Tefillin every day

Isn't the Tosefta I brought strong evidence? It really seems from there that the whole day is like a greeting to Shacharit.

Indeed, that's what it looks like there.

If we assume that tefillin are meant to be worn for a short time, then this is indeed the meaning of the Tosefta.
But in fact, from most of the sources, it is clear that tefillin are meant to be worn all day long, and if this is the meaning of the Tosefta, then if he has not yet put them on in the morning and they are not yet on him, he should put them on later and at least for the remaining time he will be wearing tefillin, and this until the evening, because at night they are not worn (either from the Torah or from the rabbis, there is disagreement).
Like saying: Put on socks in the morning, and if you don’t put them on, put them on all day long.

The article (with the permission of Rabbi Ya'evetz Shalit): Tefillin - for remembrance before the Lord's Day always A. Four parshas are in tefillin. B. Two elements of the Exodus from Egypt. C. Tefillin De'mari Alma. D. The combination of the parshas as proof of the obligation to wear tefillin all day. E. Days that are a form of a letter. F. A source for putting them on at least once a day. G. Tefillin as a Talmud Torah and in its place. H. A new explanation of the story of Elisha with wings. I. Summary A. Four parshas are in tefillin. There are four parshas in the Torah that we are commanded to write in tefillin. The simple depth of the Bible is that these are such fundamental elements of faith in the mind and life of the Israelite man that the Torah warns that they should not be removed from his mouth and memory. To this end, he must bind them by hand and between his eyes, so that his whole life may be founded on these elements. The tradition of our sages, according to the law of Moses from Sinai, explained the commandment in its practical details, how to anchor these matters in concrete actions, just as a person does with his important matters, which he writes down and wears in prominent places. There are four parshas, four issues, four foundations of faith, without remembering which the Israeli man would lack the foundation for the servitude of the Creator. Parshas Shema establishes the foundation of the oneness of God and His love, and in the language of the Mishnah (Berachot 2:2) “accepting the yoke of the kingdom of heaven”. Parshas Veyeh Im Shemu establishes the law of retribution, that the Creator rewards well those who do His commandments and punishes those who break His commandments, and in the language of the Mishnah (ibid.) “accepting the yoke of commandments”. Parshas Kadesh and Veyeh Yahveh Thus the Ramban wrote (Exodus 13:16): “And here is the root of this commandment, that we should place the writing of the Exodus on the hand and on the head opposite the heart and brain, which are the abodes of thought. And here we write a holy section, and it shall be that when he brings you with drops because of this commandment, in which we were commanded to do the Exodus from Egypt, they shall be drops between our eyes, and in the section of Shema, and it shall be that if we hear, we are commanded to do the mitzvot as well, as it is written: And these words which I command you today shall be on your heart, and they shall be drops between your eyes, and for this reason we also write those two sections as drops, which are the commandments of uniqueness and the remembrance of all the mitzvot, their punishment and their reward, and the whole root is in faith.” In short, in the words of the Book of Education (Mitzvah 122): “And the point of these four parshis is greater than the rest of the parshis of the Torah, since they contain the acceptance of the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven, and the unity of God, and the matter of the Exodus from Egypt.” And these are the foundations of the Jewish religion. There are certainly additional foundations that are necessary for a man of Israel, and the Sages discussed whether to require the inclusion of additional parshis in tefillin – the parshis of Tzitzit or the Ten Commandments (Deuteronomy, paragraph 36), but according to the law, only those that are explicitly stated in the Torah are written in tefillin, since the Torah has determined that only these foundations will not be removed from our eyes and from our hearts. But we began with four and ended with three. Why is it necessary to have two parshis to remember the Exodus from Egypt? If the Torah commanded us to remember two parshis that deal with the Exodus from Egypt, there are two different foundations that necessitate two parshis. What is the additional foundation? B. Two elements in the Exodus. The Exodus establishes faith in the Creator of the world and its leader. He is the one who plunders the systems of nature, He is the one who prophesies His servants the prophets and sends them to the creatures of the world to warn them and command them, and He judges the nation and who can tell Him what to do. In the plagues of Egypt that brought about Pharaoh's surrender, God showed His great hand and outstretched arm so that we might recount His greatness to our children and our children's children and plant faith in Him in our hearts. But another element is learned in the Exodus and stands on its own. Taking a nation from among nations teaches about God's love for Israel, about the covenant of the fathers that is remembered for the children, so that we may know and also know in the world that God will make a distinction between Egypt and Israel. This important element was emphasized throughout all the plagues, but especially in the plague of the firstborn. The main purpose of the plague of the firstborn, after all the plagues, is to clarify and illuminate this element. The plundering of the natural systems in the plague of hail, for example, is more striking and resonant than in the plague of firstfruits, and indeed in the hail the Torah emphasizes more the knowledge of the power of the Almighty (Exodus 9:16): “And in this time I have made you stand, in this time I have made you see my power, and in order that my name may be proclaimed throughout all the earth.” The plague of firstfruits is very powerful in proving the discrimination between Egypt and Israel, which indeed existed in other plagues as well, but here it seems that this is its main concern (Exodus 11:7): “In order that you may know that the Lord will judge between the nations.” Between Egypt and Israel. At Mount Sinai, God opened and said (Ibid. 22): “I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery.” Throughout the Torah, the reason for accepting the yoke of commandments due to the exodus from Egypt is given many times. This reason is divided into two: the greatness of the Lord requires accepting the yoke of His kingdom, and the gratitude for our salvation that leads to the making of the covenant. In the language of prayer, we can say this: Our Father, our King. Our Father is a relationship of kinship for His birth of us, a nation from among nations, and our King is a relationship of slaves because God is in heaven and we are on earth. Whether as sons or as slaves, in love and fear. The two parshits in the Tefillin, Kadesh and Vehecha ki ei ve vechak, bring to mind these two elements separately, on the basis of the Exodus from Egypt. Parashat Kadesh does indeed open with a command to sanctify the firstborn, but without giving a reason. Moses' words to the people deal with remembering the day of the Exodus and the Passover service, and the Haggadah to Laban is about the very departure from Egypt that makes these commandments obligatory. This obligation is to our king, out of awe, because of his greatness and might. Parashat Vehecha ki ei ve vechak emphasizes the distinction of Israel. The consecration of the firstborn to the Lord, the redemption of the firstborn of a person, the sacrifice of the firstborn of a clean animal, and the commandment to release the donkey, highlight the plague of the firstborn from all the plagues of Egypt, and place the burden of the commandments on the basis of the knowledge of good (ibid. 13:15): “And the Lord killed’ Every firstborn in the land of Egypt… therefore I sacrifice to Him’ every male who opens the womb, and every firstborn of my sons, Ephda”. This parashat establishes the foundation of love for our Father, because of His choice of our fathers and our sons. 3. Tefillin Demari Alma. It is possible to find a basis for this division between the Holy Parashat and the Parashat Veha Ya'vi'ach, in the words of the Gemara (Berachot 6:1) which details the four Parashits in Tefillin De'mari Alma: “El Rav Nachman bar Yitzhak to Rav Chiya bar Avin: Here are Tefillin De'mari Alma, what is written in it, El: And who is like your people Israel, one nation in the land… He said to them: The Holy One of Israel, you have made me one division in the world, and I will make you one division in the world, you have made me one division in the world, as it is said: Hear Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one, and I will make you one division in the world, as it is said: And who is like your people Israel, one nation in the land. Rav Acha Bariya Darba said to Rav Ashi: Rest in Had Beta, in the rest of the houses of May… But who is a great nation and who is a great nation? He compared it to each other in Had Beta, Blessed are you, Israel, and who is like your people, Israel, in Had Beta, or God tried in Had Beta, and gave you the highest in Had Beta. The Gemara parallels the first parasha with Parasha Shema. God singles out Israel just as Israel singles out Him. It seems that there is a parallel also between the additional themes of the parashas in Tefillin, and according to our words above: Who is like your people, Israel? Blessed are you, Israel? (the specialness of Israel by God and their love) in contrast to Shema, and gave you the highest (as a reward for keeping the Torah, Deuteronomy 26:16-19) in contrast to Shema, for who is a great nation and who is a great nation (the greatness of Israel) in contrast to the Exodus in Parasha Kadesh, or God tried to come and take a nation for Himself from among the nations (the choosing of Israel) in contrast to the plague of the firstborn in Parasha and in And it came to pass that He would bring you. Here too, there is a similarity, conceptual and linguistic, between the third and fourth parashas, except that one magnifies Israel and one emphasizes Israel's selection from Egypt, just as in our prayers one magnifies the Creator (Holy) and one deals with Israel's selection (and it shall be that He will bring you). D. The combination of the parashas as proof of the obligation to wear tefillin all day long. This remembrance, which according to the plain meaning is so that it does not depart from our hearts and does not depart from our eyes, is its observance once a day or at all times? Apparently, tefillin is a commandment all day long, for the Torah did not give them a limit or limit, except only during times that were limited - night and Sabbaths and the 19th according to some of the conditions (Eruvin, 1:1 and more), but on the other hand, the prevailing reality is that the commandment to wear tefillin is observed only for a short time of the day. Many sources simply teach that the main commandment is that they be worn on one's head all day, but due to the difficulty of maintaining their sanctity, their actual wearing is limited to the time of reading the Shema and prayer, so that at least one would not be like giving false testimony when one says the verses commanding one to wear tefillin and does not keep them. The evidence is known here and there, but it must be argued that the familiar external structure of the tefillin clearly proves that the main commandment is worn all day, and if it were not so, the tefillin would not look the way they do. The Torah commanded in four different parshas to tie them on the hand and between the eyes, with each parsha appearing in itself, and there is no verse connecting these commandments. It is stated in the Gemara (Menachot 44:1) that wearing tefillin fulfills eight positive commandments, four on the hand and four on the head. But in the list of commandments, only two are listed, one on the hand and one on the head, because their four sections inhibit each other, as the Maimonides explained in Shoshar 11. How is there any practical connection between them at all? Why don't we assume four separate tefillin, each with one section? What is the source of the connection of all the remembrances together? After all, there are four completely separate commandments in the Torah. The baraita (Minachot 34:2) requires: “A doctor may write them on four leathers and place them in two houses on the leathers? And for a memorial between your eyes, I have told you one memorial, not two and three memorials.” How is that? They are written on four leathers and placed in two houses. (It is further explained there that this is due to the head, and due to the hand, one skin in one house.) The baraita essentially asks our question, where is the connection between the different memories? Why don't we put four tefillin with four parshiot on the hand, and so on the head, without any connection between them? The baraita's answer is that there is no room for several memories. But this answer is difficult to understand. Can we demand that we not eat matzah and maror one after the other, or a celebration and a Passover, because there are two eatings here? Can we demand that there be no room for two sayings a day, the recitation of Shema and the blessing of food, for example? Isn't it clear that one act can be done after another and there is no contradiction between them. How does putting on several different tefillin contradict the fact that each memory stands on its own? It is clear that the intention of the sermon is that it is not possible to put several memories in the same place on the body, and after all, the place of the tefillin is the same for all parshiot. Even if there is indeed a physical place on the head to place two tefillin, and if they were smaller, each containing only one portion, there might have been room for four tefillin, the sermon is that one should not remember more than one matter separately and that they should be combined into a unified memory. However, this sermon is understandable only if all the memorizations are placed at the same time. If the Torah's intention was to place them once a day, then they can be placed one after the other, and after all, it is like all the mitzvot that a person fulfills one and then the other, even with the same limb, and there is no conflict here. It is clear, therefore, from the sermon that memorization is something that is constantly fixed in its place, and it is not appropriate to explain the Torah's intention to remember each portion at a different time of the day, since thus not one of the memorizations is fulfilled in its entirety. If the Torah commanded that four matters be remembered, and if the language of the Torah instructs that there are no two and three memorizations, then the only way is to unite all the memorizations and place them together, since they must all be placed at the same time. In short, let's put it this way: If the commandment of tefillin is limited in time, like performing an action, then it is possible to do several actions one after the other, and there is no contradiction in the language of the Torah. Only if the putting on of tefillin is a permanent state, then several tefillin at the same time will constitute the reception of several memories, and this is not what the language of the Torah implies. It is found that the form of the tefillin proves that the tefillin accompany the Israeli throughout his entire life to the extent possible. 5. Days that are the embodiment of a sign. In a baraita (Menachot lu עבר ערובים עבר Days when Israel needed to place a sign upon themselves to recognize that they held the Torah of the Holy One. Sabbaths and holy days came out, which are themselves a sign between the Holy One and Israel, as it is written (Exodus 31:13): “For it is a sign between me and you.” And the Tosafot (menachot there, the Lord came out) and their followers claim that not only the prohibition of work constitutes a sign, but eating matzah on all the days of Passover and sitting in the Sukkah on all the days of the holiday also constitute a sign, and in the Eruvin (commandment 1:5 days) they wrote that the prohibition of work on the day of the festival is the sign, and therefore the day of the festival is exempt from tefillin. And many Rishonim disagree with this, and see below, section 6. And in simple terms, the Tosafot’s method is difficult. For it is said of Shabbat: “For it is a sign,” and as Rashi interpreted, and a holy day is given to resemble Shabbat. The prohibition of performing the work of Chol HaMoed can also be said to be an extension of the prohibition of performing the work of Yom Tov, and is similar to it. However, why is the observance of a mitzvot on Chol HaMoed considered a sign that exempts one from tefillin, according to the Tosafot system in menachot? In particular, eating matzah during Passover, which is permitted, and not as a sukkah, if one wants to eat it, one must be in the sukkah, and if one eats outside the sukkah, one nullifies one’s action. Therefore, on Passover, there is no abrogation of a mitzvah, and simply, the observance of a mitzvah does not belong, and indeed the opinion of the Gra is well-known that there is a mitzvah in this, and yet the question is, does every mitzvah exempt one from tefillin? This should be understood according to what we wrote in section A above and in note 1, that the depth of the Torah's intention is to remember matters of faith at all times, and that they will not be removed from our hearts and minds, and the actual putting on of tefillin is a "sign", meaning a remembrance so that we do not forget it. And this is why Rabbi Akiva demanded, "Those who need a sign, leave out Shabbat and the holy days, which are the embodiment of a sign". That is, on the Sabbath day, a person cannot remove the belief in the Oneness from his heart, since the entire day's rest reminds him of this, and so does the holy days. And to this the Tosafot added that even the festivals do not need a sign, since a person remembers the Exodus from Egypt and the belief in the Oneness at all times, by virtue of his food and his sitting. And even actions that are not actual fulfillment of a mitzvah, remind him of the belief in the very change from routine. And these are not days on which Israel needs to place a sign upon themselves to recognize that they hold to the Torah of the Almighty, as Rashi says above. It should be added that in the Scriptures it is explicitly stated that the acts of these days are intended to commemorate the Exodus from Egypt throughout the entire year. Regarding matzah, it is said: “You shall not eat leavened bread on it for seven days; you shall eat unleavened bread on it, for you came out of the land of Egypt in haste, so that you may remember the day of your departure from the land of Egypt all the days of your life.” (Deuteronomy 16:3), and the plain meaning of the Bible is that the purpose of eating unleavened bread seven days a year is that it is sufficient to remember it for the entire year. Likewise, in the commandment of the sukkah it is said: “That your generations may know that I made the children of Israel dwell in the sukkahs when I brought them out of the land of Egypt” (Leviticus 23:44). Here too it is explained that the purpose of dwelling in the sukkah during those seven days is to remember forever and for generations. If so, there is indeed no need for them to be a sign to commemorate faith and the servitude of God. Only on the days of routine that one does not engage in this remembrance all day long is there a need for a permanent sign to remind one of this. This understanding also emphasizes what was said above, that the need for a sign is not for one moment a day, but rather it is a permanent situation. If it were only necessary once a day, then during the act of a mitzvah such as reciting the Shema, for example, it is certain that he is wearing a sign, and he did not abstain from eating matzah or sitting in the sukkah, and at that moment there is no need to place a sign on himself to recognize that he holds the Torah of God, as Rashi says above. And why is tefillin necessary? But on the days of the festivals, the acts of faith accompany the day throughout, and even if not literally continuously, they are at least noticeable throughout the hours of the day (and indeed the Tosafot adopted the mitzvah of the sukkah and not the mitzvah of the lulav, which was issued by the house). However, on ordinary days there is no such mitzvah, and therefore the Torah required tefillin as a permanent sign, and although it is not mandatory to wear it literally all day long, see below, section 7. 6. A source for wearing them at least once a day. According to us, this mitzvah has no upper limit in terms of time. Does it have a lower limit? Is there a minimum time for putting on tefillin during which one fulfills an obligation and is this not considered a cancellation of a positive commandment? It is accepted that once a day is the minimum, and passing a day without putting on tefillin nullifies a positive commandment. The strictness of putting them on once a day while reciting the Shema and the Shacharit prayer originates from the words of Chazal: “As if one were to bear false witness.” However, this is not a halacha from the laws of tefillin, but rather to avoid false witness (in practice, there is a guideline here for when to put on tefillin, and this appears in the laws of tefillin, of course). A person who is raped and recites the Shema without tefillin, why must he put them on that day? We did not find a source for this lesson in the words of Chazal. As stated above, according to the Tosafot, Chol HaMoed is exempt from tefillin. In contrast, the opinion of the Rosh and his group is that the Hol of Moed is obligatory for tefillin. The poskim have extended this (see 2:3, paragraph 3), and as is known, the Shulchan Ar-Rahman (paragraph 3, paragraph 2) ruled that the exemption was granted, mainly because of the words of the Zohar that he cited in Beit Yosef, and the Rema brought the Ashkenazi custom of placing them with a blessing. There are also those who used to place them without a blessing or with a sana’ah, and these things are ancient. Ostensibly, if the obligation to place tefillin once a day is a principle of the law, how did the Israelites practice easing doubts about a positive commandment from the Torah without the halakha being clearly decided? And was the opinion of the Rishonim faction rejected unanimously because of the Rishonim faction and the warning of the Zohar, to the point where they have no fear at all of abrogating a positive commandment? It seems that this is not the way to rule on halakha in general. It appears from this that the cancellation of one day is not considered a cancellation of a positive commandment, but rather that this amount is a custom of the Israelites so that the commandment of tefillin is not canceled. In Tractate Shavuot (25:1), they disagreed about a past-expressive oath when it is not possible to swear about such an action in the future, for example, an oath that a certain person threw a bundle into the sea, which cannot be sworn to throw, since it is not in the hands of the one swearing, if he brings a sacrificial offering and returns. Rav obliges, and Shmuel is exempted. Rav Hamonona challenges (ibid. 2) Shmuel from the mishna at the end of the chapter (29:2): “I have not eaten today nor have I put on tefillin today, I swear to you, and I say, ‘Amen, I am obligated.’ Did I not eat it without eating, but did I not put it on? Who did it without resting? ” And Rashi interpreted “Who did I put on without resting?” in a past-expressive oath? And did he swear to nullify the mitzvah?” Rav Hamonona argues that according to Shmuel, the Mishnah's intention is to require intentional flogging, even though one who accidentally commits an offense is exempt from the sacrifice. Ostensibly, the inverse of "I did not put on tefillin today" is "I will not put on tefillin today." And Rav Hamonona argued that such an oath does not apply because one swears to nullify a mitzvah. Is this the source of the fact that putting off tefillin for a whole day is considered a positive abrogation, or is it that even if one swears not to put on tefillin for half a day, one is considered to have sworn to nullify a mitzvah and the oath does not apply? Ostensibly, this cannot be said, since most people do not put on tefillin all day and do not consider this to nullify a positive mitzvah, and how is it possible that someone who swears not to do something that they do not do anyway will be considered to have sworn to nullify a mitzvah while the one who does it himself is not considered to nullify a mitzvah? It would be appropriate to say that any action that is a mitzvah for an oath to annul it is not valid, even though the mitzvah can be fulfilled in another way, and although there is no literal annulment of a mitzvah by not putting on tefillin at any moment, since taking extra time is fulfilling a mitzvah, an oath to annul this mitzvah does not apply. However, the above mishna (a) provides an example of an express oath that is obligatory: “He said an oath that he would give to so-and-so, but he did not give it,” and the Gemara makes it difficult: “What do you give? Is it not charity for the poor, sworn and standing at Mount Sinai, as it is said (Deuteronomy 15:10) “You shall give it to him as a gift.” But a gift to the rich.” And the Rashba wrote (D. Ilima, and see also Ritva and Mayari): “There are some of our great French rabbis, the late, who said that when a poor person asks him for charity, and he swears to give it to him, is the poor person not bound by an oath that he is not obligated to go and support the poor in moderation, and it seems to me that even with a small gift, such as giving him a living wage for an hour, is he obligated to do more than that, and is he not bound by an oath to enrich him?” Thus, only if the failure to perform the act is abrogation of a real mitzvah, such as when a poor person is standing before him and he is obligated to give him at least a living wage, is an oath not valid. But if he swears not to give more than the minimum obligation, the oath is valid, although it is certain that if he gives more, he will fulfill a mitzvah. The Efraim camp (Shevuot 615) discusses whether an oath not to give charity to a particular poor person is valid, since one can give charity to another poor person and others will support that poor person, and it is found that this does not nullify a mitzvah. He cites the words of the Rashba and challenges him, stating that in the Gemara (Kiddushin 8:22 and Nedim 7:22) it is proven that a poor person is not obligated to support a specific person, and a person can say that they will support another, and from the words of the Maimonides he concluded that only if one swears not to give charity to the poor at all does the oath not apply. It is explained that an act of a mitzvah, the avoidance of which does not completely nullify a mitzvah, is valid for him, and if so, in the case of an oath not to put on tefillin, only when the non-assumption is a complete nullification does the oath not apply. And some say that if he does not give charity to this poor person and gives charity to another poor person, the mitzvah has been fulfilled to the same extent, but if he did not put on tefillin for a while out of a desire to cancel a mitzvah, it is not possible to complete the mitzvah at another time, since this is a different obligation. Maimonides (Hilkot Shavuot 14-16) wrote: “And likewise, anyone who swears to cancel a mitzvah and does not cancel is exempt from an express oath and is subject to a false oath and performs the mitzvah he swore to cancel. For example, someone who swears not to build a sukkah, not to wear tefillin, and not to give charity… He swears to fulfill the mitzvah and does not fulfill an exemption from an express oath, for example, someone who swears to build a lulav or a sukkah or to give charity to the poor… Since an express oath does not apply except to words of permission, if he wants to do it and if he does not want to do it, as it is said to do evil or to do good.” In the case of the abrogation of a mitzvah, he wrote “that he shall not wear tefillin” and did not write a time period, whereas in the case of the observance of a mitzvah, he did not write an example of tefillin. Perhaps it should be interpreted that in the observance of a mitzvah, since there is indeed no absolute obligation to put on at any moment (and see more below), the oath applies, since it adds an absolute obligation that did not exist before the oath, whereas in the case of the abrogation of a mitzvah, the oath does not apply to an act whose abrogation is abrogation of a mitzvah, even though it is not an absolute abrogation as we understood above. Perhaps the Maimonides intended that he would never wear tefillin, and abrogation from this point onward is abrogation of a mitzvah, whereas an oath to wear tefillin cannot be interpreted as meaning that he should put on at any moment, but he can add by putting them on, and it cannot be said that the oath is about what was already obligatory and so on. However, I found in the Jerusalemite discourse (Horoyot P’1:3) a source that supposedly instructs on a lesson of at least once a day: “A prophet and a rejecter, can they tell you not to wear tefillin today, but to wear tefillin tomorrow, will you listen to them? You must walk in them, not in all of them, for you have disobeyed them all that day.” The baraita demands that only if a false prophet and a rejecter seek to pass on a complete mitzvah are they liable to death, and as an example, the cancellation of one day’s tefillin is given. This means that each day is a mitzvah in itself and the cancellation of one day is considered the cancellation of a mitzvah. And perhaps for the night and not the time of tefillin, there is an argument that a separate obligation is renewed each day, but for the night and time of tefillin, the obligation is continuous and has no meaning for a separate day (and the prohibition from the rabbis to put them down is only out of fear that one will fall asleep in them and does not essentially interrupt the obligation, and therefore there is also no argument that there will be a new obligation from the rabbis every day). 7. Tefillin as Talmud Torah and in its place. The halachic definition of the tefillin commandment requires explanation. The tzitzit commandment, for example, applies whenever a person wears a garment that is obligatory, and whoever takes off his garment must repeat the blessing when he puts it on again if there was a break, since he is fulfilling a complete mitzvah again. On the other hand, the commandment of the lulav, for example, is fulfilled once a day, and although the people of Jerusalem would take the lulav all day out of love for the mitzvah (Sukkah 44:2), and there is also a mitzvah to wave the hallel and there is a limit to this of the remnants of the mitzvah (ibid. 37:2), but once one has fulfilled his obligation, he is not permitted to recite the blessing again (ibid. 44:1, Shulchan Ar-Rahman 65:1). The commandment of tefillin gedera is an intermediate between them. On the one hand, the one who puts it down and pulls it out and distracts himself returns and recites the blessing, since he is fulfilling a complete mitzvah, but on the other hand, the one who does not return and put it down does not nullify a positive mitzvah, just as one walks in a garment without a tzitzit, and most people walk most of the day without tefillin. What is this intermediate limit? The commandment of Talmud Torah gedera is similar to this. On the one hand, its cancellation is only when a whole day has passed without studying Torah, and since a person recited the Shema, it is not valid (Menachot 77:2), and on the other hand, whenever a Torah learner fulfills a complete mitzvah and if he were to become distracted, he would have to repeat and recite the blessing several times a day, except that usually it is not considered a distraction. The boundary of Talmud Torah is that a person should study in all his free time, when he is not preoccupied with the needs of the body and the earthly life and is not engaged in a mitzvah that is being passed. It is possible that he is also wearing tefillin. Their commandment is to put them on whenever he is fit and able to do so. Whoever cancels them due to his needs, because his body is unfit, and the like, does not commit a sin. However, whoever cancels them for no reason does so unlawfully. And in any case, it is forbidden to go through an entire day without them, as stated above (and this is also similar to Talmud Torah). This similarity between Torah and tefillin is indeed presented in the Gemara in several contexts. In Kiddushin (33:1): “And the mitzvot of the time are exempted from women. From them? The end of the mitzvot of the time is the exemption from women, and the And are we able to meditate day and night? The Holy One, the Exalted, said to them: My son! You put tefillin on your heads and on your arms, and I adjure you as if you meditate on the Torah day and night, as it is said, “And it shall be for you as a sign on your hand and as a memorial between your eyes, that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth.” And we find something greater than this in the Mekhilta, and it was ruled in the Tosho (Lehi 10) that one who engages in the Torah is exempt from tefillin, and the early ones differed in the interpretation of the Halacha, and the Poskim qualified the exemption. See all of this in our chapter. It seems that the boundary of the tefillin commandment is that the study of the Torah be fulfilled by mouth and deed, or at least by one of them. Binding the principles of the Torah on the heart and between the eyes is parallel to the study of the Torah and the utterance of it and complements them, especially at a time when we cannot engage in it properly. It is found that the one engaged in Torah does not need this, and precisely in his trade and his journey, the reminder is more important. However, if he held onto this and did not let go of this either, his reward and his action are before him, and as is the virtue of the Rivaz and the Riva who were careful to hold onto both as one. We also find (Bak 17:1) that Rabbi Yochanan did not answer his student's question when he left the house of the throne, until he put on tefillin, and in the version of the questions (it was quoted there in Tud 17:1) the Torah is the study and tefillin are the existence, and in the study of an individual it is better to precede the Torah with tefillin because study is greater than action. In addition, priests are exempt from wearing tefillin during their service (and are permitted to wear tefillin on their heads but not on their hands because of the barrier, Zebachim 19:1, Rambam Tefillin 14:3, Keli HaMikdash 16:6). It has been found that someone who is engaged in the service of God, either in the act of performing sacrificial work, or in thought, studying Torah, is exempt from wearing tefillin. Tefillin are intended primarily to compensate for the lack of ability to engage in actual service of God at all times, and by means of tefillin he will not be distracted from the service of God (the remembrance of the tzitzit is another barrier for him, as a slave who indicates his duty to his master by wearing it, and as a king who indicates his closeness to the kingdom by wearing it, and so on). And I saw a valuable idea, that the Torah defined tefillin as jewelry, see above note 3, and as a way for a person to adorn himself with his jewelry on a regular basis, but he removes them from him in the course of his daily life. Thus, one must indeed fulfill the mitzvah of tefillin, and if a person removes them due to a reason or annoyance, and even in the course of his daily life sometimes, this does not nullify the mitzvah. However, if a person no longer sees them as jewelry that is worthy of adorning himself with beyond the minimum obligation, it must be said that he has missed the intention of the Torah. The actual situation is that most people do not wear tefillin all day, and from this stems the strictness not to engage in mundane conversation, even appropriate official matters, in them. One who wears them all day is certainly engaged in mundane matters that are permissible and proper, such as trading and doing crafts, and the like, and as mentioned, this is the intention of the Torah, that he should sanctify all his actions with them. Although one who puts them on only during prayer is careful to remove them before doing any action that is not part of the prayer, the feeling was thus received that permitted conversation that is not words of Torah and prayer supposedly detracts from the sanctity of the tefillin, and that one must remain in a kind of fast of speech while wearing them. 8. A new explanation of the act of Elisha the Winged One. In ancient times, putting them on daily was not always taken for granted. This is evident from the Tosafot (Shabbat 44:1, 45, as Elisha), and the testimony of the Samael (Mitzvot Asa 3) is well known, who did much to restore the mitzvah of putting on tefillin to the Jewish communities, after he saw that the mitzvah had been abandoned. Already in the Gemara (ibid. 11:1) it is stated: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Every mitzvah that the Israelites themselves handed over to them for death at the time of the destruction, such as idolatry and circumcision, is still held in their hands. And any commandment that Israel did not themselves pass on to death at the time of destruction, such as tefillin, is still worn by them. Rabbi Yannai: Tefillin require a clean body, like Elisha with wings. What is it? Abaye said: He should not blow on them. Rava said: He should not sleep in them. And my mother called him Elisha with wings? Because once a wicked king decreed that a decree was passed upon Israel that whoever put tefillin on his head would have his mind cut off, and Elisha would put on tefillin and go out to the market and see a halberd, running in front of him and running after him, and when he came to him, he took it from his head and put it in his hand. Elisha: What is in your hand? He said to him: The wings of a dove. He stretched out his hand and found dove's wings in it. Therefore, they called him “the wings of a dove” (the incident is also mentioned in Shabbat 40:1). The incident and the ruling learned from it raise two questions. First, where did Elisha keep his body clean? The Tosafot (v. 1, 2, 3) explained that if he had not kept the sanctity of the tefillin with a clean body, he would not have had a miracle, but ts'a, after all, if there is no halacha to keep a clean body, why would he not have a miracle? And if the intention is that even without the obligatory halacha it is clear that the degree of chassidut is to keep a clean body, how can we prove from this that it is indeed a complete obligation? Perhaps Elisha practiced chassidut and therefore a miracle was performed for him. A second question was raised by the Rishonim, how was it permissible for Elisha to remove the tefillin when the kasdor came to him, and did not at the time of destruction one have to surrender one's soul for every mitzvah, even for a demsani arakta. Several excuses were given in the Rishonim. The Tosafot (v. 2, 4) explained that many Jews go without tefillin and this does not seem to nullify a mitzvah or even to look like a gentile. In his novellas and reasonings, the Rabbi Yosef in Sanhedrin (17:2) argues that a foreigner can remove them from his head against his will, and this is a universal principle that there is no obligation to surrender one's life, because the deed will be done one way or another. The deed can be interpreted differently, and the two questions are mutually exclusive. Elisha did not remove the tefillin despite the danger, because at the time of destruction one must surrender one's life for every mitzvah. However, when the kasdor came to him, Elisha feared that he would not be able to present himself in a clean body due to the fear of death, and removed the tefillin from his head out of respect for their sanctity, and not in order to be saved. After proving his non-submission to the kasdor that he had not removed them before, there is also no concern in this that seems to be a surrender to the decree. 9. Summary: There are four parshas on tefillin: Yahud Ha-Ha; and his love, the belief in reward and punishment, the strengthening of faith through the exodus from Egypt, and the election of the people of Israel through the plague of firstborns. In the Tefillin of the Demeri Alma, four similar principles appear regarding the people of Israel. The combination of the four principles into one Tefillin commandment stems from the obligation to remember these principles all day long, and thus there is no room for several remembrances at the same time and they must be combined into one remembrance. If it had been right to be content with remembering part of the day from the beginning, the time could have been divided between the four remembrances. However, there is a minimum rate of one per day. The gedera of the mitzvah is similar to Talmud Torah, which must be observed as much as possible and at least once a day. Tefillin are the study of Torah in action, and its main purpose is to save those who do not study Torah from being distracted from the service of God. At the time of the decrees, Israel did not surrender themselves to this mitzvah, and it is still lax in their hands, except for Elisha who surrendered himself to their existence and removed them only because of their holiness and not out of fear of death.

Thank you (although the article is already on the ‘HaOtzar’ website, like all the other issues). For the sake of the Yerushalmi, he says exactly the opposite. He asked about the milk about the removal of part of the mitzvah (the question is not so clear, but from what follows it can be understood). He cites a baraita that asks whether the prophet removes tefillin one day, to hear no or no? Tell them to walk in them and not in part. In other words, removing one day is not considered the entire mitzvah, and therefore we will remove that day. (And in the interpretation you gave, why did the baraita even need to mention “and not in part”? It is unrelated) Then the Yerushalmi argues, “And you removed the whole of that day!” and makes excuses, that there is no removal of the body of the mitzvah here, and therefore we listen to the prophet and do not put them on that day, and this also answers the question about the milk. Then he cites that another Amora asked the same question about removal from one municipality to another: If we permitted removal of one cubit from one municipality and not two, why is this not considered an uprooting? After all, we uprooted that entire cubit! And he makes the same excuse.

A. Regarding the Yerushalmi, it is clear that the removal of one day is not the removal of an entire mitzvah, since yesterday they were laid down and tomorrow they will be laid down. However, the Yerushalmi discusses whether the removal of one fulfillment of the mitzvah is considered removal. This is the connection to ’and not in part’, since the simplicity of the parasha deals with a prophet and a denier who says to completely abolish one mitzvah and remove it from the Torah.

B. The article is indeed found in ’Otzar’ and it also contains numerous footnotes on the body of the article, but here, on the other hand, there are several additions that were written after the publication in ’Otzar’. One of them is the issue of Shavuot, which also perhaps has a source for once a day.

C. Regarding the Tosefta in which you opened and restated, it does indeed still need to be studied. I agree that your interpretation is the simplest in the language of the Tosefta, and in accordance with our custom today of putting on for a limited time once a day, and the discussion is whether it must be in the morning, but it seems to me that it is very difficult to interpret this in a conditional source, and as I wrote that the commandment of tefillin is not for a limited time but for all time. And indeed we are now discussing what the minimum is, but this does not arise in the language of the Tosefta in any case, since there is no need to say that if one does not put on in the morning, he should put them on all day, because even if he put them on in the morning, there is no reason to remove them before the end of the day. And the Tosefta should have said: When is their time? In the morning, and all day is their time.

One must also wonder about the order of the halakhah, which also enumerates several commandments and details their blessings, and it is precisely tefillin that suddenly deals with their time. Why? Is there perhaps a tosefta here? One must examine the Tosefta as a whole.

I have now checked the Tosefta as a plain text here
https://www.massorti.com/IMG/pdf/liberman_tosseftazraim1.pdf

He suggests that the discussion in the Tosefta is not when to place but when to recite the blessing, according to Sukkah Mo.

Ostensibly, the Tosefta's stipulation can be explained as a tradition not far removed from the words of Ulla, that initially tefillin should be worn in the morning and as a well-known tradition:
R’ Haya in the name of R’ Yochanan: What is the point of saying that a person wears tefillin and recites Shema and prays so that he may receive the kingdom of heaven upon himself, paying a price.

And if he did not wear tefillin in the morning, he can still wear them all day.

It seems from the sources at the beginning that tefillin should be worn all day.
The wording is clear.
Not ambiguous.