Synthetic test?
In the SD
Hello,
In your reference to proving your approach towards the entire synthetic-rational complex following David Hume’s questions, you provide statistical proof of this in the parable of the actualist-informativist conflict.
There you write that the actualist view can easily be refuted by an experiment that confirms the next case as predicted (correctly) by the informativist. Because the chance that the actualist approach will be right next time tends to zero compared to the informativist approach.
But I wanted to ask to what extent statistical evidence can actually be used to support one side of your argument with David Hume when he does not accept the principle of causality at all.
After all, to the extent that someone does not accept the principle of causality, it is not correct to say that according to him the chance that X will happen next time is one to infinity. Because the statistical assumption itself accepts one of the following three possibilities: either we are talking about a factor with a deterministic cause, or we are talking about randomness, or we are talking about free will. But all of these assumptions are under the glasses of the rational.
Empiricism does not claim that the lack of acceptance of causality leads to the concept of randomness in which all options are equal, (and therefore the chance is one to infinity), but that it is such an elusive concept that it is not even under randomness, it is simply a statistically undefined case (which is not even methodologically random). And so even if your predictions come true in a complete way, there is still no proof for your claim.
I would love to hear what the Rabbi thinks about this.
I’m not sure I understood the question. You’re asking why the actualist would accept probability as a consideration? In practice, he usually does. If he doesn’t accept that and the logic, there’s no point in talking.
I do claim that someone who does not accept the principle of causality (like David Hume) cannot talk about probability as a consideration.
Do you think that someone who does not accept the principle of causality (and perhaps even accepts the possibility of absurdities such as "there is from nothing", etc.) can still accept probabilistic thinking? Why? After all, he is not talking, according to his method, about a random situation given to a thing whose chance of the prophecy coming true is one to infinity, but about an undefined situation.
Just as you go to great lengths in your book The Science of Freedom to explain that libertarianism does not talk about randomness on the one hand and determinism on the other, but about a third situation. So the atheist in causality believes in a fourth situation... a completely undefined situation. I do not think that every undefined situation is random.
As I wrote, factually he accepts. And he has no reason not to accept, just as he accepts logic. What does this have to do with causality?
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