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Tema D’Kra – Questions about a chapter in the book Yishlach Sharashiu

שו”תCategory: Meta HalachaTema D’Kra – Questions about a chapter in the book Yishlach Sharashiu
asked 3 years ago

While reading the book Yishlach Sharishiu in the chapter on the topic of reading, several questions and concerns arose in my mind: [I don’t know if the rabbi has time to respond privately and whether the most convenient platform for doing so is here on the site. I’ll try.]

  1. One of the central claims there is that it is unlikely that there are no reasons for the commandments, since there is a hierarchy and a kola and a homrah. And I find it difficult: Isn’t the intention of those who believe that there are no reasons is that there are no individual reasons, but that there is one general matter of the king’s decrees (as Rashi says). If so, we can say that the hierarchy stems from the desire to allow for a gradation of rebellion or obedience. The goal of a person fulfilling God’s decrees can be achieved more completely when there are minor and serious contradictions, in this way it is possible to examine the level of acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of man, what is given up and what is not, to outline rankings of righteous, average and wicked, and more.

2. Regarding the requirement of Tema D’Kra, the argument was raised there that the non-requirement should not be based on fear of error, because the non-requirement can also stem from error. It is difficult for me: in order to add unexplained definitions to a mitzvah or a passage, I must perform an interpretive act, and performing such an act without certainty (in a speculative manner) is not reasonable. Why don’t we stick with the initial meaning? [In the case of “do not deceive”: why don’t we stick with the meaning that includes all types of widowhood. We should not fear that we are acting in error when we do not house a rich widow, since we are acting in light of the commandment of God, blessed be He, in light of the best possible interpretation.].
3. Regarding the possibility that the law is not dictated by the reasons, it is argued in the book that it cannot be said that the Torah of God is coherent, and therefore when the fear of error in determining the reason does not exist, we can safely deduce the details from it. And I find it difficult: The Torah of God is complete in the context in which it was given. There is no reason to state, for example, that it is formulated in the highest eloquent form, or that it contains mathematical equations. Why not say that in the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who believes that the reason is not part of the law, the completeness of the Torah focuses on the simple part and what can be deduced from it or demanded of it? What is the basis for assuming that there is a detailed correspondence between the laws and the unwritten reason? Another problem: Suppose we somehow hit on the right reason, we would still have to make additional shots in order to draw unambiguous conclusions from it. There is double speculation here.
4. The possibility that the details of the laws do not derive from their reasons is presented in the book there only as a narrow possibility (in a footnote named after R. Y. Engel) and because there is no Plug, etc. And I find it difficult: Why was it not said that the details derive from a general structure of the commandments? God wanted there to be a uniform legal character for the commandments, and this character is what defines the commandments in terms of law, not the reasons (call this formalism). In general, the commandments were not given as a collection of details (such as the various prophecies) but as a whole, called “Torah.” It is likely that such a whole would adopt uniform patterns from the outset. [And further: In fact, the Torah is made in the form of the laws of the nations, and the laws of the nations have uniform patterns for the above reasons.]
5. It is also written there that in places where a reason is explicitly written, it is unreasonable not to demand it. And I find it difficult: according to the above, it is certainly possible that the reason was written for another purpose, not to demand but to teach something meta-halakhic about the purposes of the mitzvot and their reasons, to straighten hearts, etc. The Rambam answers the question of why the Torah only shares some of the reasons in a concise manner.

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0 Answers
מיכי Staff answered 3 years ago
  1. This is completely theoretical. I don’t see how murder or adultery causes less obedience than eating pork. Completely implausible. Upon further reading, I understood that you meant to say that the hierarchy itself is arbitrary, because God has an interest in there being a hierarchy. Again, very implausible. In fact, the Torah works on us when it says that something is an abomination, and something else is terrible and horrible. Everything is arbitrary and they are playing with us. You could also say that every time I say the word “very” three demons and two mouths are created. I have no way of proving otherwise, but that is implausible. In some of the commandments, the Torah itself says that there are reasons (and you shall not flatter the land, and its heart shall not turn aside).
  2. I explained there that if I have a reasonable explanation, then it is valid, and whoever claims it is incorrect has the burden of proof. If this explanation is not reasonable, then you are right.
  3. I didn’t understand. What does that have to do with simplicity? The point is simplicity.
  4. This brings us back to the first point. Now you are suggesting that the details are arbitrary and not the commandment itself. What’s the difference? In my opinion, it’s not reasonable for the same reasons. What’s more, the Torah usually didn’t determine the details at all, but the sages did. And if it were as you say, then their interpretations have no validity or meaning. They themselves must have thought that this was the proper way to proceed.
מיכי Staff replied 3 years ago

5. It may be yes and it may not. The burden of proof is on the one who says yes. When the Torah says and his heart does not turn away, it means that this is the problem with polygamy.

מ. מ. replied 3 years ago

I forgot to write thank you for the consideration and answers. It is rare that an important author is so accessible for discussion about his books.

מיכי Staff replied 3 years ago

With pleasure. But I haven't reached the level of 'important' yet with my sins. Maybe I'll still fall there.

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