The controversy over whether a tallit is obligatory or a gabra is obligatory
Shalom, Honorable Rabbi, it is written in Menachot 22: In the tzitzit of the Kamipelgi, the obligation of a tallit is a Mar-Sab, and the obligation of a Gevra is a Mar-Sab.
And this is where the controversy revolves around whether it is appropriate to recite a blessing for putting them on or not. And a question arose for me: is it possible to say that because the shatanez is rejected in front of the tzitzit, one must say that it is a male obligation? In fact, if it is a tallit obligation, then where is the place to reject the prohibition because of the doing of the tzitzit? Now it can be said that even for those who believe that the tzitzit is a tallit obligation, there is still a condition that it is a garment that is in principle to be worn in order to fulfill the mitzvah with it, and therefore one must in principle reject the shatanez so that he can fulfill the mitzvah of the tzitzit in its entirety with that tallit, but from what I understand, the rule of doing that rejects doing nothing is that fulfilling the mitzvah in itself will reject the doing that which is not, and if I do not fulfill the mitzvah by going beyond the doing that which is not, then this rule does not apply there. It can be said that tzitz is still a special case because it is required by the samachit of verses, but I understood that all that this samachit comes to teach is the rule itself: do what is rejected, do not do it, so it is not appropriate to say that tzitz is an exceptional case, and even in tzitz, the permission of shatanez is by virtue of do what is rejected, do not do it. So basically I am asking whether the teaching that the prohibition of shatanez is rejected necessarily leads to the conclusion that this is a male obligation or not?
The question of whether this is a duty of a man is a matter of dispute among Amoraim there in the Sugiya. Although halakhically they rule that it is a duty of a man, it does not seem that a practical law that rejects the LT would depend on this dispute. Therefore, a priori, it is not reasonable to prove from this that it is a duty of a man.
Although it would seem that you are right, since if it is the duty of the tallit itself, why would a doer come and reject the non-doer on the tallit? And similarly, the Ran wrote regarding the law that an oath applies to a vow, and therefore one who swears not to sit in a sukkah is prohibited from sitting in it. And the Ran made it clear in Nedir 16 why wouldn’t a doer of sitting in a sukkah come and reject the non-doer of an oath? (It is true that there is also a doer here, but it is a non-doer and a doer that are in the question, and so on.) And it is said that one should not feed a person something that is forbidden to him, meaning that a vow is a law of the hafza and therefore is not rejected in the face of a mitzvah that applies to men.
But I think this is unrelated. See in column 230 where I distinguished between several meanings of the law of haftza and gabra. And simply put, even if tzitzit is an obligation of the tallit, it is not a law of haftza like a vow. Rather, there is an obligation on the gabra that the tallit be fringed. And this does not say that a person will not reject the non-person. In the name of
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
