Spiccato

Hello Rabbi, I didn't want to add another question so as not to burden the database of questions, and therefore I will ask here with your permission:
My question concerns doubt and doubt spikah. The simple explanation says that when I am satisfied if the command of God was for a certain situation – I will be stricter and not lighter. This is how we act throughout our lives regarding any situation of contentment that is quite reasonable and the other side involves danger/prohibition, etc.
And here, regarding doubt spikah, the Sages say that he has the power to unravel the apparent existing prohibition – and this is by virtue of two spikahs (and we mean doubt within a doubt) that exist in the same case. And apparently the heart has difficulty accepting this – Why is it that by virtue of two spikahs one is not afraid to be stricter in the prohibition? If there were five, six, or maybe seven spikas (the limit can be debated), it would be possible to accept that there is no need to fear the Torah prohibition, but two spikas sounds really excessive.
Even according to the Rashba's explanation, there is no logic to this - the Rashba believes that it is a matter of a majority of parties and not a majority of chances, and therefore it is even more inconceivable to accept this permission of a spikas spikas.
I would love to hear from the rabbi.

First, who said that in doubt of sifika there is a prohibition? Maybe it's like in the case of abrogation in the Ss, there is no prohibition at all, and then there is certainly no need to worry. It is true that the law of the Ss is based on interpretation and has no source (unless you say that it is the LBM), and therefore it is less likely.
But note that the question is not where it is appropriate to be stricter, but where it must be stricter. It is appropriate to be stricter even in cases of doubt of sifika (and perhaps also in doubt of five). But there is no obligation to be stricter when most of the chances/parties are in favor of the vote.
This can also be seen in the case of a majority vote. From the gist of the law, it applies even when there is a small majority of 51%. Ostensibly, there is no prohibition at all in the case of abrogation, but the law of something that has a permit does not see it that way. After all, if it has a permit, then they say not to eat it because it is better to eat it with permission and not with prohibition. It is proven that there is a prohibition/problem in the case of a majority vote as well, but it is permissible to transgress it (there is no halachic obligation to be careful of it, but perhaps it is appropriate to do so).
And in closing, it is worth remembering that according to Maimonides, even in the case of a single doubt, there is no obligation from the Torah to be stricter.

Good week Rabbi and thank you very much for the answer.
I would like to make a few comments:
A. You wrote that regarding the doubt of the Sipika, the question is where we must be stricter and not where it is appropriate. And so I would like to comment that this is my own question: Why is there no obligation to be stricter in the case of a Ss? To repeat: If there was some order from some body to perform action X and whoever does not perform it will lose/be punished. Now I am satisfied if a certain action is action X and as a result I cease to perform it. Of course that body will punish/lose me on the grounds that it was appropriate for me to perform this action despite the doubt. Therefore, I argue that the simple explanation says that there is an obligation to be stricter in the case of a Ss and not only that it is appropriate to be stricter, and it is not clear what exemption there is for a Ss.
B. Regarding the image of a judgment of nullification by the majority, first of all I liked the evidence that the prohibition still exists, which is compelling. But this still does not solve the problem, at most there is an English-English dictionary here. So we have another case before us that is similar in its strangeness to the present case and it is also appropriate to explain it. What is certain is that – the simple explanation does not say so and therefore the question exists – why is a doubt about the spicah (which is agreed to be from a Sabra) useful for unraveling a Torah prohibition.
C. Regarding the Maimonides, I did want to mention his words but I refrained in order not to prolong it excessively. In my opinion, the Maimonides' words are not understood from a Sabra – why is it that the instruction to be stricter is not from the Torah but from the rabbis? The simple explanation (and perhaps as a result of this, a Sabra is from the Torah) says that one must be stricter. After all, every commandment or instruction that we are satisfied with whether it should be kept or not, we understand that it should be stricter and kept and not abandoned. Therefore, in my opinion, the words of Maimonides themselves need to be studied, and therefore I do not think I can justify my question with his words.
Thank you and have a successful and excellent week!

PS
I forgot to mention in my previous words: Yashar Kawh for the wonderful books and insightful articles.

A. Why should it be obligatory? Not everything that is proper is also obligatory. Otherwise you would not have left things out of the law. You yourself wrote that in five spikot you would understand why to be lenient, so where exactly do you think the line is drawn? This is precisely what the Rishonim disagreed about: whether after one doubt (Rambam) or two (Rashba). I see no question or problem here.
B. English-English dictionary It can be said that when I use one thing to explain the other. That is not what I did here. I brought another example of the same phenomenon. That is all. The first case is not strange, nor is this one. In total, I showed you that there are cases in halakha in which it is proper to be strict even though it is not obligatory, and I argued by this that this is also the case in ss. You refuse to distinguish between what is proper and obligatory, and I do not understand why.
C. See my answers in the previous sections.

With pleasure.

With one doubt you fulfill the commandment.

With the doubt of a doubt you fulfill the doubt that the Torah did not command.