The induction problem

And the scope of the induction problem:

Karl Popper did attempt to overcome the problem that David Hume posed to science by claiming that the main mechanism of science is deductive , and that science operates with the help of deductive refutations and not inductive proofs – that is, that a scientific theory can only be refuted, but not verified (for example: it is possible to know that the theory that the crowing of a rooster is not the cause of the sunrise based on the fundamental refutation that exists for this claim).
However, Popper’s opponents and critics argued against him that he actually hides the problem of induction through the mechanism of refutation, and does not necessarily solve it: they argued that Popper assumes that if the results of an experiment indicate the refutation of some theory, these results will necessarily repeat themselves in the future, thus refuting the theory again and again, and here again induction is used. Popper, for his part, would argue that the refutation of a theory is not a theory itself, and therefore the requirement of reproducibility is demanded only from the theory – not from the refutation of the theory; Popper does not therefore pretend to assume the future recurrence of the results of the refutation, but only pretends to claim that a one-time event that is not in line with a given theory is enough – to refute its reproducibility, i.e. its permanence – and therefore its general validity, and therefore: itself.

Did Popper actually solve the problem?