The Fidelity of Tradition and the Validity of Revelation
Throughout the trilogy, the Rabbi attempts to show how the existence of a thin God (who is actually not so thin) is philosophically the most likely conclusion, and in a way that hardly (or perhaps not at all) leaves room for any other position that is not complete skepticism in all types of knowledge accumulation in reality. But with respect to the fidelity of tradition, it is clear to the Rabbi that the arguments do not leave one with a similar attitude in weighing up whether to believe or not (since even the very authenticity of the tradition of the Mount Sinai event and the Exodus from Egypt, regardless of what was in the event itself, is undermined by critical research, and it is certain that their claims cannot be considered completely unfounded even if they are not accepted). But from the perspective of a priori explanation, would we not expect revelation to be carried out in such a way that would leave one with little doubt as to the faithful nature of the transmission of tradition (or even that it would be renewed in each and every generation)? And if so, isn’t this a consideration in itself against the fidelity of a tradition, since it can be historically challenged in several ways (a subject that I won’t go into in depth), and therefore we wouldn’t expect the revelation of God, which is the way in which man realizes his purpose, to be given in such a historically questionable way? And doesn’t the fact that the claim of exposure to revelation was made only to a nation and not to humanity also reduce the a priori likelihood that this is the way in which God would decide to reveal himself?
This is certainly an argument against belief in tradition, but it must be taken into account along with other arguments and come to the bottom line.
Beyond that, I think this is a pretty weak argument, because you’re assuming something about the way God should act. It’s a bit presumptuous in my opinion.
But isn't this what the Rabbi does in the a priori consideration of seeking revelation in the world (because the purpose of society cannot be the correction of society itself)?
First, it's a consideration for both you and me, but I wrote that it's not strong. I've written more than once that for me, too, it joins the whole. Beyond that, I think there's a difference between saying that he doesn't do things without a reason (which is a general intuition), and a specific claim that is appropriate for humans and draws a conclusion about the way of behavior that is appropriate for him (how to manifest).
Rabbi: If the purpose of society cannot be morality (correction of society), why were the Gentiles who are not bound by the Torah created? For the seven commandments? Sounds forced, these commandments are too rare to constitute a sufficient explanation. What prevents you from saying that the experience of moral behavior and the reward for adhering to it are sufficient reasons for the creation of man?
And for what purpose were animals created? It is clear that there are groups in the world that have no purpose beyond their nature, and for the Gentiles, this is also their seven commandments. Beyond that, the Gentiles can also convert, unlike animals.
Beyond that, there may also be human purposes (education, research, understanding the world).
Most animals seem to lack choice and self-awareness, which makes it easy to see them as serving man rather than an end in themselves. This is not the case with Gentiles. The possibility of morality as an end, as well as the other ends you mentioned (humanity), weaken the expectation of revelation (they allow for a purpose for creation that would not force God to reveal himself).
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