Rhampamite/Thomistic cosmological view in contemporary formulation
Below I will briefly outline a cosmological view of the type proposed by Maimonides and Aquinas, which relies on the existence of some contingent entity and derives the existence and activity of a being whose essence is existence. As anyone who comes to the conclusion will be able to see, it has several advantages. I would be happy to hear from the Rabbi, and indeed from everyone, what the strongest attacks that can be raised against it are.
Where does metaphysical necessity in causality come from and when does it end? According to Maimonides/Aquinas: From the fact that the world is not so irrational as to have properties that are not derived from the essence of things without a cause. ‘Why is the sausage hot?’ Because the hot water in the pot heats it. ‘Why is the water hot?’ Because fire heats them. There is nothing in the intrinsic nature of a sausage or water that involves heat, and therefore there must be an external cause. Why is the sausage wet? Because the water moistens it. Why is the water wet? Assuming that the conditions are given for the state of aggregation, it has already been said here that you probably do not understand what water is or that we will provide an analytical explanation that derives the property of wetness or fluidity from the molecular composition that arises from the essence of water (the examples are intended only to illustrate the principle and I do not go into the exact physical/chemical description), but we will not look for an external explanation. Similarly, if we now ask why fire is hot, the answer will be that perhaps you did not understand what fire is. But once you have understood how warmth necessarily arises from the essence of fire, you have answered everything that can be answered in principle. This must be distinguished from the question of how fire *is created*, for which an external cause would be accepted, but this is not the same question as ‘why is fire hot’. But unlike fire, even if we explain how The sausage was created and we will derive everything that follows from the essence of the sausage, we will still need to explain why it is hot. The difference between properties that follow from the essence of objects and those that do not follow from their essence is distinguished in philosophical parlance as “necessary properties” or “contingent properties” respectively.
For any specific object in the universe, say a peach or a grain of sand, as soon as we grasp its essence it is immediately clear to us that there is no logical necessity in its existence, in analogy to the way it is clear to us that there is no necessity in the essence of a hot dog for it to be hot. In any case, it is known that it began to exist at some point, while that which is necessary to exist cannot begin to exist since its non-existence constitutes a contradiction, just as there is no historical stage at which fire can be non-hot. For any such object we also know that it is in principle destructible (physically, and even more so logically) and that it will actually be destroyed at some point in the future history of the universe.
We will now need to distinguish between a relative contingent property and a non-relative contingent property. A relative property does not reflect an inherent state in the entity but an external relationship between it and other objects. For example, the position of bodies in space or the unchanging speed of a body that remains in its state. Examples of a non-relative property: the heat of a hot dog or water, the application of force (as opposed to the frictional forces) of a car in constant motion on railroad tracks. In addition, we will distinguish between a negative and a positive property. Blindness is a negative property (the negation of the ability to see); darkness is the absence of light. But light is not the absence of darkness in the metaphysical sense of the word.
Claim : If a cause of any contingent (positive, non-relative) property ceases to operate, the contingent property is nullified.
Why do you think the claim is true?
Let us take as an example connected, unmotorized cars passing by us at a constant speed. Let us suppose that the train is very long and we are unable to see whether it has a beginning. But we see that there is nothing in the nature of the cars that allows them to overcome the forces of friction on their own, and we immediately conclude that there must be an object different from the cars – which is essentially capable of causing this – that gives them this ability at any moment (a locomotive). Let us note that this inference is required even if we imagine that an infinite number of such cars have already passed before us. Because the reason for the inference is not related to any consideration of the possibility of an infinite number of cars or causes, but to the simple fact that none of the cars is able to explain the contingent property that is attached to their essence here and now – the ability to overcome the forces of friction. On the contrary: the addition of more and more objects with a similar contingent property only increases the need for an external cause, because now such a reason is needed to explain each and every one of them.
An example for which the claim is irrelevant: a father who begets a son. Once the son exists on his own, he does not need the father, and the son can still beget (even if the father no longer exists). Here it is possible in principle to think (according to Maimonides and Thomas, in contrast to Kalam) that the causal chain of progenitors never began. Why the difference? The very ability of each son to procreate is an essential property of the son, and therefore does not require the activity of the father, as opposed to the very ability to overcome the friction of each carriage, which does not stem from its essence, and therefore requires the activity of the locomotive. From this we can arrive at a distinction between a temporary causal chain and a hierarchical causal chain. Temporary dependence : A causal dependence in which each member depends on the member preceding it in some respect, but does not depend on it for the very performance of the action on the member following it. Hierarchical dependence : A dependence in which each cause (except the first) causes the result only to the extent that it itself constitutes a result. The ability of each member to act on the member following it is created through the same action caused by the previous cause.
From these examples, it can be seen that causal chains of contingent properties (positive and non-relative) express hierarchical dependence, which by definition requires the existence and persistence of the actual activity of a primary cause on which the entire chain depends, in contrast to causal chains with essential properties, which express a purely temporal dependence. This seems to be true for any positive and non-relative contingent property: Suppose that the causal effect of the locomotive is eliminated, all the carriages immediately cease to resist the forces of friction (and begin to slow down). Take hair dyed purple; if we could eliminate in one fell swoop all the chemical bonds and forces (arising from essential properties of things) that attach the dye to the hair, its property of specificity would be eliminated.
In conclusion
We saw that
- If a cause of a contingent (positive, non-relative) attribute ceases to operate, the contingent attribute is nullified.
- The *existence* of objects in the perceived universe is a non-relative positive contingent property. (The contingency assumption was explained earlier; existence is a positive property inherent in the essence and not the negation of non-existence)
It follows: If the cause of the existence of objects in the universe were to cease its operation, their existence would cease.
In addition, we saw how
- Causal chains of contingent (positive, non-relative) properties are hierarchical chains.
and yes
- A hierarchical chain, by definition, requires the existence and continued activity of a primary cause on which the entire chain depends.
Conclusion: The existence of *any* contingent entity is sufficient to dictate the “I will be what I will be,” whose essence is existence, on which the entity’s existence here and now depends.
Three main notes:
- I don’t understand how this formulation differs from the usual formulation of the cosmological view (see second notebook). Contingent objects (like those in our experience) need a cause that creates them (you also talk about a cause that sustains them now, and I’m not at all sure about that). The objects around us are like that and therefore there is a cause that created them. In the background, there is of course the assumption that infinite regression is not an explanation (like the train example).
- You are moving from a contingent property to objects whose existence is contingent. I don’t understand the justification for this transition and why it is necessary.
- Why do you focus specifically on non-relational properties? Relational properties also hold all of this. In my opinion, this distinction contributes nothing to the argument.
Paragraph 4: “Light is not the absence of darkness, in the metaphysical sense of the word.” It seems to me that “light is in the physical sense of the word”.
1. With apologies for the rabbi's teachings, but there are huge discrepancies between the different formulations:
a. The writer means the cause that is causing them now and not a normal causal cause.
b. It seems to me that the writer accepts an infinite regression of causes. As he says:
And for which the claim is irrelevant: A father who begets a son. Once the son exists on his own, he does not need the father, and the son can still beget (even if the father no longer exists). Here it is possible in principle to think (according to Maimonides and Thomas, contrary to Kalam) that the causal chain of begetters never began.
To the Rabbi,
As I mentioned, this version seems to have several advantages over many of its counterparts.
A. The existence of God is proven by every object. Have you seen a grain of sand in the sea? You immediately realize that there is a God. Do you see a raindrop? You immediately become aware of the divine action that gives it existence.
B. There is no need to include all objects in the universe or to see them as one organic whole for which the claim of contingency is asserted. Some argue that this is the logical fallacy of attributing the properties of the part to the whole – Fallacy of Composition, but their claim is not relevant to the argument here.
C. The present and constant dependence of everything in the universe on God more faithfully reflects the religious intuition according to which an intimate, contemporary connection occurs between every object and the Creator and His action is present in it at this very moment.
D. The principle of causality is based on the most general metaphysical considerations (every contingent property/principle compels a cause) and is not a kind of special pleading that focuses specifically on the principle of existence to show the existence of causality that leads to God.
E. There is no need to rely on the assumption that infinite regression is not an explanation, since this version explicitly admits that it does constitute an explanation in standard cases of temporal causal dependence (for example, procreative ancestors can go back in a causal chain to infinity), but hierarchical dependence requires a primary cause by definition, and not only for existence but for any parallel causal chain that we know in the familiar everyday reality perceived by the senses.
The fact that it constitutes a cause that sustains them now stems from the definition of hierarchical causal dependence (which originates from both the Rambam and Aquinas) presented in the argument. Does the rabbi believe that there is something wrong with the definition?
2. This stems from the consideration presented at the beginning: I wrote: “Where does metaphysical necessity in causality come from and when does it end? According to Maimonides/Aquinas: From the fact that the world is not so irrational as to have properties in it that are not derived from the essence of things without a cause.” This seems to me to be the most basic, inclusive, and plausible metaphysical principle for the principle of causality that I have ever heard of. The principle of existence is a special case of a matter that is not derived from the essence of objects in the universe, and therefore requires a cause like them.
3. Relative properties do not satisfy all of this. There is no need for a cause to act at any moment on an object moving at a constant speed in a space devoid of gravitational forces in order for it to persist in its motion. By virtue of this example, the philosopher Multimar Adler opposed this argument of Maimonides and Aquinas (in his book How to Think about God), claiming that inertia is possible with regard to the principle of existence, as in the motion of a body that persists in its state. But in my opinion, he made a fundamental error by not distinguishing between relative and non-relative properties.
The god of the Greeks.
Copenhagen continues not to understand that since, from the application of his logic to his world of concepts, he concludes that there is a first cause, it follows that his logic precedes the first cause. That is, Copenhagen is the first cause.
Therefore, Copenhagen enjoys speaking of God as if he were his son.
Kunda continues to insist (because he doesn't sound stupid) that he doesn't understand anything.
Indeed, in terms of drawing conclusions about the world, Copenhagen's and everyone else's logic precedes the first cause and everything. So what? Essentially, the first cause preceded everything. You only need logic to *understand* it, and only in this matter does logic precede the first cause.
(Also in the dictionary, “reel” precedes ”God”. Apparently, according to Kunda, the dictionary is a heretical book and should be burned with the rest of the Greek books)
D, it seems you thought I just wrote “his world of concepts”, you may not have understood the meaning of this in the context of the whole story.
In terms of mental reality, the concept of first cause precedes logic. The problem occurs when he applies his logic to other concepts and then concludes about the first cause. When in fact the concept of first cause already existed for him before.
The lie is that Copenhagen presents it as logic requiring the existence of the first cause. And why would he present it that way? What is the interest? He wants to be the first cause, God's understanding. Grandpa.
And the fact that you write “essential”, if you mean physical reality, you will know that Copenhagen is not talking about it at all. In physical reality there is none of the things that Copenhagen talks about. Everything exists in his mind and imagination.
That is, Copenhagen always talks about his soul, about himself, about the concepts he created and instilled within himself from reading, learning and thinking. And this has nothing to do with physical reality.
If you read all of Copenhagen's claims assuming that they refer to himself, everything will be clear and coherent to you.
Dot,
You make various claims that you probably imagine are true – otherwise why bother thinking about them? My question is, do you think the fact that they are true is related to objective reality or does it all come from the world of concepts that exists in Dot's mind and imagination?
I want to hear a reasoned answer
Point, everything is clear and coherent to me even without your suggestions (I'm pretty sure that with them it wouldn't be coherent)
You think you're some kind of genius and therefore you're doing a psychological analysis of Copenhagen's motives (“He wants to be the grandfather”) even though he clearly doesn't. He's trying to prove the existence of God. If you think there's a problem with this (that's how his logic precedes God! Oh my! The god of the Greeks! etc.) you should explain what it is. As I noted, even in the dictionary, “lake” precedes ”God”
And I didn't quite understand what you meant by "in terms of mental reality, the concept of first cause precedes logic."
Mental reality doesn't matter. What matters is the philosophy/thought, not the feelings.
D, the thought that is part of mental reality uses concepts that are part of mental reality. Regarding what is important, this is exactly the point I made. Finally. What is Copenhagen's interest. That is, what is important to him there in all this text.
Copenhagen, once again a question that stems from the lack of separation between you and what is outside of you.
I read what you write. And I relate to what you write. And when I ask about interest, then of course it is a question about your psychological reality as I perceive it.
It is clear to me that what the words “reality” and ”objective” indicate some mental perception of yours that by using them something happens. As if if you hadn't said them then it would be something else. Witchcraft.
What is really happening outside of my perception? How should I know? Maybe some demon is transmitting to me everything I perceive.
Point,
You say that it is about “your psychological reality as I perceive it”. Is there any connection between how you perceive it and what it is?
If not, what difference does it make what you say about it?
If so, why and how exactly does this happen?
Furthermore, do you attribute to various claims about my mental reality the attribute “true” or “false”? If not, what sense does it make to you to claim about the condition of someone that your own mind believes is neither true nor false?
If so, why and how exactly does this happen?
Thinkers such as Aristotle, Maimonides, Aquinas, and others have answered such questions. Are you able to answer them?
Gilad,
1. Machul.
A. I wrote that I do not understand why there is an advantage to a cause that binds them in the present over a cause that created them in the past. I also do not see any necessity for such a cause.
B. If he accepts infinite regression, then it is also possible to do this for causes in the present. I do not agree that it is possible to think that the chain of father-son-son never began. This is a problematic regression like any other regression. How is this different from the infinite train he gave as an example?
Copenhagen,
A. This is also true in the usual formulation. You see a grain of sand, you know that there is someone who created it (or its father and its father's father).
B. This is also not necessary in the usual formulation. Even if they are not one whole, each of them has a cause (in the past or present).
C. It does not matter to the validity and strength of the logical-philosophical argument.
D. I did not understand.
E. As I wrote to Gilad, I don't see why an infinite chain of generation is not a problem.
2. I really don't see a fundamental difference between this and the principle of causality. If anything, then the opposite. The principle of causality seems more logical and intuitively plausible.
3. It's not because of the difference between relative and non-relative properties. It's clear that there is no need for a cause to act at any moment on an object moving at a constant speed in a space devoid of gravitational forces in order for it to persist in its motion. It's not because of relativity, but because when there is no resistance, there is no need for a force. In your sense, the persistence of an object's existence or the red color of an object also do not need a cause to persist in any moment, even though they are not relative properties (existence is not a property at all). Simply because there is no force trying to change their existence or color, and therefore there is no need for a cause to oppose it (as in motion without friction or external forces).
Copenhagen
Why just ask when you know my answer? I wrote at the end “What is really happening outside my perception? How can I know”
Do you dig in when you can't handle the answer?
To the Rabbi,
A. It seems from the wording (“who created…or his father and his father”) that the Rabbi attributes deistic causality to the grain of sand. If a first cause created the universe billions of years ago and since then everything has existed by force of inertia, the grain of sand no longer needs a first cause here and now, and the same is true for any point in the past at which it exists (except for creation). Such an argument allows some room for the skeptic to doubt that it is possible to continue backwards in the chain of causes and thus “get rid” of the first cause. On the other hand, when causality is hierarchical, this forces me to explain an action of a first cause that is happening right now, for which explanations cannot be borrowed at the expense of the past.
B. The fact that each one requires a proximate contingent cause means that I have a longer way to go to the first cause. Why? Because when the chain is not hierarchical, causality is not transitive. It is not correct to say about the grandfather that he caused the father to beget the son. However, when causality is hierarchical, the relation is transitive: the locomotive causes car A to cause the feature in car B, and so on (A causes B to cause C). That is, according to the Rambamist/Thomist argument, *God himself* is the cause of the existence of the grain of sand, which is not the case in other formulations in which he is only the cause either of the totality as a whole (in which case they would claim the Fallacy of Composition) or of the first contingent event (where the skeptic would try to eliminate a first cause).
C. If a particular version of the philosophers' God is closer to the God of revelation, is there no reason to give it more trust than others? It depends on whether we have independent reasons to believe in the God of revelation.
D. In philosophical proofs, there is room for greater credence on the assumption that we had prior reasons to accept it anyway, regardless of the narrow subject of the argument. The current version is of this type. It makes use of a principle motivated by independent considerations about the metaphysics of causality that were accepted regardless of the evidence, and that concern the concept in general.
E. Agree that there is a problem even with infinite temporal causality, but not as strongly as with hierarchical causality (in which the question of infinity is not interesting). Again, when it comes to temporal causality in an infinite chain on the time axis, every point on the axis is explained (a fact that there were “Aristotles” who did not think there was a problem with it – including scientists in the 20th century – until the evidence for the Big Bang became too strong to deny), in contrast to hierarchical causality, in which *no* point is explained.
2. This is about something that itself constitutes a principle of causality, and more than that, does not limit itself to a specific type of causality (existence or formation) but discusses the more fundamental question – when does causal necessity begin and end in general. The examples I gave in evidence illustrate the intuitiveness of the principle, which in my opinion can be seen with at least the same degree of clarification or even more (if we delve into it) precisely in the general principle. We see that *every* contingent property has a cause (and not just existence or formation) and we receive endless daily confirmations of this.
3. In my opinion, this stems from the fact that it is a relative property, and not because ”when there is no resistance, there is no need for force”. Even if there is no resistance but it is a positive contingent property that describes an aspect of the essence itself, the reason that attaches the property to the essence must persist in its action. The example of the color red shows the opposite: without the forces (chemical and/or physical) that connect the color to the object, there would be no red object here. There may indeed be red-colored substances in the vicinity of the object, but there would be no connection between them and the object except for the temporary proximity of the place, and any small movement of it would show that it was only an appearance and that it was not a red object at all. Regarding existence, I believe that it is definitely a property or principle in the objects themselves that is different from their essence, but this requires expansion and I have already extended it enough.
Point,
If you have no idea what is happening outside your mind, how do you explain sentences you have written about things outside your mental reality?
Here are some examples:
“Copenhagen continues to not understand…”
“That is why Copenhagen enjoys talking about God as if he were his son.”
“The problem occurs when he applies his logic to other concepts…when in fact the concept of first cause already existed for him before.”
“The lie is that Copenhagen…He wants to be the first cause, God's understanding. Grandpa.”
“Copenhagen always talks about his soul, about himself, about the concepts he created and instilled within himself from reading, learning and thought.”
“Copenhagen, once again a question that stems from the lack of separation between you and what is outside of you.”
“It is clear to me that what the words “truth” and “objective” indicate is some mental perception of yours “
You only prove what I claimed that you perceive your perception as identical to the universe. Therefore, all your questions when they are in this context are trivial questions.
It also seems that you know the answer to the questions you asked me, since I answered them for you in the previous question. You are just talking nonsense because you are not willing to accept the fact that there is a universe outside of you.
Copenhagen,
You are dealing with a skeptic.
I am not a skeptic, I know with absolute certainty that Copenhagen is not God.
Why are you the God of God that you determine for him what he can and cannot do?
Y.D.,
Did you mean a rabbi or a dot?
Dot,
Let's try to focus on the matter, on the literal meaning of the things, and then we'll move on to the rest. You say “thought, which is part of mental reality, uses concepts that are part of mental reality” and that you have no idea “What really happens outside my perception? How can I know”. All this means that perception is an intra-mental event and nothing more.
It follows that you have no way of knowing what is happening in the mental reality of others, and no idea whether sentences like “Copenhagen perceives his perception as identical to the universe”, “knows the answer to the questions he asked me” or “is not willing to accept the fact that there is a universe outside of him” are true or false.
Do you understand that the problem here is that the sentences you are saying make no sense?
Copenhagen,
What does it have to do with the rabbi??
Your entire argument lacks logical continuity. Something doesn't add up there.
The possibility of knowing is not a verbal matter.
“Where does it come from”? It doesn't come from here, it's the claim itself that I don't know what's happening outside my perception.
I don't understand the unnecessary text, including the examples. What does it add to the claim itself.
If the sentences don't make sense, why did you bring them up as examples that you seem to have understood very well.
Perceptions are not divided into truth or falsehood, but into perceptions that you believe are true or believe are false.
You tend to introduce truth and falsehood into every matter, which shows your inability to separate the fields of logic from the fields of language and perception.
Again, from everything you say it follows again that you think that what you know is the entire universe. Or that it imposes things on the universe.
Point, where did Copenhagen say or how does it follow from what he said that his knowledge is the entire universe? So far, the only one who has hinted at this is you (when you said that what is outside your perception is imagination)
The sentences you wrote about Copenhagen make sense, but *in your opinion* they have no meaning (they are just imagination, after all)
And the fact that you used them anyway shows that you don't really believe what you are saying (don't bother answering me. I am imagination)
D. Once again you ignore the things I wrote.
It is clear that they have meaning, otherwise I would not say them. What defines meaning is the emotion (not the thought, the emotion, you should start understanding where you live). If you feel the emotion of meaning, then you say that it is understandable to you and in short you say that it is understandable, that is the whole meaning of meaning, it has no other mystical meaning.
What triggered this emotion, probably a combination of thought, logic and the world of concepts.
Regarding Copenhagen, he does not say, he assumes this as a basic premise. It precedes every statement of his. Copenhagen assumes that when he relates to me, then my existence is identical to his perception, that is, he deluded himself that he knows me. The same is true for everything he relates to, that is, for him the universe is identical to his perception.
Of course, this fits with his perception that he is the first cause, and it is clear that from a psychological point of view, man perceives things. It is just that Copenhagen confuses cause with purpose. Perception is not a cause but a result. And so he turned things against their creator. Witchcraft.
And I say that man knows nothing about what happens outside his perception. That is, there are things that man does not perceive.
Does no one, except for Rabbi Michi's comments, have any attacks on the evidence?
Period,
Some of the sentences you said do indeed have an independent meaning on their own, but their combination is meaningless. If you claim that you are incapable of knowing things in the world as it is outside your mind, you have thereby lost the ability to give any rational meaning to the claim to know what the motivations are that drive others, or the degree of correspondence between their concepts and the world. You have denied yourself the possibility of knowing such things from the beginning. You are trying to grab a rope at both ends out of some kind of illusion of pseudo-psychological acuity, when in fact it is a random jumble of syllables trying to disguise themselves as meaningful sentences.
In your opinion, once we encounter fire, it is not unreasonable to assume that it needs a source.
How did you come to this?
Try to discern the essence of fire and whether there is anything in it that implies a lack of need for existence.
You wrote this. Because heat is not a relative but an intrinsic property of fire. So if we see fire, it means there is no problem that it is an intrinsic entity.
B. Why do you assume that a property that is not intrinsic to an object should disappear? This sounds like an unclear philosopher. Why isn't it a frictionless train?
On the 26th of Elul 28th
Copenhagen's neighbor is the Swedish city of Malma, one of whose attractions is the tower that appears to be an upright human body in a rotational motion. Within the seemingly static material, a double mobility is revealed - rotation around a central point and upward growth.
Dynamism in the physical sense also signifies mobility on the perceptual level: the 'what?' leads to the 'why?' The existing reality leads us to the insight that there is a reason and a purpose, and from the definition of the 'what' we ask: 'why?'
And from the perception that the universe does not only ‘revolve around itself’, and the feeling that besides the self there are also others who are similar to me but different from me, that between us there can and should be relationships of giving and receiving, and a ‘port of merchants’ grows (‘Copenhagen’ in Danish), where everyone gives and receives, sends his bread across the water and brings his bread from afar.
And from openness to space in the manner of ‘take and give’, grows a gentle and pleasant spatiality of ‘gardens of pleasure’, where man clings to the altruistic goodness of his Creator and extends and withholds to others without reckoning.
And between Malmö and Copenhagen, the bridge connects the ‘Er-Sound’, is the sound of the shofar that awakens and calls to emerge from the captivity of narrowness into the spaces of openness, openness to God and openness to our fellow man, and from the straits of ‘Shavi-Dan’ we emerge into the spaces of ‘Dan-Y-H’.
With best wishes, Sh”Z Levinger
At the beginning of the title
From the dynamics in the statics of the addressee…
Gilad,
A. I did not write that heat is a non-relative property of fire, but that it is not a contingent property. If not contingent, then certainly not relative – there is no need to write such a thing. It is recommended that you go over the meaning of the distinctions between the examples given in the second paragraph again.
Since we perceive that heat is derived from the essence of fire, there is no need for an external object to explain why it happens to be *hot*. Because heat in fire is not something that happens to fire (like in water or a sausage) but a necessity that stems from its essence. But we are only talking about heat itself, not about the question of whether fire exists or whether something is needed to bring it from potential to actuality. It is not possible to make a logical deduction from the essence of fire to the statement that it does not need an existence. These are two different principles. Take the example with the father. To explain why he begets the son, we do not need the grandfather (or something external) to make him do so, since the ability to procreate is in his own essence, and therefore we will only have to explain the internal principle by which this is done (that he is a creature with a reproductive system, the reasons he had for this, etc.). But there is no connection between the ability to procreate and the question of whether he needs a being.
B. First of all, without a cause, it is impossible to give a reason for the question of why the attribute is there or not there, and the world would be irrational. Attributes could appear and disappear from nowhere without a reason, and we do not seriously think that the world could be like that. (You are probably thinking of cases in which a reason realizes some essential attribute, in which case there is an internal necessity why it is able to remain there – because that is the essence of the thing – but we are dealing with contingent attributes). Second, so far we have not found any example that refuted the principle. Every contingent attribute that is not relative that we find in the world is there as long as the reason that attaches it to the object persists in its action. You are welcome to try to think of a counterexample.
S.C. Levinger,
The ‘what’ does lead to the ‘why’, but the question is why? The answer of classical theism: because of the metaphysical necessity that contingent properties cannot exist without a cause.
I don't think your words are correct.
A. At the level of definitions between an essential property and nothing. There is no basis for this because the entire definition is our analogy. There is no such thing in reality. You can define the definition as a hot sausage. Then there is no problem with the sausage being hot.
B. You are talking about realization here. And jumping to a causal relationship instead of the view you gave.
Let's assume that we have a primitive clock.
You assume that there is nothing that forces it to continue to exist and therefore, the logical argument that it will disappear/change. (In the parable of a train of infinite cars with friction force)
But I disagree with this and think that indeed there is no reason for it to change. But there is also no reason for it to disappear. Because to the extent that something exists, there is no reason to claim that it will continue to exist (cars without friction).
So I did not understand the answer.
Gilad,
A. First, I must say that the definition is capable of capturing the essence of the thing, because otherwise there is no sense in the claim that we know things about the world and remain in a world that is essentially no different from an illusion.
Secondly, it is not that you first define random definitions and then try to capture things in reality using them (sounding like something between neo-Kantianism and postmodernism that contradicts common sense), but rather that you first capture things in reality and then perform an operation of abstraction of the universal common denominator on them. First, you capture hot, lukewarm, or cold sausages with your senses, and then you strip them of properties such as warmth and other contingent characteristics, and thus distinguish between the essence of the sausage and all sorts of events or properties that have joined it by chance (that is, not for reasons that stem from its essence) and can also stop characterizing it by chance.
In other words, if you define “hot sausage” This would be an artificial definition that is not based on the normal process of intellectual abstraction. It is like defining “a person with dyed hair” as an essential attribute of someone, which is an artificial fiction that does not exist in the attribute of humanity itself that is common to all humans, and therefore when you someday see that that person himself continues to exist even though his hair is no longer dyed, reason will immediately whisper in your ear the reason: it was a contingent attribute from time immemorial.
B. I did not understand the first two sentences, and the following sentences are not entirely clear either. In the example of the cars, what immediately disappears is the ability to overcome friction. Such an ability does not stem from the essence of the cars and therefore requires a permanent cause that connects it with the cars. You say “As long as something exists, there is no reason for it (not) to continue to exist (frictionless cars)” And it is assumed that you unintentionally omitted the ”not”. But I have already shown that the comparison cannot be to the motion of cars without friction but to the very application of force against friction. Speed in frictionless motion is an external description that expresses a relationship between other things and cars and not an inherent matter in cars. But when a car exerts force, it is a concrete aspect of the car itself. If you want to disagree, you will have to explain why when it comes to existence there is no need for a permanent cause, but when it comes to any other positive and non-relative contingent characteristic we always see that there is.
A. It is not natural, everyone agrees.
B. Existence is not a property. So it is not correct to compare the cases.
A. I spoke from the perspective of common sense. The problem of those who claim that we live in a hallucination is more serious anyway, so I did not speak to them.
B. There are philosophical reasons that show that existence is a property, but they require a long time and I will not go into that. In any case, this is a grasping at words. The question here is whether some property or aspect of a thing derives from its essence, no matter what we call it (property, principle, matter, etc.). As soon as it does not, the mind looks for a reason. When some essence can or cannot be x, there is a lack of logical necessity in the connection between it and x (in our case, existence), and this is what requires causal necessity. Some matter, no matter the name, that is randomly added to a thing and is not necessarily derived from it. If such a situation did not require a reason, an irrational world would be obtained at least to the same extent as for any other contingent property lacking a cause.
To use Richard Taylor's example, you see a transparent ball in the forest and are immediately certain that there is a reason for it. Suppose you did not see such a ball - you would not ask why there is no ball. Suppose there were no contingent universe at all, we would not ask where the reason was that there was no universe. But when you see a universe, you ask. If the universe were composed of nothing but an eternal piece of butter, it would certainly be necessary to ask why it exists. In contrast, according to the "existence is not a property" method, there would be no difference between the existence or non-existence of a thing in terms of the requirement for the principle of causality, and any possible universe we can imagine could exist without a cause (and for the same reason could also appear at any moment from nothing without a cause, but I will not go into that), which is absurd.
Existence can be a cause if it were a primordial.
I agree that existence cannot be carved out of nothing.
Just as a change in that existence requires a cause.
But to the extent that something exists, it is not clear that it needs a cause. This is too big a question for us to answer because it seems philosophical and throwing incorrect assumptions into the discussion.
To me, things seem clear.
Gilad,
You don't directly address the reasons so I see no point in responding. Try to think about them. They speak for themselves.
I do not accept the assumption that existence has a cause. I have no good argument to say otherwise.
Why do you think that if I do not accept this assumption then things can be created from nothing? If indeed this is the case. Then I will probably change my mind on the matter.
Because I do not accept the creation of something from nothing at all.
As opposed to the continuation of what is if it already exists, such as a primordial world.
?
Gilad,
Is it true that “insofar as something exists, it is not clear that it needs a cause”? If so, why can't we say similarly, that insofar as some *contingent property* exists, it is not clear that it needs a cause? The metaphysical status of a property is lower than a thing (because it is only some characteristic of a thing and not a thing in its entirety). If the constant realization of some (contingent) property requires a cause, even more so the constant realization of a thing. It would certainly not be rational to say that the constant realization of some contingent property, such as the application of the force of cars against friction, requires a cause, while the constant realization of a whole thing does not require a cause.
And again, as noted earlier, the argument leads to absurdity. According to which it follows that *any* possible world could exist without a cause, and it is no more likely that one or more of any imagined worlds would be realized (constantly, of course) than not. For example, a flying spaghetti monster that makes kugel every 5 minutes, makes sure to eat it every day of the week except Shabbat, but eventually goes to war with Zeus (who has always existed, of course), falls in love with him and gives birth to Apollo, who only eats kugel on Shabbat.
There may be *ancient*, but I do not say *shir*.
Once again, I agree that everything may exist, just because I have not seen it, I assume with Occam's razor that only this world exists.
I do not accept that a world can be created from nothing, and indeed you have not shown a claim for this idea that it is possible according to my approach. Rather, I believe that what existed ancient existed will be what it will be.
I did not understand why an existing thing is more of an explanation in your opinion than the question of why another thing does not exist.
According to you, one should not be surprised that Zeus does not exist, while one should be surprised why the world does exist.
But this is not true, because you are supposed to believe that following the realization of the existence of the object is an explanation, then we will also need to give an explanation and understanding of why another object does not exist.
This clearly weakens your basic premise. But we should not be surprised by what exists just as we should not be surprised by what does not exist.
Gilad,
I don't understand your Hebrew. What do you mean by "there is an ancient"? Does the object (object, being) ancient?
In any case, the argument is simple: if your method shows that by chance it turns out that some other crazy imaginary universe does not exist, but in principle there is no difference and to the same extent that our universe exists, any other universe could exist, provided that it is ancient, then there is an absurdity here. Don't you see why it is absurd? It goes without saying that we would look for a reason why a piece of butter has always existed. Especially in a universe containing creatures like Zeus and flying spaghetti monsters. This is the classic case, the paradigm, of intellectual wonder that leads to the search for an explanation.
If anything can exist without a reason, provided that it is ancient, then yes, worlds can be created out of nothing. Because there could be a being outside our space-time that is inherently capable of doing supernatural things (and that is how it has always been by its very nature without a reason) like creating a new universe at any moment out of thin air, or creating out of thin air a fairy that flies over your head only when no one can see and immediately disappears as soon as someone sees it, and so on.
I don't think I've ever seen anyone who disagrees with the simple fact that what requires explanation is the existence of things, and that the absence of something does not require an explanation - and that's how all of science works. No one needs to explain why some force X doesn't exist, but as soon as forces like gravity or electromagnetism are discovered, they immediately look for an explanation. This stems from the metaphysical principle that contingent properties require a reason. The world is not chaotic and irrational enough for things to just happen without a reason at all. This is the working premise of rationality itself, and we receive countless daily confirmations of it.
The point is that when there is no necessity for an object to exist, something external *that has its own capabilities* to cause it to exist is needed. On the other hand, we do not need an object with any ability to explain the *lack* of existence of something, and therefore there is no problem with the absence of the infinite number of possible objects that do not exist, and no researcher or scientist would think that an explanation should be sought for this. Alternatively, it can also be said (after reaching the conclusion of the cosmological view) that the fact that Zeus does not exist is rooted in the wisdom and will of God who decided not to cause this.
In any case, you did not answer the first paragraph that was cited earlier, and I will quote it again:
Is it true that “insofar as something exists, it is not clear that it needs a cause”? If so, why can’t we say similarly, that insofar as some *contingent property* exists, it is not clear that it needs a cause? The metaphysical status of a property is lower than a substance (because it is only a characteristic of a substance and not a substance in its entirety). If the perpetual realization of some (contingent) property requires a cause, even more so the perpetual realization of an object. It would certainly not be rational to say that the perpetual realization of some contingent property, such as the application of the force of wagons against friction, requires a cause, while the perpetual realization of a whole object does not require a cause.
I'm sorry, but I don't see why this is an absurd approach. In the butter example, we know that humans create things that resemble butter, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that if butter exists before us, it was created by a human. (The physio-theological evidence/Bayes' formula).
But, when you ask about the essence of the existence of things in general. For example, the “universe”, I don't see that it needs a cause. However, I accept that it is not its own cause.
Regarding the creation of something out of nothing, as I assumed, you fail to establish the assumption that a contingent reality can be created out of nothing. You are using the assumption that there is a causal entity with a ”supernatural”power to create it. So this is not about *absolute nothingness*.
I didn't understand why the non-existence of something does not distil a cause.
If I were to summarize your argument in this part, is it an axiom?
I answered,
The difference is that an attribute is part of the entity and it follows the entity. But this existence is not an attribute. Rather, it is a realization and it does not require a cause.
And if you say that it requires a cause, then you will also need to give a reason for the non-existence of an entity.
Your statement about butter is confusing gender with non-gender. Try to reexamine what the butter example is for, strip away what is relevant from what is irrelevant, and see if your response to it is related to the substance of the matter.
You don't see why it needs a reason, but as I mentioned, it is the working assumption of rationality itself that does not accept the possibility of brute facts without a reason. The brute existence of some contingent universe is the most surprising brute fact there is and therefore certainly requires a reason. It is not enough to qualify as ”I don't see”.
So you admit that according to you we have no way of estimating the probability that a flying elephant will suddenly appear in your yard out of thin air, because there is no problem with an ancient creature with supernatural abilities for such magical acts having always existed outside our space-time just like that for no reason (although it is agreed that since the elephant was created by this creature, it is not a case of absolute nothingness). But this contradicts the obvious, which is that the probability is zero.
Please review again the explanation of why the non-existence of something is not something for which a reason should be sought. This has been explained well, and in two ways. The responses seem naive to me.
A contingent property by definition is not an integral part of the object but something added to it. Otherwise it could not exist without it, but this is exactly what follows from the definition of contingency – that the object does not depend on it for its existence. The argument was that if the perpetual realization of a lower ontological order (a contingent property) in some entity compels a cause (as seen in the example of the carriages), then surely the perpetual realization of a whole entity as a whole must follow. You did not answer that question.
The non-being of existence was well explained as stated.
The assumption of the rationality of the world is a subjective assumption and is well explained in the methods of psychology and evolution. We have no reason to assume that the world is subject to our human thinking.
The world is not a health insurance fund nor is it a school.
Indeed, I have no way of calculating the chance that a flying elephant will be created in my yard. But I do not rule out that it may be created. While you consistently insist on the known and deny any ability for scientific progress. All because it does not fit with your rationalism… we have seen how successful it was in discovering the laws of nature…
The non-existence of something is nothing more than the materialization of something, and therefore if the cause is distilled from a cause, the end is also distilled from a cause (all this according to your theory). You claimed that the contingent assumption is that the object does not exist. But it fits with your theory that existence is a property that is added to the object.
The problem is that you define every object into classes and general entities as I stated above, you need to understand that these definitions are ours for our convenience, there is nothing between them and reality. In any case, there is no such thing as a contingent property. There is a contingent entity that is illuminated by x,y,z,a,ab. You ask that what keeps a from existing then must keep the entire entity from existing. But the entity itself is also a. It is not something that accompanies it. The general is composed of the particulars. There is no “general” + properties.
Surely my sentences are meaningless to someone who thinks that he is God and that he is the only one who exists and that he is the knowing and known science. Because my words doubt the divinity of that snake that determines for God what he knows.
All your effort is just so that everyone knows that you are the grandfather, the father of God, because God is subject to the laws of logic, and you are the one who controls the laws of logic (this is what you believe even though in reality your logic is reduced to the logic of kindergarten children), then God is subject to you. You expect others to understand this for themselves.
But what is revealed here? That there are many more like you who want to be the grandfather, and each one tries to prove and thereby rape or create the existence of God. Each one in his own unique, clever way.
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