The first principle and logic
Hello Rabbi
Doesn’t the claim that God is incapable of things that lack logic assume logic as a primary existence for God and as something separate from Him? After all, if we assume that God is the primary cause of everything, then we also assume that logic is a result of Him, and it doesn’t seem reasonable to me to think that God created logic and denied Himself the option to overcome it.
Now you might come and say that the very statement that God can act contrary to logic is meaningless, and I agree, but does that resolve the contradiction? If so, then I would love to know how, according to how I understand it, at most it means that perhaps the very consideration of God is meaningless by virtue of his being prior to logic (which all our thinking is done only within).
thanks.
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Do you recognize that the content of words is separate from the logical form? We can understand that content in a vague intuitive way even before we apply the laws of logic to it. Of course, as soon as we apply them, the game is over and then everything is “logical” and defined in a sharp positive way. But this does not contradict the fact that we also have pre-logical knowledge and that we can talk about it anyway (albeit “logically”).
As far as I understand, I did not talk here about the very thing that is outside of logic. All I did was present here is the apparent logical contradiction between the definition of God as the first existent and the assumption that logic precedes it. I did not come and claim that it is possible for God to be outside of logic because I agree that this is a statement that does not mean anything. I see no difference between presenting this contradiction and presenting any other logical fallacy.
Now, regarding the fact that logic is not something, I would be happy if you could explain to me what this means, why does logic not meet the definition of something for the essential purpose of the aforementioned contradiction? And how does this resolve the aforementioned logical contradiction? (if at all)
I answered everything. See also the article I sent to him above.
In my humble opinion, the assertion that ”logic is not something” is based on the assumption that ***verbal*** assertions (like this assertion itself) are bound only by formal and content-empty logical conditions. In other words, this assertion itself is devoid of content or meaning. And this is, as I understand it, what happened to the early Wittgenstein.
I argue that logic is definitely “something” and therefore we can talk about it and its limits.
I am of course not claiming that logic has no necessary status. I am claiming that we must assume that there are necessary conditions that precede even it.
(Here is the place to add “and say amen..”, Mikhi)
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