not interest him. He does not understand that his conclusions lead to the destruction of the Jewish faith and a contradiction in his method. He frequently errs in interpreting the verses, the Gemara, and the Rishonim. He builds his entire book on ideas that I do not prove in the book: Torah from heaven, not everything is predictable, the authority of the Tosh’a and our ability to make changes in halakha under current conditions. I will explain the main difficulties that arise from the book and give examples of the above-mentioned hobbies. Needless to say, it is better for the educated reader to study each topic separately from other books. For example, on the Tosh’a, the books of Rabbi Ariel, Inbal, and Halin are worthy of study, and volume 3 is in no way a substitute. Chapter 1, the last part, which discusses the origin of the belief in the Torah from heaven and the obligation to its commandments, which on the face of it seems to be the main thing in the book and the most fundamental in the trilogy, is Surprisingly, the most neglected and superficial part of all. The task of establishing faith is apparently less important to the author than the analysis of Anselm’s ontological argument, which is ridiculous. The content is also clearly problematic, and is yet another example of the author’s amateurism. Just as nothing can be learned from the Bible, the “evidence argument” cannot be learned from it. Maimonides in the Moreh has already rejected it (Chapter 33; there are contradictory places, as is his custom in the Moreh, but I agree). Just for the reader’s pleasure, the author reveals his ignorance of the Bible in identifying the eagle and his rash declaration of a clear fulfillment of a prophecy. Volume 2 MA sees a logical contradiction between freedom of choice and knowledge of everything (including the future) and briefly explains that without free choice there is no point in all the commandments, etc., and therefore “knowledge” must be given up. As I mentioned, in my opinion MA did not prove that there is a logical contradiction and, surprisingly and strangely, here he justifies the Freedom of choice from the Scriptures (in fact, he does not justify this for a secular reader who deviates from his path in the book and again has to turn to other books). In addition, he claims that there is no private providence but that there is nevertheless the possibility of sporadic interventions by God in the world. I did not understand how he could have said that such interventions could occur, and I am very surprised that he accepts Rabbi Levin’s miracle and at the same time denies the question of the righteous and is bad for him. In short, MA comes to the conclusion that providence is only for rare individuals of virtue. After studying it all night, I came to the conclusion that what follows from his words is that we need to return to a literalist reading of the Bible (Vaynahem, etc.) and see the patriarchs and the prophets after them as individuals of the aforementioned virtue. There remains a possibility of preserving the building on its foundation if we accept the distinction between the individual and the public, in fact the possibility of understanding the prophecies starting from Abraham and the Exodus from Egypt through the prophets of destruction and ending with the prophecies for the days of the Messiah and the promise that the people of Israel will not It could. However, he did not notice this problem (MA did not even wrap himself in ornaments) and later on (chapter 14) concludes that there is no difference between an individual and a group. Here the destruction of faith. The only thing in his words that can save biblical faith is his claim that the situation was different in biblical times. There were miracles and revelations, etc. He does not provide any justification or reasoning for this (!) Although this is a rather strange claim and every Rabbi who has read the Book of Psalms and Job knows that the righteous and the wicked are not a new question. Most of all the miracles were not revealed and the Maimonides in the Moreh also rejected the argument of the witness (Chapter 33, above). After these nice things from a Rav, MA did not feel like saying that the Torah is the word of God and that everything in the Torah is binding on him by virtue of being the word of God (pp. 316-317). For some reason he rejects the Tanakh and the Aggadah but puts the Halacha on a pedestal. Why? Because it has authority Formal. Where does it come from? (Hint: He does not give an answer in this volume. And there is no answer that puts the mind at ease in volume 3.) [Reminder: Everything is subject to interpretation and is a source of inspiration only, except for the halakhic part] The questioner (the fool he uses) first asks a good question regarding the interpretation of the Sages regarding the remote city, the wayward son and the teacher, an eye for an eye, etc. What does the sharp and knowledgeable rabbi answer, who relies only on his intellect: We see that in other cases the Sages did not do this, even though in these cases there was also a moral problem. Apparently they had a tradition or learned it from the Gash (see p. 353). A weak argument, to say the least. Even more so when we take the counterexamples he draws: . Capital punishments: The R.A.’s method in blows 1:10, Sota 9:9, a beheaded calf, and so on 7:8: Because they rejected the Danfishi for them and could not reconcile. See Halacha, its power and function, pp. 88-8. .Miserrot: .Miserrot are allowed to come in the congregation because of concerns about the oppressed (Shulchan Ahab 4:14 with Rama, Shulchan Ahab 4:15 with Bar-Havit, Ahab 4:20 Rama). Miserrot originally refers to a Canaanite slave girl. See Even HaEzer 2:34 and Shulchan Ahab 4:25. .Homosexuality: No Israel is suspected. The woman’s dependence on her husband: Yes, they improved the situation a little with the Ketubah, with the Halacha that she can refuse, and more. In order to prove his point that the Talmudic commentators and poskim are not biased in their interpretations, he brings (by chance?) the laws of eating pork and preparing food (examples from which it is impossible to conclude anything because they are neutral from a moral/value perspective). Once again, he has not proven anything and sounds a bit amateurish. There are many other issues with which I disagree. On it. I will add just a small question. MA claims that most of the narrative and moral parts are no longer relevant to our day. My simple question is why he does not say yes regarding the halakhic part. (He alludes to this in volume 3 but does not draw a conclusion from it and does not admit it outright.) Summary: .He does not prove his main claims. .He does not apply his critical remarks to the Biblical period and to the halakhic law without justifying this choice. .Twice he quotes a text passage from the Rambam, presents his opinion on the subject in question and rejects it. Then he quotes another text passage and rejects the Rambam’s words according to his own opinion (and not the Rambam’s). First of all, these quotations are unnecessary and secondly, there is no problem with the Rambam because according to his system it works out. See pp. 202 and 276-277. .Pg. 220 “All the laws of sacrifice are not relevant today.” The Passover sacrifice is also relevant today. .
Pages 346-347 are nonsense. In principle, it would also be possible to learn about the status of Mount Sinai from other sources… but the fact is that there is no such historical book that covers the plight of Israel, and with the help of archaeology it is impossible to reconstruct an entire period.
Page 379 They also studied Bible and philosophy in yeshivas. The author will find sources in research books on Sephardic yeshivas, for example during the time of Rabbi Kershakash. In Mizrahi-Sephardic yeshivas, it was customary to study Bible and grammar properly until recently.
Volume 3
Page 243 “According to the Rambam’s view and more, establishing a prohibition without a source is a transgression from the Torah.” We will give just a few examples from which it follows that the Rambam himself violated this prohibition from the Torah: Rambam, Laws of Prohibitions of Arrival 12:10 “But if an Israelite comes to a gentile, whether a minor of three years and one day or an adult, whether a free woman or a man’s wife, and even if he were a minor of nine years and one day, since he came to a gentile with malice, then she is killed, because coming to Israel is a mistake by her hands, like an animal.” Rambam, Laws of Kiddush of the Month 5:1-2 All that we have said about establishing the Rosh Hashanah on the sighting… It is not performed by anyone but the Sanhedrin in the Land of Israel, or a nearby court in the Land of Israel that the Sanhedrin has given them permission to do so… and by the bride who stands behind them in their place. But while there is no Sanhedrin in the Land of Israel, no months are determined and no years are passed except in the calculation by which we calculate today: and this matter is a halakha from Moses of Sinai, that while there is a Sanhedrin, they determine by sight, and while there is no Sanhedrin, they determine by sight, and there is no need for a halakha… [I obtained the Ramban and I saw him again in the halakha of the Holy New Year that he said that while there is no Sanhedrin in the Land of Israel, no months are determined and no years are passed except in the calculation by which we calculate today. And this matter is a halakha from the MMM that while there is a Sanhedrin, they determine by sight, and while there is no Sanhedrin, they determine by sight, and while there is no Sanhedrin, they determine by sight, and this matter is a halakha from Moses of Sinai that is not stated in the Talmud and was not mentioned anywhere, and he himself, the late, mentioned there that in the days of the sages of the Mishnah and in the days of the sages of the Talmud until the days of Abaye and Rava, they did not determine by sight, and they relied on the determinations of the Land of Israel by sight, and we have already explained that The Sanhedrin would have followed the example of the Great Torah, and if they had followed it, there would have been no law of the Great Torah in them, nor would there be any law of the Sanhedrin at all.] Laws of Talmud Torah 1:11-12 (11) And he must divide his time into three, one-third in the written Torah, and one-third in the oral Torah, and one-third in the final According to Maimonides in the introduction to the Mishnah Torah, the Babylonian Talmud is the supreme halakhic authority: (No) Therefore, the people of this country are not forced to follow the customs of another country, and they do not tell this court to issue a decree that another court in its country issued. Likewise, if one of the rabbis taught that the way of justice is thus, and it is explained to another court that followed him that this is not the way of *the law written in the Talmud*, they do not listen to the former, but to the one whose opinion is inclined, whether the former or the latter: (Lev.) And these things are in laws and decrees and regulations and customs that were renewed after the *compilation of the Talmud*. But *all the things in the Babylonian Talmud, obligate the entire House of Israel to follow*, and obligate every city and town and every state and country to follow all the customs *that the sages of the Talmud practiced* and to issue their decrees and follow their regulations: (33) Since all those *things in the Talmud that all Israel agreed upon*, and those sages who established or issued decrees or instituted or discussed law and taught that the law is thus, are all the sages of Israel or most of them, and they are the ones who heard the Kabbalah in the principles of the entire Torah from one person to another until Moses: If so, why did Maimonides rely on other halachic sources (Midrashei Halacha and Yerushalmi) that sometimes contradict the Babylonian, and in addition to this on legendary sources (Hilkot Machalot Asurot 9:2 according to the Maggid Mishnah; Hilkot Issurei Bi’ah beginning of chapter 22 and Adarn beginning of chapter 22), interpretations of revised readings and interpretations (Hilkot Issurei Bi’ah 12:10; Hilkot Issurei Bi’ah 12:10; Hilkot Issurei Bi’ah 12:10) Kings 6:7; Laws of Abel 1:5)? A question that is not discussed at all in the book. In addition, the author mixes all the methods and in his book there are opposite and diverse methods that he presents as complementary, when they are not.
Page 248 Maharam of Rothenburg writes the exact opposite as stated in the glosses of Maimonides, letter 4 on the laws of wives, chapter 25. Regarding a woman who has committed adultery, see his responsa, Prague printing, sign 399.
Page 576 “Secularism is a new phenomenon, the essence of which is indifference and denial of the Torah and its giver, but not rebellion against it.” I invite the author to open the books of Zalman Schneier and others to taste the taste of hatred of Judaism. I am sorry, but at the sight of this nonsense I could not ignore. The secularism we know today is not monolithic either. And with all due respect, apart from “another” who in himself was a heretic in his opinion, who rebelled against the Torah? In Shlomo Ben Ami’s book, the author attributes the following statement to Ben Gurion: “The Israeli people are a people without history” (erasing the past of the exile, etc.). [What is between this people and the Palestinian people?!] Page 592: “In such a reality, it is clear that there is an obligation to conquer the land and build a temple.” What?? If the law forbade abandoning territories acquired in war and returning the temple to the Ishmaelites, so be it. If not, I will. Regarding the question of the attitude towards seculars according to Halacha, MA has also failed and, to be honest and precise, has not even tried to justify the positive attitude. He does not naively accept the decision of the poskim to consider them as “captured infants,” but he does not give a reason for this and in any case his conclusion is almost identical to theirs. It is clear to any intelligent person that at the time of the Chazon Ish, many of the seculars, if not the majority, were wicked to the point of anger. And those who were “violent in their minds” who disdained the Torah and its guardians were always: the Greeks, the Menites, the heretics, the peoples of the lands and the ignorant. Why not do a little research, see what the characteristics of each group are and see if there are any similarities.
Why copy it here? In the future, you can put a link.
It’s clear that he’s biased, and some of his arguments that I read are nonsense, so I didn’t continue. I have no interest in commenting, unless someone sees a specific point and wants to discuss it.
This is critical criticism, not flattering criticism, what can be done?
I would be happy if the rabbi answered the first question that also bothered me when I read the first volume of the trilogy:
"The last part, which discusses the origin of faith in the Torah from heaven and the commitment to its commandments, which on the surface seems to be the main part of the book and the most fundamental in the trilogy, is surprisingly the most neglected and superficial part of all.
Establishing faith is apparently less important to the author than analyzing Anselm's ontological argument, which is ridiculous.
The content is also clearly problematic, and is yet another example of the author's amateurism. Just as nothing can be learned from the Bible, it is impossible to learn the "evidence argument" from it. Maimonides in the Mora already rejected it (Chapter 32; there are contradictory places, as is his custom in the Mora, but I agree with him)."
Below is a brief summary of most of the main points of the criticism.
1. The transition to a religious God is explained relatively superficially and amateurishly (because the witness's argument is weak).
2. No contradiction between knowledge and choice has been proven. The proof of choice is given only from the Bible. It follows that there is sporadic intervention. The claim of a change in policy by providence has not been reasoned or justified and is strange.
3. It follows that halakha has formal authority if the Bible and legend do not.
4. Examples are given of cases in which the Sages did not bend the halakha according to their moral perception, and hence it is proven that they did not think it was acceptable without additional considerations. This is a weak argument. In all the examples, the Sages did refine, soften, and limit. The prohibition of eating pork is not contrary to morality.
5. If only the Babylonian Talmud has formal authority, then how did the Rambam also use other books (Midrashei Halacha and Yerushalmi, Aggadot, original commentary on the Bible, Sabrot).
6. Today's secularists are no different from the heretics of all generations who truly and sincerely believed in their heresy and did not just deny it for the sake of appetite. There have been heretics and heretics in all generations, and nothing substantial has changed in their reasoning.
7. Since LGBT is allowed, why is incest (and zoophilia) forbidden? And since LGBT is allowed, it is permissible to be gay, and if so, it is clear that immodest films are permitted.
8. Separation of religion and state will lead in the long run to the fact that most citizens of the country will not be Jews according to Halacha and will be alienated from Judaism and religious Jews, and the national identity will be eroded and this will not be a “Jewish state” and that is not what Chuzya and her builders intended.
9. The trilogy does not explain who can actually make the necessary halachic changes that are proposed.
And here is my initial attempt to offer answers.
1. The witness's argument contributes its part within the broad line of argument outlined in the book.
2. Proving the contradiction is a delicate matter. Anyone who thinks there is no contradiction should be well. The proof of choice is not from any verse in the Bible but first from a direct feeling, and second from the very existence of the commandments and the idea of reward and punishment, and third because without it it is also not understandable why God would create the world. It is not said that there is sporadic intervention, but that it cannot be ruled out because reality does not prove it. The argument for a change in policy was justified by the fact that today, from the perspective of reality, there seems to be no active supervision, and if the Bible records that there was in the past, then apparently there was a change, and as is agreed, there was a change in prophecy and in visible miracles.
3. Things that God commanded are binding (because there is an obligation to fulfill God's commandments. Why? That is a different question. Whoever does not accept this obligation, then so be it. The trilogy addresses those who do feel such an obligation) and because the people of Israel took it upon themselves. If the critic intended here to criticize the formal authority given to the entire people to receive the Talmud, then this is another matter that is not related to the Bible and the legend.
4. This is a strong and clear argument. Although they were destroyed, they were not completely uprooted, meaning they did not do it in the Torah as they did in their own way. Otherwise, why do they bother? Even the prohibition of eating pork has a certain moral problem of harassing people for no reason.
5. An interesting but irrelevant question. What the critic will answer for himself, the author of the trilogy will also answer.
6. I don't know how to answer that. (But were the words of the prophet about those who take down and those who do not raise up only because of the ways of peace, and his true opinion is that they do take down and those who do not raise up? Does the critic think that we should really treat the secular of today as the sages did about the heretics? Is this how the religious and ultra-Orthodox practice and believe today? Let him offer his teaching.)
7. LGBTQ people were not allowed. Incest (and zoophilia) are similar to homosexual relationships as they are similar to regular relationships, and there is no basis for comparison. Even if LGBT people are allowed to have sex, they are not allowed to have sex except when it is within a relationship, just like it is allowed with a wife when she is pregnant.
8. Nice speculation, if the secular people want to do it themselves, it is not the role of the religious (nor their right) to force religion down their throats so that the descendants of the secular people are not alienated. On the contrary, when the secular people understand their need for the Jewish religion, they will bring it closer to them themselves.
9. Apparently, when there is a broad consensus among the rabbis and the public that a certain justified change is needed.
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