The consequences of rejecting skepticism according to you and Descartes

Thank you very much for the comments. I understood some of them. I will try to clarify parts that I did not understand.
2. I did ask about this point as well. It seems that everyone who is not a skeptic agrees that there must be a connecting factor between the world and the phenomenon (say, the eyes and the light in Dog’ 1), but if all of our knowledge is built only on the basis of an a priori principle such as causality, it can still be interpreted in countless reasons for how the impressions from the senses were created. Even Descartes' demon is a reason in this broad sense; but most of us do not think that it is a correct reason. If so, it does not seem that the principle of causality is sufficient on its own, but rather distilled something else, although of course it seems to stand in the background.

3. I did not mean the question about events or phenomena, although of course there is a connection, but mainly about basic assumptions and claims, for example, the definition of a basic assumption is that it has no reason. I suppose that only with this can one trust something, in a kind of perception that God is the anchor of the reasons in the world. But if we do not question the basic assumptions, how can we say that something is not certain but also has a dimension of probability? After all, the entire assumption of probability assumes that it can be doubted.
3. Similarly, on the other hand, the skeptic in his method is indeed willing to doubt basic assumptions, but if so, he can also doubt the assumption that one should doubt basic assumptions or that everything without reason is wrong. To the extent that this seems to be cutting off his branch? No?
5/ 4 I meant like 3 Risha.

3. You use the term “”reason” in a way that I don't understand. Do you mean reason/reasoning?
A premise does indeed have a reason that supports it. But it is not true that I do not question premise. No claim, assumption or conclusion is certain as far as I am concerned.

Indeed, I mean from a reasoning/reasoning perspective.
First, regarding 2, do you agree that we simply have a basic premise that what we see is true? Because it doesn't seem like any a priori principle is enough to be able *alone* to bridge the way toward accepting the material world.

So then, how are you able to accept a basic premise but in an uncertain way? That's what's really unclear to me.
And even if you say it's possible, in relation to what would it be uncertain? In relation to another challenge or another doubt? Apparently that doubter would also assume that there is another, more basic explanation, and he too, or at least the system of explanations is fundamentally axiomatic. But then that simply means that the premise that we thought was a basic premise is not such, but a conclusion from something more basic.
Unless you're a skeptic and claim that it's possible to question basic premises, but then where does plausibility come into the picture? Because everything is equally arbitrary from his perspective. (And the assumption that everything is arbitrary is arbitrary…)

And so, to the extent that you accept skeptical claims, then there is no validity to the fact that something seems reasonable to me, because all reasonableness is only on the level of subjective reasonableness, but there is no connection between it and the objective world, and it can never be bridged, as you presented in B2 on the question against Kant.
And if you are not a skeptic, then you are not challenging basic assumptions anyway…

“An electromagnetic wave in the world translates into light”
The wave translates into neuronal signals. Which translate into something else which translate into something else… Somehow in the end there is light.
There is no direct connection between light and the wave. The connection is very, very indirect.

I've completely lost you. You're mixing gender with non-gender over and over again, and don't address what I answered. I've already answered everything.

Ruling, it's a direct connection. One causes the other, even if it's done through the mediation of several steps. When you break down the path between striking a match and lighting a fire, you'll find several intermediate steps. So what? One causes the other. What if there are intermediary steps? And are we dealing with the issue of the power of his power?

If you lost me, then how did you answer?…

What is not clear to me is that we all agree that the definition of a premise is that there is no reasoning that supports it.
But if so, how can one doubt a premise without using a certain prior premise? As you claimed to do.
So on the other hand, you accept that it is possible to doubt premises, so how can you assume that something is more or less certain? After all, you can also cast additional doubt on that sense of probability…? And so your reasonable conclusion is that you will be a sophist. Or you will doubt the assumption that can be doubted and you will be stuck.
But we must say that at the beginning of thinking there is some *certain* assumption, no matter how small it may be.
For example, the assumption that what we think is reasonable is indeed objectively reasonable (even if it is not, it is not objectively certain). Because only from there on can one say that one works with probabilities, etc.’. But if you say that all our basic assumptions always have a certain percentage of doubt inherent in them, then this doubt must arise as a result of skeptical claims that are external to them, and no matter how skeptical you are, you can never claim that something is at all probable…

Therefore, I want to say that you also agree that in your opinion there is something certain and primary and not everything is just probability. Or that probability is certain.
Anyway, if I'm right, then what's good to see is that you prefer to be a postmodernist than a fundamentalist 😉

And even though there is no evidence of this, there is a hint of it in the introduction to the Notebooks of Faith:
“As far as I understand, it is not possible for a person to reach certainty in any field…. If he found a way to reach such certainty, he was probably wrong (for sure! 🙂 ).”
This means that there is something certain and fundamental at the bottom of our thinking at the end of the day that says that there is a coordination between probability and the world, otherwise we must be condemned to skepticism.

Answerer, I have lost you now (what do you want now) since I have already answered everything before.

Does your method also require a certain premise (even a limited one), which we will accept with certainty and not just out of probability?
And I think that this premise is that what seems reasonable to us is indeed reasonable and there is coordination for it. Only in this way do I think it is possible to rationalize my questions without falling into complete skepticism and on the other hand not claiming that everything is certain.
On the other hand, you previously claimed that you do indeed “question the premises. No claim, assumption or conclusion is certain as far as I am concerned.”.
But if you did mean what you wrote, you must have the ability to distinguish which premise is correct or not (because you are not a skeptic….), but this ability is also a kind of premise and you will also doubt it and so on and so forth, and then you must be a skeptic.
I think these things are simple, but since I see that you are already the second philosopher to claim similar things when both of you declare yourselves not to be postmodernists, I wanted to examine whether I am indeed right or whether my words are not pointed. And you can eat your cake and leave it whole.

Because he also accepts that there is no connection between basic premises and their readiness in the world according to Kant and that all of them are worthy of doubt, and yet in other matters there are reasonable conclusions… It is not exactly your claim but in the end it is quite similar to the move I presented here.

I answer for the third time: No. Nothing is certain to me. And I repeat for the seventeenth time: Uncertainty is not skepticism. Skepticism means that some position is no better than its opposite. Uncertainty, on the other hand, just means that I am not sure.
That's it. I'm done.

And what about a geometric sequence that tends to 0. Something seems plausible to me. It seems plausible to me that what seems plausible to me – is plausible. It seems plausible to me that what seems plausible to me is plausible – is plausible. We quantify the likelihood to 99.99% certainty and every claim rolls around at the limit to 0% certainty.

I wrote what I understood from the question. Because if the answer is that ”something seems reasonable to me” when quantified, let's say 99.99, then it is 99.99 after all the calculations in the world, and this is a direct claim about the world and not a claim about myself – then it is that we establish the rigid relationship between probability and certainty in a certain way.

How did the wonder arise that there is no certainty but that does not lead to skepticism?
Because the whole idea of uncertainty and remaining within reasonableness assumes that there is a second option, but you have no ability to assess what is reasonable because that is itself another assumption that you will also ask about whether it is reasonable…

This wonderful miracle lies in the difference between a 90% certainty and a 50% doubt (if we insist on quantifying). Although it is truly amazing and incomprehensible, it can still happen. I roll a die six million times. I bet that the result will be evenly distributed and there will be about a million results for each side. I have some doubt (it's not 100%) but that's still probably what will happen. Amazing.
And I also have the ability to intuitively assess the value of intuition. This circularity is just nonsense. It's like asking how you know you're right, after all, you yourself are the one who decides you're right. How is this different from a normal skeptical argument?
We've really exhausted this nonsense to the point of blood.

What does this have to do with a normal skeptical argument? Here, we don't ask "how do you know?" but accept everything the person says and discuss it solely according to his method. If he says he is 100% sure that something is true, and he is also 100% sure that in cases where he is 100% sure that something is true, then 100% that something is true - then everything is fine because one to the power of whatever remains one. But if he only has probability, then in an iterative circle he fades to zero. Very simple. In any case, it seems very likely to me that there is no one here on the site except you who knows the answer to this. And even if you have a well-informed answer, it is impossible to find it here in the thread. Apparently the author is at fault and switched between responding and answering.

Indeed. I agree that it is so simple that in the end the ability to evaluate intuition itself is a premise that you must accept with *certainty*, even if within the intuition is included the possibility that it is uncertain, but this does not come from an external doubt, but an *internal* doubt that is part of the definition of this premise, the main thing is that there is a certain certain element here.

This point is important, because I wanted to make sure that these things that seemed completely simple to me are indeed true. Because as I said at the beginning there is someone important who is also a philosopher who completely denies this point but firmly claims on the other hand that he is not a skeptic, which sounds completely unlikely.
And so throughout the entire discussion here it seemed that you also go by his method, and therefore I was unable to see how this miracle could be created, and especially in my previous understanding of you that it is an external doubt to the premise, so the question arises why it is only 10% doubt and not 50% methodological doubt. But I see that you agree with my method that I presented here.

It is indeed possible that Batt offered an explanation that explains the same philosopher using the integration of infinite explanations, even though every explanation distilled into an explanation still has little weight. To me personally it sounds completely puzzling if it is even possible. But it is the only way out that I have found.

This question is also critical for your objection to fundamentalist claims on the one hand and the possibility of uncertainty on the other. But you could say that this is a kind of tautology. Although I think it does sharpen the difference between external doubt (PM) and internal doubt (your synthetic method).

No, it's not for sure. That's not certain either.

Do you accept the difference between your claim that the assumptions themselves contain the assumption that they are uncertain, and casting doubt that is external to the assumptions themselves? (Then either you accept another control system as a premise, or you are condemned as a skeptic).

Otherwise I really don't understand how you are not a skeptic if you doubt the assumptions even by a few percent (as long as it is not part of the same premise that is uncertain).

It seems to me as if there is some distinction here that I probably don't catch because if it is not as I said I completely don't understand how you claim that you are not a skeptic. Maybe you could explain this little point.

I really can't figure out where the problem is here. I'm saying very simple and clear things. My basic assumptions are uncertain to me. Not because they have any solutions, but because I'm not sure if they're correct (there are possible alternatives). I don't know what external doubt is. I have some doubt in my assumptions. That's all.

External doubt means that the doubt comes from a negative place as a kind of external bewilderment to thinking but not inherent as part of the basic premise of thinking which, for example, says that it is accurate only in 90% of cases.

But as soon as you wrote: “My basic assumptions are uncertain to me…. Because I am not sure whether they are correct (there are possible alternatives)” . So it sounds like negative doubt in general and if so you can continue to cast it backwards:

Because it implies that there is “you who observes” and as external to them you observe the basic assumptions. For example, this can be understood in your parable about the eyes of the mind that observe distant ideas.
But if so, you must admit that you are the observer (= the eyes?) themselves endowed with complete certainty regarding their ability to discern the basic premises, so that even if you do not accept their level of accuracy as completely complete, you must still accept with certainty that they have a certain level of accuracy – for example, that they depend on several parameters such as the distance of the idea, the passions, etc. So towards that level you do not doubt at all because their inaccuracy is also inherent in this basic premise.
But if you cast negative doubt about them once again:
1. Then you will never be able to get out of the cycle of casting doubt. 2. There is no reason to assume that the statistical quantification of doubt is only 10%, let's say, and not 50%. And that is already complete skepticism 3. This will lead to a loop of skepticism that will ultimately lead you to accept that the accuracy of your subjective truths tends to zero by multiplying probabilities. 4. You can also cast doubt on the principle of casting negative doubts.