Sanhedrin, source of the Oral Torah
Hello Rabbi Michi (again, light from the group)
I wanted to ask something that I couldn’t understand even though I was looking for information about it.
Did the Sages interpret all the commandments in the form of innovation as if taken from the verses, or did they already have a practical tradition of commandments and simply sought authority for them from the verses?
And if they did, why should we listen to them and not to our own personal opinion? After all, from the perspective of La Tesur, this does not apply to the Sages, but rather to the Sanhedrin sitting in the grove.
Another thing, can the Sages uproot a commandment from the Torah? And if so, does the authority threaten, did the Sanhedrin fulfill the obligation towards them? Even then it is not clear where the authority comes from, since it is said not to add or subtract. This is a question in itself about the additions and subtractions that the Sages made to a commandment from the Torah, such as 39 malkiyot instead of 40.
Hello.
It is clear that the Sages did both types of things: they both found an anchor for existing laws and also created new laws by virtue of the interpretation and sermons of the verses.
There is no dispute that they have the authority to do this by virtue of “You shall not depart.” The Ramban disagrees with the Maimonides (see his observations on the first root) regarding regulations and decrees, but both agree regarding the interpretation and teaching of the Torah.
As for who are the sages who have halachic authority by virtue of “not to be violated”? In principle, only the Sanhedrin sitting in the grove. But did all the sages of Israel agree to give authority similar to the Talmud (Tannaim and Amoraim), and it is accepted that this is valid. Is anyone who disagrees with them violating “not to be violated”? I am not clear. But he is violating the consent of the public (as in the case of Mount Sinai). It is quite clear that according to the renewed foundation of the Rambam, who believes that the ordination can be renewed “from below” with the consent of all the sages of the Land of Israel, it is likely that this consent also has validity. But here even those who disagree with him agree. The validity of this consent is either by virtue of public acceptance (see Beit Yishai, Sermons 315, which expanded on this), or perhaps by virtue of the regulation of “shlichiyotiyehu,” in which the neighboring peoples of the Land of Israel saw the Babylonian sages as their emissaries.
Regarding the removal of a word from the Torah, the Gemara says that it is possible to remove it by returning and not doing anything. However, several rishonim (the Ha-Abad in Tamim Da’im and the Rabbi Ba’al Ha-Tos, and others) wrote that when the time requires, there is permission to remove it even by standing and doing. And in fact, these things are explained by the Rambam in Hala Memariam 2:4 (removal by time). He attaches this to the authority to punish for something that is not lawful, and this authority certainly exists at this time as well (see Shulchan
How this is consistent with Bel Tasif and Bat Tagra, the early ones have already dealt with this. See Tos and Rashba, 16:2. And the Rambam, 11:2, Memariam, 5:9, disagrees with the Rav:
Since it is up to a court to rule and prohibit something that is permitted and its prohibition will stand for generations, and it is also up to them to permit Torah prohibitions for the time being. What is this that the Torah warned against adding to it or subtracting from it, not to add to the words of the Torah or subtract from them, and to establish the matter forever in a matter that is from the Torah, whether in the written Torah or the oral Torah? How is it that it is written in the Torah that a kid shall not be cooked in its mother’s milk? From hearsay, they learned that what is written forbids cooking and eating meat in milk, whether the meat of an animal or the meat of a living creature, but the meat of a bird is permitted in milk from the Torah? If a court comes and permits the meat of a living creature in milk, then that is a deduction, and if it prohibits the meat of a bird and says that it includes the goat and it is prohibited from the Torah, then that is an addition. But if it says that the meat of a bird is permitted from the Torah and we prohibit it and inform the people that it is a decree that does not follow from the matter that it is obligatory, and they say that the bird is permitted because it is not interpreted that way. The animal is permitted, after all, it was not interpreted. And another came to say that even the meat of an animal is permitted except for the goat, and another came to say that even the meat of the goat is permitted. In the case of the milk of a cow or a sheep, it is not said except its mother, which is its species. And another came to say that even in the case of the milk of a goat, which is not its mother, it is permissible not to say except its mother. Therefore, all meat with milk is forbidden, even poultry meat. This does not add anything but creates a restriction to the Torah, and so on.
+/The attainment of the R’Av’d/ Since there is a L’B’d to decree and forbid, etc. A. All of these will carry the spirit that everything that was decreed and forbade to restrict and preserve the Torah has no basis in it, you will not add to it, even if they established it for generations and made it a fallacy of the Torah and authorized it for reading, as they forgot in some of the rabbis’ doctrines and read the reference in a book, and if it is subtracted according to the need of a time, such as Elijah on Mount Carmel, even this is a matter of Torah. It is a time to do for the Lord. They have violated your Torah, and you will not find an additional prohibition except in positive mitzvot such as lulav and tefillin and tzitzit and the like, whether for a time or for generations, whether it was established in a matter of Torah or not.+
The innovation of the Rambel on the ordination as an innovation in my opinion needs a source for his words that would allow him to accept it. And it is really difficult for me to accept.
The fact that everyone accepted the Sages as the source of their authority does not seem logical to me. If the people accepted authority from the Sages, would that also be okay? Or the Sadducees?
I have always attributed the Sages as teaching the tradition known to them from the Sanhedrin, from this side we listen to them and not from their authority. It is that the Sanhedrin renewed the prohibitions of the rabbis, etc. and passed them on in the tradition of the Torah, etc. Therefore, from this side of the Sages who discussed the issue in discussions, we accept their words but not from the authority of the Sages themselves.
Regarding the ‘Shab ve al-Ta'ase’ I understood that the sages could instruct not to perform a positive commandment so that they would not come to another prohibition.
Does this apply to future sacrifices?
And if not, how did Rabbi Kook write the above:
As for sacrifices, it is also more correct to believe that everything will return to its rightful place, and will be fulfilled with the help of God when salvation comes, and prophecy and the Holy Spirit will return to Israel, all of which is stated in the decree as a statement. And we should not be overly impressed by the ideas of European culture, because the word of God that is with us is destined to elevate all the elements of culture to a higher level than any human judgment can do. We should not think that sacrifices contain only the crude idea of clumsy work, but that they contain an inner sacred nature, which cannot be revealed in its manifestation except by the revelation of the light of God. upon his people, and a holy life will return to Israel – and all the nations will recognize it as well.
— Egrot HaRaya, Egrot TeTektzed
Thank you very much
Forgiveness is the letter:
Hence, the demand for this exaltation is correct, but when it comes at an inappropriate time – it destroys and consumes. The attitude towards sacrifices is only a section of the question of the general attitude towards animals. As long as we see them as servants of man, for riding, amusement, or food, we will not be able to claim morality and avoid using them specifically for the service of God. Only when human cruelty is reduced to such a great extent, and we return to the situation before the flood when eating animals was forbidden, will the time also come for the abolition of sacrifices. The great court of that period will have to decide on this, and not in the way that a righteous person in his own eyes would do. An attempt to advance that time is nothing but a disruption and distortion of the correct order and a spoiling of the path to progress in it (Igrot Raya 1, 44, Vision of Vegetarianism and Peace, Chapter 6).
If they accept it, it will indeed be binding on the part of the public acceptance, but there will be an opposing value of the prohibition of it, and it will reject the contractual obligation. But when it comes to a right and not wrong act, the contract is binding. It is not for nothing that they needed to be done and heard, that is, to accept things for themselves. And truly, the status of Mount Sinai is a prelude to public acceptance.
Regarding the cancellation of the sacrifices, I did not think of the connection to the removal of anything from the Torah in vain. Maybe. I do not think that the vision was intended as a halakhic statement. After all, in the future both the commandments are null and void and the festivals are null and void. So why is it impossible for the sacrifices to be canceled? In the future it will be fulfilled: yes, it is in heaven.
Although the Maimonides' innovation on the renewal of the ordination is based on the fact that in the future there will be no renewals of laws, since his view is that in order to establish a Sanhedrin, the ordination must be repeated, and he denies the repetition of the ordination from above (because in their view it is close to the mouth of the close). And according to my view, there is no need for this.
And perhaps the cancellation of the sacrifices will be done in an interpretive way. The passages of the sacrifices will be interpreted or required in a different way and will be taken out of their simple form. This is not considered as uprooting anything from the Torah (therefore, this can also be done in Qom and Asee).
Incidentally, freezing laws due to harm (moral or practical) can also be done at this time without ordinations and without a Sanhedrin. As is known, a temporary freeze can last forever (there is nothing more permanent than the temporary). And evidence for this is from the Maimonides' words: The Magisterium of the Second Temple, which associates the freezing of laws when the time is right with the law of the preparatory court and punishments that are not part of the law, and this law also applies to the time of the day (see Shulchan
“If they accept the אזר, it will indeed be binding on the part of the public, but there will be a contrary value to the prohibition of the אזר, and it will reject the contractual obligation.”
But to add insult to injury, a mitzvah… even in the case of the Shev and El Ta’ase’ah, is it still contrary to the written Torah?
Regarding the fact that Mount Sinai as a mass acceptance is binding - I agree, it sounds very true.
The mitzvah of the כלאם does not nullify the future according to the principle of the Maimonides. Or would you say that this is an innovation of his?
A new interpretation of the mitzvah is not considered an abrogation? And after all, the mitzvah preceded the interpretation of the כלאם, and the interpretation only provides a reference according to the Maimonides.
And what is the source of freezing a mitzvah for the sake of value? After all, the Torah is the value. Where do we learn this from the Torah.
Sorry for the many questions, the topic is simply vague. If the rabbi has an article on the subject, I would be happy to read it.
I already answered in the first post about not adding and not subtracting.
The Gemara says that they are null and void. I did not understand the comment on the interpretations of the commandments. The interpretation reveals what is in the commandment. Why should we suddenly see this as a displacement? And does a verse without an interpretation have any meaning?
First, there are values outside the Torah. When it says “and you did what is right and good” and does not specify, it assumes that we understand on our own. Beyond that, there are values that originate in the Torah and their existence justifies displacement (even where the pure halakha itself does not allow this, such as when doing something for the sake of it, you have violated your Torah, or an offense for its own sake, or in the case of beatings and punishments that are not from the Torah).
“The Gemara says that they are null.”- and everyone understood it not literally but about the change of the world and not that the world as it is customary practices that then the people simply decide to nullify them but because of the change of reality to a metaphysical and spiritual level it will no longer be appropriate for the mitzvot to continue to exist in the natural material way.
” The interpretation reveals what is in the mitzvah. Why suddenly see this as a displacement? And does a verse without an interpretation have any meaning? “- To interpret a mitzvah in a way that is not accepted in the usual tradition throughout the years is literally its displacement. If I interpret it in such a way that the word “thou shalt not murder“ does not at all mean murdering animals and not humans and therefore it is permissible to murder, is it not displacement?
First, there are values outside the Torah. When it says “and you have done what is right and good” – which is the word of God that commanded. And not just what is good and honest in the eyes of every person, right?
Thank you very much
I don't know what everyone understood and who they all are. There are no questions to be built on that. And, by the way, here too we are talking about a change in reality (spiritual ascension).
Interpretation is not a displacement. See Rambam Reish P'B Mehal Me'mariam. The interpretation accepted in the tradition itself was created at some point. So is it also a displacement? And the R's sermon that I mentioned regarding "Hadvah Nidita" is also a displacement?
I explained that what is right and good is what is right and good in the eyes of every person. The Torah does not detail what that right and good is. In your opinion, is this a command to observe the halakha? The Rambam and other commentators did not interpret it that way, but rather about what is beyond the halakha.
Rabbi,
I do not understand how it can be deduced from the גמעם that it believes that the mitzvot of ttillot are for the future, although this sentence is written there, but one who studies the Sugiya (Nida 6:) will see that the גמעם is probably not intended in its simplest form (I am aware that there were the first to explain the גמעם in its simplest form, the question also arises regarding their words).
According to your words that the גמעם's words are in their simplest form, how do you explain the image of the גמעם there in the words of the Rabbis: "Be free from the dead, since a person dies, he becomes free from the mitzvot", what is the connection? "For the future" means regarding the resurrection of the dead, how does the גמעם connect this with the life of the dead in the hereafter? Of course, one can interpret the words of the Rabbi in this way, since a person dies once, even when he returns to life, he is free from the mitzvot, but apart from the fact that this interpretation is narrow, it is not clear to me how the Rabbi supports himself in the passage?
In addition, according to the Rabbi whose words are simple, it is not clear to me how Rav Yosef proved that the mitzvot of tishloh are nullified for the time being because it is possible to bury the dead in prisons? His proof is built on two very non-obvious assumptions, a. The dead will rise to life from within the grave itself. b. The dead will rise to life with the clothes in which they were buried, that is, God will also return the clothes himself.
It is much clearer to understand the g If we learn that she is talking about a lawyer or something like that, the joke in the story would still be a bit strange, but much less forced, so drawing any conclusions from this story at all seems very childish to me.
I assume you understand that there is a Yeshivite joke here: and it must be urgently made difficult.
Beyond that, I do not rely on the Gemara but rather bring it as an illustration. I explained that there is no need for this Gemara and the principle expressed in it, so why all this chatter?
To Rabbi Mikhi,
I am sorry, but your assumption is wrong, and this is because apparently you have not opened this issue recently, simply, everyone who reads the issue understands that your understanding of the Gemara in the Gemara is simply wrong.
And you did not understand my words. There was no argument in this. And there was no need to make it difficult, on the contrary, I said that it is possible to make it very difficult.
Well, regarding the matter itself, I did not know that you do not rely on the Gemara and you did not write it. However, from now on I will know.
I did not understand what you meant by saying that I explained that there is no need for this Gemara and the principle expressed in it, why do I support the principle expressed in it, it seems that you believe that the principle is correct, that there will be a great spiritual ascension and that there will be significant changes.
It was said about you, “And when you afflicted him, he was afflicted.” 🙂 I am afflicted too, but I disagree.
To see that I did not rely on the Gemara, you only have to read my words. I suggested a possibility of interpreting the Gemara in this way, and I explained in several unrelated ways the possibility of canceling sacrifices even without it.
Regarding the resurrection of the dead and the issue of clothing.. Maybe it was because the person would be buried and then the resurrection would happen. And also that when the dead are raised, there will be a spiritual ascension that will also raise the clothing from its normal state to a spiritual one and thus it will be corrected from its sinful state.
Thank you very much Rabbi Michi for the answers, I really appreciate it
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