The border line
Peace and blessings
First, I would like to express my gratitude for the informative articles and books.
I would like to ask for clarification on where the line is that limits you when accepting or rejecting religious or halakhic statements. I will ask the same question in similar variations:
Accepting facts established by the Sages: You repeat the statement that we are bound by the normative statements of the Sages and not by factual statements. In certain cases, you rule differently from the accepted norm, such as accepting a woman’s testimony, killing a louse on Shabbat, paying off a debt within the time limit, and so on. This is in light of your confidence in the specific halachic reason.
I asked why we don’t go further and determine in a blanket manner that entire sections of the Shulchan Aruch are irrelevant today. For example: Halacha, Halacha Vestot, Halacha Bishl Beshabbat, Halacha Bishl Be’ach, Halacha Tripot, and more. From my simple impression, the halakhic system on these issues is founded on factual determinations created from a rational, not empiricist, perspective, and therefore they are subject to abrogation or change.
If we take the laws of menstruation, we will accept the normative statement that one should abstain from menstruation as required by the verse, but to determine when menstruation may come, we will use modern means. What is wrong?
Accepting statements of faith from the sages:
According to your distinction between factual and normative statements, to what extent are you committed to metaphysical statements, such as statements about heaven and hell, the afterlife, and the resurrection of the dead?
Torah verses:
You are not willing to sign that the verses of the Torah in their exact form before us were delivered to Moses our Rabbi, even though you are certain of the status of Mount Sinai.
However, you accept every verse and every statement as absolute, and try to reconcile it when it does not fit your approach.
In the post about homosexuality, you vehemently refuse to find an explanation for the ban, and when asked about its reason, you reply, ‘I don’t know.’
Since in the ancient civilized world such relationships were morally forbidden, I don’t understand why not base them on this prohibition? And Maimonides already wrote that it is better to find a reason for the prohibition, and not to rush to determine that everything is beyond our reach.
I ask this because you accept that later human ideas were woven into the text. How do you know that a commandment whose human-cultural interpretation is apparently clear was given as it is from God?
Verses of the Holy Quran:
In response to the question about God’s answer to prayer, you refer to the verse in Psalms, “The Lord is near to all who call upon Him.” The question here is why not refer to the verse in the cultural constellation, and say that David wrote it from his perspective and belief? Why should his words, which are not a “normative statement” but a factual statement, bother us at all?
In conclusion: The basis of the question is uniform. If we are making a selection and deciding what to accept and what to reject, I ask – where exactly does the line cross?
Thank you very much in advance and best wishes.
Hello Moti. You asked a very important question, and it is difficult for me to draw a complete map (in my current book, the trilogy, I hope to do so). I will nevertheless try to answer briefly.
The Torah’s statements are different from the statements of the Sages. Regarding the Torah, my assumption is that the facts are correct. Either because God wrote it or because it was given in prophecy. Although in cases where it is clear to me that this is an error (and not just a hypothesis) I would be willing to consider that there was a combination of a verse from a human source and it was incorrect. But that is in cases where the error is clear to me. I don’t think I know of such a case.
Regarding the interpretation of homosexuality, this is a requirement for a clear reason, and according to halakha, this is not done except in cases where the reason is clear. And especially in the Torah, where it is difficult to assume that something was forbidden simply because at that time people thought it was forbidden (unless it is a human addition, see my comments above).
Maimonides writes that it is better to find a reason for the prohibition, but that is on the interpretive level. Halacha does not require a reason for the prohibition.
Regarding a woman’s testimony, I did not write that I ruled differently. I raised the possibility of changing the halakha. And this is different from an interpretation and a pretext that called for homosexuality because the disqualification of women is not written in the Torah, and the prohibition of homosexuality is. The disqualification of women is a sermon (which seems quite dubious) of the Sages, and it is certainly likely that it is based on their perception. See my response, which will probably be published in the original on Shabbat Sunday.
Regarding killing a louse, it is indeed quite clear that this is a factual error. Repaying a debt within the time limit is not even a change in the halacha. The Sages did not establish a halacha (that a borrower has no fiduciary duty to claim default) but rather established a fact (that in practice he is not defaulting), and it must be examined whether or not it is still true today.
Indeed, even with regard to the parts of the Shulchan Arbiter, when I reach a clear conclusion that this is an error, I will not deny them. Even with regard to the Talmud, I argue that its authority is not granted to it when its words are based on a fundamental error (not when reality has changed, when we enter into the question of whether a reason is not a rule, and so on). In most of the cases you mentioned, I do not think that it is possible to reach the conclusion that this is a clear factual error. It is true that they did not rely on observations, but the determinations are normative. For example, swallowing rates are not objective. A line must be established as to when swallowing is significant, and the Sages and the poskim established this. The fact that they did not rely on observations is not so important, because observations cannot provide an answer (after all, the threshold of swallowing that prohibits swallowing still needs to be determined). It is true that these days there is a discussion on swallowing in light of measurements (Rabbi Dror Pixler of Bar Ilan, and in Rabbi Yair Frank’s master’s thesis, which was done under his supervision).
Regarding menstruation, it is also not possible to determine when menstruation will occur, and this is an arbitrary line. It is likely that the Sages did not think that the date in the month determines anything. This is an arbitrary line, probably to maintain awareness and the importance of the prohibition. All the laws of 3 times force are determined without reference to a known mechanism (as explained in the issue of Yevamot sd a”b – sa a”a, es tvet – a kind of factor or a lucky factor). If there were modern scientific indicators that predict the onset of menstruation, I would definitely be in favor of abolishing the laws of menstruation.
Regarding answering prayers, why do you think I don’t say exactly what you wrote? I am certainly willing to say that. Although the Torah itself speaks of God’s intervention in the world, my assumption is that His policy has changed and not that it has never been true. Thus, prophecy and miracles disappeared from the world, and so did divine interventions in general (including answering prayers).
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