Something that is not intended (and explanation by R. Shkop)
Does the Rabbi have an explanation for the words of the Rabbi who permits something he does not intend?
I saw the words of Rabbi Shkop, and as I understood it, he argues that if the man does not intend a prohibition, the action is not called a prohibited act (for example, it is not an act of plowing but rather the removal of a bench). I can understand why the action is not called a prohibited act, but this seems to me to be a purely semantic matter, and I do not see a fundamental difference that justifies the permission.
Semantics are not important here. There is an assumption here that says that a person's action is the action he intended. This is an assumption that also exists in the analytical philosophy of action. Of course, one can argue about the assumption (and Rabbi Yehuda does argue), but it is not at all unfounded.
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