The firstborn of a doubting priest and the territory of commandments
Hello,
I remember from the third book (I don’t have the book right now, to verify this), that the commandments have territory, so sometimes they won’t reject things even though they are a more important value (I’m probably phrasing it incorrectly, sorry).
The Mishnah in Yevamot (10:1, 10:1) writes that a doubting priest is not obliged to sell his firstborn to another priest, but rather to graze until he becomes rich. This is understandable because the one who takes it from his fellow priest is the one who bears the burden, but the Aruch of the Light makes it difficult – it follows that he loses holy things from the start. He could bring someone else to sacrifice him, and instead he allows him to be blemished. Should we also say here that simply delimiting the mitzvah of the firstborn does not include a loss of money? (The Aruch of the Light himself put the Mishnah in a complicated way)
Thank you very much.
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
I didn't understand. That's exactly the question - why can he let the result of the exemption come, and not act to fulfill the mitzvah. Do you mean that the obligation to sacrifice the firstborn is not on the owner, but only on the priest who brings it to him, and in any case he doesn't have to take care that the sacrifice arrives? For the answer, this is less clear, because such models exist in the mitzvahs that every person can fulfill, and therefore if my friend desecrates Shabbat, then I am not obligated to prevent it, but in a mitzvah that depends on me, and he will not be able to fulfill it if I don't bring it to him, it doesn't sound reasonable that the obligation is only on him, and I can ignore it.
I will not be punished if I do not save my friend who is in danger. And if it were not for the verse "You shall not stand for the blood of your neighbor," there would be no prohibition in this either. And there is no question of territory here.
I assume that the rest of the sentence is despite the fact that there is a commandment and you have been very careful about your souls. It does not seem to me that it is similar, because as stated there it can be a personal commandment on every person, just as I do not have to worry about all my neighbors eating matzah. What is different here is that in the definition of the commandment, a person brings the firstborn to the priest, so the owner is also part of the commandment.
But it is good that you mentioned you shall not stand on the blood of your neighbor, which is the original question I wanted to ask. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 33) requires the verse “you shall not stand on the blood of your neighbor” beyond the law of losing one's body in order to oblige him to hire workers. Why is the obligation of the one who shall repay and cannot ignore not sufficient to oblige a person to spend money on him? Is this also an example of the same principle?
Thank you very much.
definitely
Glad to hear. I must add many thanks for your columns and the third book, which really developed my thinking. And also for your responsiveness to all those who ask, it is truly a holy work, which glorifies Torah in Israel. You provide clear answers that are difficult to find good parallels to. Many thanks.
happily.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
