The attitude towards the laws of the Torah in the interpretation of the Pasha

Hello again.
Thank you for the reference to the articles of Prof. David Haneska on the aforementioned matter, it is indeed a beautiful collection of articles worthy of being placed on the table of kings, although in many cases it is appropriate to say that even the simple simple in the context of the sermon has significance, and as Haneska did well to bring examples in his articles, such as ‘And work for the world’ What is said in the verse after six, which is to say that on a fundamental level, slavery is a reason for servitude for the world and the departure of the jubilee is an external reason that terminates slavery for the world (although Rashi in Tractate Kiddushin 15a דלהיה קמלאל דלואל wrote ‘מידי דעבור עד לואלם’, meaning that departure in the jubilee is not a confiscation for the world’, but a definition for the world’). And like all six examples that the passage cites, in any case there are cases where the sermon completely uproots the plain meaning, such as the example I gave in my question that the plain meaning of the verse entitles the harmer to the carcass of the ox, while the sermon entitles him to the damage, then it is not at all appropriate to say that in the fact that the harmed person receives the carcass, there is a certain existence of a law that the harmer must receive the carcass.

Regarding the dead man, the Mekhilta asks this explicitly, and explains:
And the dead man will be his – for him – to harm, or is he only a harmer, you said, if so, what is the meaning of the dead man, but it says that the fat of his carcass is the blood of his deed and the dead man is the blood of his damage [Mekhilta]:
It seems that this is not even a midrashic consideration but a simple one. In a situation where this is the simple one, there is no need for the simple one to also participate in shaping the halakhah (and perhaps this is what Rabbi A of Kinon meant in Sefer Kiryatot when he spoke of the qualities of a deresh that were not included in the list of the simple ones, since they teach about the simple one).
And he also saw this in the Melvim and in the Torah Tamima there.
Beyond this, there is still a meaning to the phrase, since it is required that the harmer lift the carcass out of the pit (B”E 11 ע”a), and likewise with regard to an ox that is not fit for the consecration, it is said that the dead one is not his (נא ע”a).
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Avraham Aharon,
I wrote an article about this. Only in chapters 6-7.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mK1MZ7j0Y0fB5ljZpVqSw5beZZwIYuN6/view

Rob Shlomo,
I saw your article that you provided in the above link, needless to say that it is a masterpiece that deserves praise.
Although I did not find a clear answer to my question within the words, that is, in your article you validated the authority of the sages as interpreters of the biblical ‘accepted law’, and established the lineage of rabbinic halakhah over the Karaite system, but even the sages in their interpretation did not prevent the study of the Bible as it is, saying ‘no Bible goes beyond its literal meaning’ Rather, they added an additional layer of sermon and established laws based on the interpretation of the sermon, while the reader can continue to read the Torah as it is, and now the question arises if I, who open the Torah scroll and read it in complete simplicity, encounter a certain commandment that tells me to do X and the halakhic interpretation of the sermon tells me not to do X but rather W. If so, I cannot adhere to the rule of "no scripture goes beyond its plain meaning" because the Torah in its plain meaning is a book of commandments, but I cannot keep those commandments since the Oral Torah limits me, and again the scripture goes beyond its plain meaning.

Avraham Aharon,
Thanks for the compliment.
As far as I remember, I brought several possibilities in the article to understand the logical place of the Peshat after the Dersh.
For example, the Dersh is a halakhic change that occurred in a certain generation (perhaps even in the generation of Moses), and the Peshat truly represented the old Halacha. This is what some sages wrote.

See, for example, on page 72, one possibility out of several that I brought, I will quote it here:

Sometimes the difference between the Peshat and the Halacha of the Sages stems from the fact that the Peshat is the Halacha that was practiced at a certain time, and the Halacha of the Sages is the Halacha for generations. For example, Rabbi Sherki suggests, directly from Rambam, that in Moses' generation the Halacha of "eye for eye" was practiced as simple and that it changed to Mammon already in the time of Joshua, see his words here and here. He also noted that the Netziv had already raised the possibility that changes had occurred in the Torah from the time of Moses in the wilderness to the entry of the Israelites into the land. These changes made certain verses seem redundant, but in truth, according to the time they were written, they were necessary. See, for example, his commentary on Leviticus 7:24 (cited here on page 10), on the possibility that in the time of Moses there were no prohibitions on carrion and prey: “And it seems that the interpretation of the pashta is a carrion that is a snare in the wilderness that they were permitted to eat.” Similarly, the way of the “Meshech Hochma” on the Torah is to explain certain pashta readings as arising from the different halachic reality that prevailed in the wilderness era, and hence its contradiction to the accepted halachah. In our hands, see the article by Rabbi Yehuda Kuperman, “Introduction to the Commentary of the “Meshech Hochma” on the Torah,” especially in chapters 8 and 9 (pages (2nd – 4th).
Mostly, the Sages come to explain the contemporary Halacha in verses, even though in truth they do not
suit them, and are not supposed to be suitable, and this is the way of the Sages in many places, to portray the ancient reality as if it were suitable for the contemporary, and they do so even in matters of legend (such as: “The fathers existed
all the Torah”, or “And the commandments of the Lord” are mentioned in the verse, “Passover was”). Therefore, of course, there is no
contradiction between this verse and the rulings of the Sages, who obligate the harmer with money and not with the cost of his eye (hence
“an eye for an eye” It is a contemporary practical interpretation and not an original literal interpretation.
It is possible that over the generations the fact that practical halakha is not a literal interpretation of the plain text of the text, but a practical interpretation that arises from various reasons anchored in the text, has been forgotten, and this leads to unnecessary attempts to reconcile the plain text of the text with practical halakha (for example, this may have happened with
‘The day after the Sabbath’, see Samet's article).

Peace and blessings,
According to your above words, is the interpretation of the Torah in a simplistic way inconsistent with the value of the "eternality of the Torah"? And the entire basis of the obligation to believe in its eternity is only at the level of the sermon, but the simplistic reader should view the obligations as a historical and not practical commandment for the time when he reads that commandment?

Indeed, at least in some cases, the eternity of the Torah, in its conventional and radical meaning, is hidden and improbable regardless.