Several questions
Good evening, Your Honor,
Following the lesson you gave on Thursday evening at the Yakar synagogue in Tel Aviv about freedom and liberty, at the end of which I didn’t want to delay you and so I only asked about the column that dealt with dog matters, I thought of two questions:
A. When the Rabbi distinguished between liberty and freedom, and in particular when he spoke of liberty, he repeated several times that an expression of liberty is an action that is done within the framework of laws, but without them dictating my manner of action (or my opinion) about me, and that, if I understood correctly as stated, you called it liberty. But the matter is difficult – could it not be said of any “act of liberty” that I was not in fact limited in advance to do if I managed to do it? I will try to demonstrate with the help of an analogy to the law of gravity.
The law of gravity is a law that imposes limitations on me. For example, if I start running downhill, I can “let it” drag me down quickly, or alternatively choose to stop, slow down, jump down, etc. And as far as I understand, such an act (i.e., for example, stopping halfway down and not letting gravity drag me down while running) is the kind of act that resembles an act that the Rabbi would see as an expression of freedom. My question is: If I succeeded in stopping, hasn’t it actually been revealed here that the law of gravity does not restrict me in this regard at least? And if it never restricted me from stopping, isn’t this a free act (according to the Rabbi’s definition of freedom that he spoke about in the lesson) and not an act of “freedom”? And so it turns out that every act fits into one of two categories: If I succeeded in it, it was done within a free framework. If not, I am unable to do it, and there is no question of freedom or liberty at all here. I hope the question is clear.
on. During the experiment, you referred to an experiment in signals that attempted to confirm or refute free choice and claimed that although it was discovered that the signal precedes the choice, this was actually a reasonable discovery in light of the fact that the subject was not faced with a real dilemma. But I wondered if there was still no innovation in the experiment: after all, without the experiment, it would be reasonable to think that free choice means some moment of decision and only then the creation of a signal that leads to the action we chose. But in light of the findings of the experiment, it became new to us that free choice means (at least according to your method) not a specific moment that establishes a signal, but that a signal is not the only dictator in the question of what a person will do. This is a great innovation, since we learned that in fact the “content” of the signal is not binding !
And regardless of what has been said so far, I would love to know what you think about the interview published on the news channels of Rabbi Eli Sadan with Dana Weiss (and especially in the last few minutes where he seems to call himself “tolerant” in exactly the sense in which you have so well defined it).
Have a good week, hope things don’t take too long.
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A. The more accurate analogy is the following: Within the framework of the law of gravity, it is difficult for me to climb up a slope of dependence and it is easy for me to descend into a valley. And yet I choose to climb even though others choose to descend. This is freedom, since I acted against constraints. Clearly, this is not an action against deterministic constraints, because that is an oxymoron. But within the framework of constraints beyond my control, I chose my own path and did not let them direct me. As I explained in class, even in a concentration camp there are extremely strong constraints and some still gave their bread to others. This is a similar example. I don’t know if you are familiar with the books on the science of freedom, where things are explained in a more precise and detailed manner.
B. Indeed, that is true. There is certainly something new in this. There is another new thing that is more relevant to our case, which is that although we have a feeling that we have decided, it does not always reflect the truth.
I didn’t hear the interview.
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A. And yet, even according to your analogy – logically, what is the difference between an act that is difficult for me to do and yet I managed to do it and an act that I managed to do without a problem? After all, in the test of the result “it was discovered” that in both cases there was no restriction on climbing the mountain.
My argument is that the situation in which I do things but under restrictions (what you called freedom) has no unique meaning logically over the same act that I did without restrictions. As mentioned, in both cases I succeeded and therefore I was never limited.
B. I would be happy if you could stray a little outside the analogy and give an example of “liberal” conduct in the lifestyle of a religious person.
A. There was a limitation that made it difficult for me. This is also a limitation. After all, a limitation that makes it impossible is clear that I cannot act as a free person against it. These are always limitations that leave some margin within which I can maneuver. People who are less free will surrender to the limitation and not fight against it.
B. A person can innovate new ways of thinking (like Maimonides), against the accepted view because that is what seems right to him. He can rule a different law from the accepted view when he finds creative reasoning (in the positive sense. The reasoning is correct that they did not think of). For example, Rabbi Shlomo Carlebach acted in a way that was condemned by all the rabbis. After his death, he returned and became more accepted. Among other things, because they understood that there was justification for what he did. I will touch on this topic later in the posts I am writing now on the subject.
A. As you have already mentioned several times, disability is the inability to do something specific. According to this definition, I make two claims: 1. There is no limitation here because if the thing defined is climbing a mountain, then I managed to climb the mountain (and I will explain that according to the definition above, it does not matter whether it was difficult or easy at all) and/or alternatively 2. If the thing defined is climbing a mountain easily, then there is indeed a limitation here. On the other hand, I have never overcome this limitation because even though I eventually managed to climb the mountain, it still was not done easily.
Your Honor, I am reaching the point that after much thought on the subject of your recent columns (and later on the lesson in the synagogue, dear), I am not so sure that the relationship you have drawn between the condition (or “asset” as you put it) called freedom and the value of liberty is so clear.
For example, your reference to the subject of aesthetics and the error of postmodernism, which thought that the dismantling of all the legal frameworks of art would lead to a more “noble” art. Although, in your opinion, it is clear what the error is here – the postmodernists “confused” between freedom and liberty. They are unaware of the fact that the value of art is derived precisely from the limitations of style, form, message, etc.’. However, it is possible to formulate the postmodern transformation also in terms of freedom and to argue that at most this is a dispute about what the limit of artistic creation should be and what should not be. This is similar (from this aspect at least) to the question of whether and when it is appropriate to use the argument of public respect or not in halacha; that is, when should this limitation be expressed, in what way, if at all, etc.’.
From this moment on, the discourse that “a moment ago” failed in the naturalistic fallacy and identified freedom as a value, will become a different discourse that contains within it a value dispute regarding the dosage and nature of restrictions! And once we are all in the same boat (both those who claim to confuse freedom with liberty and the religious camp that constitutes an example of an audience that can potentially behave in a “liberal” manner), it seems that the differences between people do not differ in form, but at most in content.
B. Thank you very much. I will follow the following publications.
A. I have already answered that. An action that requires effort from me and that someone else would not do, therefore expresses my freedom. Too bad about the conceptual chatter.
B. If this is indeed the intention of postmodernism, then it is just a quantitative debate and not a real innovation. I have no problem with that. I argue with the position that advocates breaking the limitations and seeing them as a casual and arbitrary narrative. If you claim that there is no such narrative, I tend to agree. No one thinks so, but there are many who talk so (they live in an illusion).
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