The flexibility of Halacha

“To the best of my judgment, there is no prohibition in this” meaning there is no formal prohibition to take this voice and that voice.

Why in another answer did you refuse to issue a license for such a permit? There, a central issue was that perhaps the voices contradict each other to some extent beneath the surface. And even if this concern is a minority, “they have become stricter not to trust a majority in your general leadership in Halacha”. By the way, I did some digging and did not find a discussion that takes this bull by the horns.

https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%d7%a7%d7%95%d7%9c%d7%99-%d7%96%d7%94-%d7%95%d7%a7%d7%95%d7%9c%d7%99-%d7%96%d7%94-%d7%a8%d7%a9%d7%a2

Thank you very much Rabbi,
And when I decide a position for myself, can I always try to make it easier/worse?

Ro, how can you try to do such a thing? If you study an issue and come to a conclusion, then in your opinion that is the truth. It has nothing to do with aggravation or alleviation (unless there is such a built-in consideration, and there are such cases).

I claim that there is no halakhic prohibition in this, but it is not appropriate to do so. Did I write something different somewhere?

RO, my father answered you well.

In the above answer, I thought that your statement, "They have become stricter not to rely on a majority in your general leadership in halakhah," was a halakhic claim (although I haven't found anyone who explicitly addressed the whole issue. One can only infer from silences). I don't know what is appropriate and inappropriate in halakhic considerations. Do they bless the Torah with blessings for this "appropriate" chatter?

What is appropriate is what is included in ”and do what is right and good” and ”be holy”. I think this is commendable, although it should be discussed.

And even if it is faded, my voice is a secret, I am not sure that this is a halakhic prohibition.

Tell me, my dear? The Gemara says evil, and in your opinion, evil is against the will of God without there being an explicit command (this is how I understand the "appropriate" you wrote).

For example, the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam on the matter of Sabbath time. Whoever brings in on Shabbat eve like Rabbeinu Tam and takes out on Shabbat night like the Geonim, there is no halakhic problem, but only appropriate?

Maybe it is according to the explanation you once put forward that there is no prohibition against causing oneself a sin retroactively. Like, this is your gitta from now on if you dance. Halacha received a blessing from so-and-so and the next day she was with her husband and gave birth to a male child. Now if you dance, then she was the wife of so-and-so and her husband committed adultery and the child was a bastard. You put forward the explanation that it is permissible for her to dance. [And I wrote there in Nik 3 that I once saw someone bring evidence that there is indeed no problem in causing a sin retroactively, etc. Since then I have searched and found it and it was the stone tori but I no longer remember where. But apparently the evidence should be easily rejected as explained there and if I find this stone tori I will look inside. https://mikyab.net/posts/66093#comment-33006%5D.

But what if it is in one act.
Suppose there is a question whether the pig mentioned by the Torah is actually a modern-day cow or whether a pig is actually a deer. And as in the samicha controversy in every generation there is a faction of rabbis who say from deep convictions that a pig is a cow and a faction of rabbis who also say from deep convictions that a pig is a deer. In such a way that if a cow is forbidden then a deer is certainly permitted and vice versa. Now I want to eat a cow and a deer in one bite. I have certainly eaten pork but in every question whether a cow is forbidden or a deer is forbidden I discuss it with a grain of salt. And chew with pleasure. It does not seem reasonable.
The kind of cunning opinion in the book of K'alvo that you attributed to Yehoshua before (according to Ayelet Hashachar, who understood this in his method. And in my opinion, the insider really doesn't write this if you look inside) and you disagree with it.

Correction to the link, although there's really no point in looking there.
https://mikyab.net/posts/66093#comment-33006

True. For example, one who raises a hand against his friend is called wicked, even though there is no halakhic prohibition against raising a hand.
Regarding the prohibition against turning an act into a crime, I once provided evidence for this from an Amoraim dispute in the Gemara in Nedim 14:1: I will not sleep today if I sleep tomorrow.
The cow and the pig are the case of two who are in a relationship, right?

A1. Are you really saying that bringing in Shabbat as a keres and taking out as a geoni is not a halakhic prohibition? Or what case was in your mind when you said that conflicting opinions are perhaps not a halakhic prohibition.
A2. I thought that two shabbilin is a realistic matter and it does not belong to taking sides in it, but in the dispute of the poskim, if it is permissible to take one after the other, why not take together each piece that is worthwhile for it, and that the act combines them. (In the cancellation of the majority of the well-known rasa, Chulin, p. 7, 37, it says that since there is a permit one after the other, then there is also a permit at once. Of course, there is a good thing for pepper, etc., but for the answer, it is similar.)
Is doubt of impurity in public property allowed in one person even if there is ”peace of mind”, such as one who walked on a path and entered the temple and was purified and then walked on a second path and entered the temple, I remember that R’ Shimon brings the opinion of the Phar”ach that one is indeed condemned as entering in impurity and I agree with him. R”ash raises there exactly the distinction between reality and laws but it is difficult for me to search now at this time.
A3. Perhaps today you will enable me to understand the difference between the will of God Almighty and a command of God Almighty. Is a command an indication of the strength of God Almighty's will? Creates a normative entity? Creates in people a greater sense of obligation? Causes more serious spiritual consequences? Is this whole division a Midrash of wonder to me?

B. Retroactive prohibition. It seems that you are proving that it is forbidden to create retroactively. Eating it for a prohibition and eating it for its conditions is a problem if you have given a warning, a doubt about the warning. Or I did not understand. But it seems to me that there is a slight difference between Bel Yahl's word, which was precisely his word to prevent such a situation and therefore does not change the order, although in other prohibitions that are conditional in a case such as a gett, perhaps there is no prohibition to create retroactively. [If eating it for a prohibition and then we do a piku'n and eating it for its conditions, perhaps it should be ruled that it is not a problem. Apparently they dealt with this].
The Torah of the New Year, 28: (I once saw someone who brought it up, I think in some kind of collection of articles, I don't remember who and where and in what context) suggests that it is permissible to be asked about a sacrifice after slaughtering even if a hulin has brought help in retrospect, "because at the time of slaughter, it is the same as a slaughter that had a holy name on it, and therefore the question becomes hulin in helping, and hulin in helping is already the case." I have not found a good basis for distinguishing between a question and a condition.

A1. When ruling on the subject of a slave as a slave, there are opinions that this can be done even in place of a separate, There are things that are a standard required of everyone. There are things that are below the standard (then it is the strength of the will) and there are times when there is a point in not commanding so that things are done out of ateruta deltata (voluntariness). Such as the work of virtue, studying Torah beyond two chapters in the morning and evening, setting aside a donation beyond the minimum, further aggravating the letter of the law (sanctifying oneself in what is permissible. Which may also be less willing, but it is also not possible to command because of the paradox of the wicked) and so on.

B. Indeed, that is what I meant. From there, it is apparent evidence that the law has a prohibition. It is still necessary to clarify what the prohibition is (in the current or previous act). I wrote about this in the fourth book in the Talmudic Logic series. There I gave more examples, such as someone who blessed and now does not want to eat (Ritva in Holin and another long reply by Rabbi Kook and other poskim). He who brought a sacrifice and now obtained a better sacrifice, and the same is true regarding the etrogs of the Grach of Brisk. Speaking of which, the Torah scholar Even, in Shacha, elaborates on this both regarding the etrogs and the sacrifices.
Incidentally, the Rav wrote that if a man consecrated a woman by a messenger, he should go back and consecrate her himself because of the mitzvah in him greater than in his messenger. One should pepper all this with Tuba, and so on.

A1-2. I understand.
A3. In the strength of will, I do not see the point of assuming that all humans map in the same way the strength of will to duty/ought. It could be that I map all of God's desires to "ought" and you map them all to "ought".
The argument Deltata is not understandable to me and seems like a trick. If God does not "command" just so that there is no command, but from His perspective it is exactly the same, then from My perspective it is the same, and His attempt at camouflage is not successful. Refusing a command from God is not like abstaining from legislation by legislators in Parliament.
[Until today I thought that from your perspective the command itself creates something normative (not understood) and therefore there is a difference between a command and a will, but I am no longer sure about this, which is why I asked]

B. I will get the book at the ביא. I did not understand why the condemnation of the sacrifice of etrogim and kiddushin (where the possibility of performing it in a proper manner after the obligation has already been fulfilled arises. I will see the body of the idea in the book) is similar to creating a retroactive offense.
Regarding hulin in ezra, the Tu”a supports the fact that it is permissible to be questioned about a sacrifice after slaughtering, even if it was uprooted (in retroactively!) and became hulin in ezra. How does this really fit in with the fact that the ate of it is for its suffering and the ate of it is for its conditions is problematic.

A3. Who said that the mapping is agreed upon? My argument is that God decided what to include in the halakha through these criteria. What do we think and do we understand this or agree with it? That is a different discussion. Indeed, in my opinion, the command itself creates something normative from our perspective, but there is a reason for God to define something as a command and something else as a will that is not a command.
B. This is a retroactive cancellation of a mitzvah. Of course, this should be discussed, and I was just commenting.

Regarding the issue of vows, perhaps a prohibition that a person himself created is different from ordinary prohibitions. After all, the obligation is to keep one's word and not a substantive prohibition (although a vow is the clearest example of a voluntary prohibition), and therefore there, if he himself intervened, it would not change his obligation.

You assume you know what is serious and what is easy. But it could be the exact opposite.

“…They argued against him that he was lenient in the laws of fasting. He said that he was strict in the laws of protecting life…”

It is known from the Torah about the monk who was apparently punctual and meticulous and very strict with himself. But he was considered a sinner. Who deprived himself of wine.

Why, from our perspective (from your perspective), does it make a difference whether something is “within the law” or not? If the law reflects a willpower of 80-100 and the proper reflects a willpower of 60-80, then the expectation that a person's behavior will be determined exactly by the difference between above or below 80 is strange. Can a person think that for him everything above 70 is a complete obligation and what is below 70 will depend on the circumstances and context, etc. But the commandment itself generates something else besides reflecting willpower, as you wrote. What is this something else?

By the way, regarding avoiding a command so that there is a delta, speaking of what I wrote in point 1 about a judge whose opinion is clear to him but says I don't know in order to manipulate the outcome, it seems clear that if he explicitly says "my opinion is on verse 1" but I declare "I don't know" so that the judges will add it, then that is a ruling for everything and we follow the majority as usual and there is nothing in his declaration.

First, I wrote that it is not just a difference in the strength of the will. Second, God decided this is the line, not us. At most, we interpret His will.
The commandment creates an obligation on us, as opposed to what is merely desirable. Whoever refrains from doing an obligation has a claim against him. Whoever refrains from doing what is desirable is simply wrong. Perhaps there are different wings in hell for these two.