The cosmological view and teleological entity

Yes, an entity that acts for a purpose.

Why only “seems to be”? Not absolutely?

Because in principle, it's possible that he created the world for no purpose. He just felt like it.

I am willing to live with such objections.
So why attack the cosmological view that it does not say who the Creator is? It adds a lot of information.

I think the rabbi did not clarify this in the notebook that the view says that there is an entity that is voluntary (or just because it feels like it)

I also always understood, like Kobe, that we simply proved that there is a different first link, but not that it "chooses" to do something teleologically and not causally (even if it has no purpose in the world).

Friends, it seems I woke up on the left side this morning. Excuse me, these are two bizarre messages or is there a joke here that I didn't understand.

Kobe,
A matter of taste (is this a lot of information or not). But I explained that this attack is irrelevant even if there was no information here.
I should have clarified in the notebook that the entity we reached has a will or not??? Earth to Kobe, are you with us? Maybe I didn't understand the joke?…

Danny,
Did you understand like Kobe? He understood the opposite, and I said it.

Icon scratching his head…

Haha, things are simple, at first I didn't understand it…. And so did Danny explain that he didn't understand it until I asked. And anyway, if the Rabbi had clarified things, it would have made it easier to understand (or for Danny to understand at all).

In any case, in my opinion, there are two different types of appeals to the need for will:

1. We can talk about a primordial thing that had an energetic instability that caused the explosion.

A. As a general definition: a primordial thing is anything that always faced ‘forward’.

It is true that for the same thing, they would need sufficient reason why it always faced forward.

2. The Rabbi usually emphasizes that our nature is fundamentally purposeful, for example, quantum mechanics has no reason, only purpose. Although, as the Rabbi emphasizes many times – The quanta themselves are created in a causal process from the hyolic matter as the Rabbi mentions in the notebook and in his article in the morning.
But towards that hyolic matter we can say that it acts purposefully. And we have no information that it was created. Therefore it seems that it can replace God in the story, right?

The primordial being must have the ability to create a world. The physico-theological view adds that it should be intelligent (because without this it is not clear how such a special world came into being), and then it is also likely that it acts for some purpose.

Indeed, I assumed so. Two more additions can be added to the answer:
1) When we talk about the world beginning in a purposeful way, this strengthens the teleological argument.
2) What is also possible to make an induction from the acts of free choice of people. Which is within the scope of the position on the known that the initial entity is not deprived of choice. (This is not an exaggerated thing)

What does the Rabbi think about purposive entities as in the Aristotelian view.
I mean like, they said that the foundation of the ashes strives to reach the earth because it is the source of its foundation. Etc. etc.

Did these entities have free choice but they did not want to go somewhere else? Or were they really deprived of choice and only behaving purposefully?

The second. See Appendix D of God Playing Dice. This is clearly what Aristotle thought as well.

Your Honor, if you have changed your mind, you should put this in your notebook.
In the notebook on cosmology, the Rabbi confuses readers with vague concepts such as “something in our experience” “something not in our experience”, whereas according to what you say here, this can be explained as a kind of matter.
A primary cause that is without will will also need an explanation for why it revolved around a future event (what is the reason that caused it to do this), and then we enter into infinite regress.
Only a primary cause that is *willful* (has free choice) can act without a cause that precedes it, but rather teleologically, facing “forward”, for a future purpose, and then it is clear why we do not need to look for a reason that caused it to do what it did, that is, it is clear why God does not have a reason.
Things are simple like that, and have nothing to do with whether something is material or not.
Isn't that right?

Danny, I also understood that the proof that the first cause is *voluntary* (and not some kind of “mechanical” mechanism with the ability to create a world, etc., meaning that it is not a personality = it is not a will) is that the world is not ancient but had a beginning. In other words, there was a phase in which the first cause did not create a world and a phase in which it did create a world. If we do not assume free will – we will have to say that the cause of this change was another cause, and then we are no longer talking about a first cause

But what, “voluntary” is not the same as ”purposive”. Will only means that the creation did not come as a result of a reason external to the creator, or pressures exerted on him, etc., but came completely from him with free will. But perhaps this free will was a whim. Not for the sake of a purpose. What Rabbi Michi calls “simply because it came to Him”.

Therefore, these are two separate issues, voluntary – purposive, which require separate proofs.

[By the way, at the stage when the first cause did not create the surrounding, it was not yet a cause in practice, only in power. How does this fit in with Maimonides”s claim that with God everything is in practice, because with Him a change from power to practice is not possible? Likewise, when we assume free will, we are talking about a change in the first cause, from state to state. Isn't this a problem?]

I also think that the solution of "will" to the question of the change between "creation" and "uncreation" relies on our experience. We do not recognize in our world a cause for change that does not depend on anything other than the creator himself, but rather "free will". The fact that "will" is in our toolbox and concepts is the only solution makes us say this about the first cause and conclude that it is voluntary. Therefore, in any case, there is no escape from this, we are in need and assume something from our experience here. Otherwise, we can only ask questions without any ability to answer.

Danny, I didn't claim that God created the world for any purpose, but only that the cosmological argument proves that He had free choice, and that's not really written in the notebook.
The notebook simply says that one must assume that there is a primary cause different from those known to us, but according to what is said here, the reason it doesn't need a cause is not that it is not in our experience, but that it has free will. The word free will does not appear in the notebook.
Apparently our Lord thinks that everyone is a skilled philosopher.

Nathaniel,
Every purposive entity acts not because of a cause. So does Aristotle's father.
Otherwise it is not purposive but causal.
So I don't see why you are introducing free choice into the story here?!

I don't see it either. As far as I remember, I wasn't talking about a willful entity. In the cosmological argument, not even necessarily an intelligent one.

I responded to Danny (not to the original question).