The Metaphysics of Halacha

What is meant? It says there, “Just as there are ethical facts, there are also halakhic facts. These and those are not dependent on God and are imposed on Him.” (Although later on it is suggested that God can change spiritual facts, and perhaps that is what is meant here?).

I don't know where it is written and I don't remember anymore. I wrote what I think now. I suppose there are metaphysical religious facts, but I see no reason to assume that they are unchangeable (i.e. not dependent on God. At least not all of them).

Doesn't this contradict the assumption that the religious values that Halacha promotes, according to your view, are also imposed on God?

I really don't think they are forced on him. At least not all of them.

There at 457 at the end of the column that goes like this. On the one hand, a halakhic value that overrides a forced morality must itself be forced, that is, prior to a command. On the other hand, a halakhic conflict that has been resolved (a mitzvah man rejects a lulav and a leva) seems completely relaxed in contrast to a moral conflict that has been resolved (killing non-combatants in war) and therefore seems to be the product of a final command only. And the solution you proposed there is that indeed the halakhic value is forced (even though the obligation is by virtue of the command) but the (spiritual) consequences of violating the halakhic value are not forced.
In your answer here that not all halakhic values are forced, do you mean that halakhic values that override (in some situation) morality are indeed forced but other halakhic values may not be. By the way, does such an argument follow that in a coincidental, non-essential conflict like yours (if I remember the terminology correctly) it is reasonable to assume that it is a halakhic value that is not forced and therefore reasonable to assume that morality will prevail.

I have a little difficulty with the claim that value is forced but its prices are not. Simply put, the necessity of some value is because of its prices.
The distinction you made at the end is possible, but it seems to me that the rest of your statement is problematic. Accidental or essential conflicts do not necessarily deal with different values but with different situations. If a halakhic value X rejects a moral value Y because the conflict is necessary, it does seem that X is forced. But if there is a situation in which a halakhic value Z will not reject Y because it is accidental, this does not mean that Z is not forced, because there may be another situation in which Z will reject some moral value (because there it is necessary) and this would prove that Z is forced.

It seems that the difficulty is that if you separate the value from the price and the problem of violating is only on the price side and it is not forced, then it is found that there is no force at all, and if there is a problem for its own sake even if it is not for the price, then the absence of force in the price is unimportant. Maybe it is not just a little.

Regarding the continuation, I understand that you are clarifying that for a halakhic value if there is at least one necessary conflict (and in your opinion, in such a case, given the certainty of the halakhic law, it is a forced halakhic value. But if all the conflicts with it are accidental, then it is possible that it is not forced and will not prevail (and perhaps they will say that there is no doubt that a forced one takes away from me, it is certainly forced). And if so, there is an interesting result here that the division is sharp, since all the details in morality and all the strengths are all about everything that is forced, then a halakhic value that is not forced always clashes with any easy grammar in matters of morality (if when a lulav is lifted it momentarily obscures the view from his neighbor and causes him some displeasure, then he is forbidden to wave it at that moment, and perhaps he is a scoundrel). Perhaps it is better to assume that everything is forced and that is it.

In principle, that is true. A religious value that is not coercive would be contrary to any moral hesitation. But we have no way of knowing what is coercive and what is not.
This is always a result. You use intuition and the rules of halakha, according to which you decide whether the halakha is rejected or not, and in that case you will be able to conclude whether it is a coercive value or not.
At most, you can be consistent in your teaching.
And this decision is not simple either. If the religious value is contrary to morality, it can be coercive or not. If it rejects morality, it is necessarily coercive.

It seems that intuition and the rules of halakhah certainly say that every religious value rejects any oscillation of moral value, and therefore all religious values are coercive. Don't they?

Not necessarily. For example, entering someone else's territory rejects religious values, even at the slightest hint.

But it is enough to assume that for every halakhic value there is a moral value that is rejected in every way (even if there is another moral value that is not rejected even in every way), and in this case who would not assume so?