testimony

[By the way.
Taanit 18. Toreinus sought to kill Lulinus and his brother Pappus in Laodicea.
Rashi wrote that Lulinus and his brother Pappus were completely righteous. In Laodicea, Lod, and we used to say that in every Dukhata, there are so many dead that no human being can stand half of them in the Garden of Eden. Some say that they were killed over the house of a king who was found dead and said that the Jews killed her, and they issued a decree against the enemies of Israel, and these stood up and redeemed Israel and said that we killed her, and the king killed only these ones.
I once saw someone who commented that he could not find a source for these sayings (and what is their source).
And I wondered to myself why both of them went and it was not enough for one of them to say I killed her and save the Jews with it. If it is enough for one of them to go, then the other loses himself in knowing and has no part in the world. And who allowed Jonathan ben Uzziel to fly and doom himself to the fire? Except that if one goes, then the king will suspect precisely that he wants to save the Jews and sacrifices himself. But when two go, then they undergo interrogations and tests and cross-examinations and yet they managed to convince the king that their words were found to be deliberate, and therefore he believed them.
And perhaps it is part of their praise that they did not give themselves away in a moment of weakness, but rather invested and bothered to create a detailed and meticulous cover story that would stand the test.

Why use an arbitrary line and not rely on the judge's discretion? The more grandiose the claim (the smaller the prior), the more witnesses and more circumstantial evidence will be needed, and the whole island and maybe. And inspired by the column on statistical drag (which is a formulation of Yom's claim about belief in miracles. Somewhat good evidence for a very bad claim is not good enough).

Does the establishment of rules for tools that only clarify reality, such as witnesses, also exist in other legal systems? (There is talk that the witnesses are not the "spectacles of a court of law," but rather that they issue the judgment themselves, and the judge only instructs the whether-then, that is, "if these witnesses are right, then the judgment is thus and thus," and then the witnesses will have a hand in it first and by virtue of them the judgment is carried out. It seems very foreign to me.)

The Torah itself established this, and I am only offering an explanation. There is legal logic in establishing a clear law. Of course, in the background there is always a deceitful law so that the judge will not be forced to pass an incorrect law. There is also a court that prepares and punishes beyond the law.

The source of the witnesses participating in the creation of the verdict is R. Bish'ari Yashar. We will discuss it here in the last few days.

If there is legal logic then it should also appear in other systems apparently (I don't know if such a thing exists today, for example). A fraudulent law is supposedly only in pathological cases where the judge is personally convinced of the opposite.

I don't know this guy. The question from the last few days is this and I just saw that he mentioned to the gate https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%d7%a2%d7%93%d7%95%d7%aa-2 who is the hero who got there. I'll look into it. I just heard the idea at the time from someone in the public eye (and his name is Menashe Ohana, talented as a devil and I think we'll hear more about him) so I thought that the crocodiles were out of our sight.

Why does it have to be bound by rules (not that it doesn't fit the Torah laws so well), why can't each case be decided on its own merits?
And would “Tari ka maa” be acceptable in other legal systems??????

Are you making things more difficult than there is another option? I explain the law of the Torah and see no problem with it. It is completely reasonable and logical.

Do you distinguish between explanation and legislation? Apparently reasonable and logical means that as a legislator this is what you would legislate (similar to the idea that a logical derivation of claim A from a set B means that ”not A” is inconsistent with a set B).

Certainly I notice. At least when there are two options that are both reasonable, then even if I might have chosen option A, there is no problem with someone showing me that the Torah chose option B. What's more, I assume that the Torah has insights that I don't have and goals that are not faced by a normal legal system. Of course, it is worth understanding the logic of the laws as much as possible, but it is not always possible, and if there is an option that is reasonable to me as well, then the argument that it could have been done differently is very weak.

This is if there are two equally reasonable options and you can only choose one, then you can choose arbitrarily (even for the Hagarenchik, you don't need to, because there is no demand for equal rights for anyone here). But if there is a more reasonable one, then what is the difference between saying the Torah chose the less reasonable option or an unreasonable option at all? From your wording, it seems that if you cross the threshold of the reasonable, then that is enough, and then the choice can be made dependent on unknown insights and goals.

To draw*

By the way, these are loose things, but what do you think about the question according to the method of the Rashi that Pappus and Lulinus took the blame upon themselves:
A. Why were they allowed to do this? Ostensibly, according to deontological halakhah, a person is forbidden to jump off the bridge with their hands to stop the train that is about to run over five people (unbelievable. In my opinion, of course, everyone is obligated to jump). Or here to save many, and then deontology bows to consequentialism. Or here it is just a lie to the kingdom and not an act of the hands, and therefore halachic deontology is not so angry.
B. Why were both of them allowed to do this and not one alone.

Is it possible that they (or one of them) were forbidden and yet if they did, they would receive a reward?

If there is a reasonable possibility, even if it is not the most reasonable, it is easier to assume that there is something I missed here, and therefore there is no great difficulty.

A. There are opinions that it is permissible, but not obligatory. In Gehmi”i P”a, a murderer named Hierushalmi wrote yes even to saving a single person.
B. In Tzitz Eliezer claimed that I saved many (and not many individuals but a public).
C. It is likely that without both of them being handed over, it would not have worked. And perhaps one encouraged his friend who without it would not have dared to do it, and so they went together. I don't know, of course.
D. It is possible for an act that is forbidden and yet for which one receives a reward (and perhaps along with it a punishment. A fine of one shekel). I think that Roy Klein's act is a good example of such an act. On the surface, it is forbidden, but a heroic act that deserves to be rewarded. Certainly if the person himself thought it was permissible and appropriate.

[C. From the lines we learned that you didn't like the suggestion that precisely because two witnesses are much more reliable than one (because of the cross-examination) then their trick was to manage to be reliable despite the cross-examination and then they would be less suspected of lying to save Jews. If only one had gone then they would have been suspected. Who would have thought that a successful liar would recruit another liar with him?]

This is certainly possible, as are other suggestions.

You must remember that for this very reason it is not advisable to go with two, for there may be a contradiction in their testimony. The strength of their true testimony is the weakness of their false testimony.

I have not found any Maimonides glosses on the subject of Chapter 1 of Murder. In Halacha, the Maimonides writes: "You shall not stand for the blood of your neighbor."

Ah. The Hebrew Bible used the Constantinople type. But here it doesn't https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14274&st=&pgnum=123

In the Ks”m (Rötz 1:14) and in the B”i H”m Tchko, Maimonides glosses in the name of Yerushalmi state that even putting oneself in doubt is obligatory. And apparently this is how it appears in the Hag”m of the Kostah printing (which is the Hag&#8221 with additions whose origin is probably unknown, and it is known that this was the printing that R”i Karo had. I did not find it in Hibrobox). And the interpretation of the Ks”m is because it is certain and it is doubtful.

But putting oneself in certain danger of death for a single person does not seem to be an opinion there that it is permissible (even if not obligatory).
[And in my opinion, in such a situation, the “moral” demands seeing the situation as it is, that there is one person who will die, and therefore one can arbitrarily choose whom to save and one may choose to save oneself. Just as in the case where there are two to save and one can save, who is allowed to choose arbitrarily. And if in the case where there are two to save, one is not allowed to choose arbitrarily but must draw lots (according to your method that chance is a right and must be shared equally), then even when he is one of the two who can be saved (he can save himself by saying "no," which is exactly like saying "no,") he must be objective. And just as the "moralist" does not favor the recipient of the command, so he also does not favor him for the worse and prohibits him with a normal prohibition from hurting himself, just as he prohibits him from hurting others. ]