Testimony customs and authority from the Marathas
If I did not receive halachic customs from my parents, do I have the law to not forsake the Torah of your mother? Or do I not have the obligation to follow the customs of a particular sect? I currently hold that customs that are observed by all of Israel (Sefardim and Ashkenazim) I observe, but customs that only one side observes, I regard as a rabbinical question and therefore do not observe them. For example, I eat rice on Passover as is the custom of the Sephardim, and I also abstain from selichot as is the custom of the Ashkenazim and do not begin on the first of Elul as is the custom of the Sephardim. Another example is that Ashkenazim abstain from fish with milk and Sephardim are strict, and I follow the words of the rabbinical rabbinic commandments like this, without associating myself with a particular sect. I should note that my father is Polish and my mother is Moroccan. And they are both secular. The question is whether I am acting correctly.
Regarding customs, absurdly enough, the laws of customs themselves are based on customs. The custom of ancestral customs (which never existed) spread, and the custom that the ancestral lineage is according to the father spread (even if he does not observe the Tomah. His father’s father or grandfather did).
But it should be known that custom has no validity in a place where you have your own halakhic position. Only in a place where halakha is loose in your hand, do you follow custom. Or in matters that are not halakha at all (i.e. not a ruling custom) but are all just custom. Prayer texts are mostly a custom that has no halakhic root, so there is a custom law. But when the question is halakhic and the Rema rules one way and the author rules another, in my opinion there is no obligation for a Sephardi to act like the author if he himself believes like the Rema, and vice versa. In such a place there is no reason to follow custom.
There is a reply by the son of the Rosh (Zichron Yosef) who claims that there is no validity to the custom of a community to follow a specific poskim (such as Rambam or Shulchan Arutz Sheva). What determines is the Hamara Da’ara, who must rule on his own, or the person himself, if he is the most righteous, to rule for himself. Although many poskim disagreed on this (there is an interesting discussion in the Kush), I, the little one, believe the same.
Asks:
I understood that in Beit Yosef, Rabbi Caro claims that his halakhic ruling is valid only where there is no custom, but where there is a custom, the halakhic ruling is according to the custom. How does this fit in with the fact that customs are valid only where the halakhic ruling is loose?
Additionally, you wrote that where the halakhic ruling is loose in your hands or in matters that are not a halakhic ruling, follow the custom. The question is which custom to follow, since there are different customs for each community? Should one choose a particular community and follow its customs in this context? Or is it possible to combine the customs of different communities as I see fit? Or is it possible for me to be bound by the Ashkenazi custom because my father is Ashkenazi?
Additionally, let's assume that in most places I do not have a clear decision about what the halakhic ruling is (i.e., the halakhic ruling is loose in my hands), am I allowed to follow the words of the lenient rabbi and the stricter rabbi in the Torah? For example, in the example I gave about fish in milk?
Also, is a custom that is not a custom of ruling (for example, the custom of Selichot starting from Rosh Chodesh Elul for Sephardim or the custom of Hanukkah for a house) obligatory to follow if they are customs practiced by a particular community (not a custom of all Israel such as head covering, for example)?
Sorry for the many questions, it is simply a subject that I am very confused about, and opinions on it are very divided among the poskim.
— As I wrote to you, the laws of custom are based on custom. They have no real basis, and everyone does what they see fit. Therefore, all I can tell you is what is customary to do with respect to customs. It is customary today (unlike in the past) for a person to belong to a community according to his origin (=his father), and from there he takes his customs. When it comes to a community, this is certainly the result of a choice and decision to belong to it. There are several communities in every place, and therefore the place does not determine. I am not familiar with this statement by Beit Yosef. In any case, it is reasonable to assume that their attitude to customs was different from mine. He was a decision maker of precedents even in the field of pure halakhic law (after all, he himself writes that he rules according to the majority of three poskim: Rif, Ra’sh and Rambam. Although he himself sometimes deviates from this). Combining the customs of different communities is the most puzzling thing in my opinion. Until they convinced me to do things that are baseless and without a source just because I was born Ashkenazi or Sephardi, why would I do it without belonging to that community? Either you follow your father, or you don't do customs at all (unless there is something about them that speaks to you, and then you do it just because you want to). When you don't have a position on any issue, either you get a rabbi to decide for you or you act according to the laws of spikot. Fish in milk is a baseless and without a source thing and there is no reason in the world to do anything about it. We have already talked about community customs. I didn't understand the question about the customs of slichot. In customs, it is customary to do what is accepted in your community (your father's).
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Hello Rabbi, I would like to ask whether Moroccans who have come to Israel are obligated to cancel their customs that they practiced abroad and to practice as a Maran in Israel?
In addition, regarding the customs that my ancestors practiced, such as the Rema during the Nine Days, am I obligated to them?
— Asking specifically about Moroccans? Rabbi Ovadia wanted to claim that everyone must behave like him in the Damran site. But this is an invention that has no basis and no one accepts it, and rightly so.
I will add that I personally do not think that there is an obligation to behave according to any custom, neither the Maran nor the Rema nor anyone else. A person should behave according to what he himself believes, even if he is Ashkenazi and believes as an author and vice versa. Only if the halakha is loose in your hand then follow the custom. And if he is not a bar, then let a rabbi do it for him.
Regarding the second question: Yes. The matters of the Nine Days are all custom, and therefore the custom of the fathers is important. In halakha, there is room to deviate from the customs of the fathers.
— The rabbi's position regarding a person who can rule on his own and is not bound by any custom between the Maran and the Rema, and after all, we received instructions from the Maran according to which 200 sages trusted the Rema from the Land of Israel and we accepted his ruling method, so why not rule according to the author?
— Folk tales. I did not accept his method of ruling. Absolutely not. As I explained, there is no concept of a dead mara datra. I will add that in the response of R”y ben Har”sh he wrote that one should not follow any halakhah, but rather a mara datra rules according to his understanding. And beyond that, when the halakha is loose, you follow the custom. But when you have a position, you do what you understand and do not look for customs. Therefore, even if when I am doubtful, I will follow the author - it is only that I have a doubt.
For the halachic origin of the term "greatest of the generation", see A'amo'r's book, Part 1, page 84, which can be retrieved here: http://www.eretzhemdah.org/data/Uploadedfiles/ftpuserfiles/books/government_and_country/1.pdfRegarding "Mara da'tra matar", the meaning is that there are places that have taken upon themselves the rulings of a scholar even after his death. See here: Responsa Rashba Part 1 This path is marked by all those who used to do all their actions according to one of the great rabbis in a place where they used to do all their actions according to the laws of Rabbi Alfasi, may his memory be blessed, and in places where they used to do all their actions according to the group of the Rambal, may God bless him. And indeed, these great ones did as their rabbis. And who is it, if there is one wise and worthy of teaching and who sees evidence to prohibit what they permit, practices prohibition in it. These are not as their rabbis in the true sense of the word, in the place of their rabbi. If they do not do according to his words, they will belittle the honor of their rabbi in his place.
When I said there is no source, I meant a primary source. Regarding the renunciation of the Jews, there is a source (at least for the methods that refer to the greatest Jews of the generation). But I do not know of a source for a general authority for the greatest of the generation. Indeed, some of the first wrote this without a source, but the things are puzzling. Where does this authority come from? After all, the authority to renounce wealth proves the opposite, that they received authority for this very reason and not for all the other powers of the Sanhedrin. Otherwise, what did the Sanhedrin hate? And the matters of education are known but puzzling and not agreed upon. Perhaps the authority is, as the Rabbis say, the consent of all Israel, which is the authority of the Sanhedrin, but then again we are talking about consent and not authority. And when there is no consent, there is no authority. However, if there was a halachic authority for the greatest of the generation, it does not depend on consent (just as the authority of the Sanhedrin does not depend on consent). And the point is that even if you hold that someone is the greatest of the generation, you have no obligation to listen to him, and this is the situation in our time with regard to those who are accepted as the greatest of the generation. There are also some of the first who wrote that the greatest of the generation can inflict corporal punishment, but this too has no source. This is simply the necessity of the hour (in their opinion) and not a law that was learned from any source. And regarding a place where they used to do as one Posk said, the words of Responsa Zichron Yosef (Levan HaRassh, also cited in Kosh 2b, I believe) are known, who wrote that this has no validity (at least in the place of Mera Da'Atra, as you also cited here from the Rashba). In any case, we are not talking about a Da'Atra because he was the Rabbi here and has authority, but rather this is at most a custom they accepted to act according to his opinion (and not an obligation by virtue of authority). And the point is that the mouth that forbade (=the public) is also the one that permits, as far as a situation of halakhic authority is concerned. In any case, here in Israel this is not the case. Even in the time of Rabbi Caro, they did not act here according to his opinion.
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