The mind as a cognitive tool

But I don't “feel” that it is a cognitive tool. I do understand that a significant part of my understandings are not valid without the approach you present.
But in the end, if I don't feel that it is a type of cognition, isn't it better to assume that it is not? I mean even at the cost of giving up some of our conclusions.
What is the Rabbi's opinion on this? How can thinking be transformed into cognition without a prior feeling in the ideas of cognition?

What priority do the senses have as instruments of cognition over the intellect? Ostensibly, both the senses and the intellect are instruments of cognition that are based on different a priori knowledge, right?

I did not mean that the senses have more cognitive ability and power than the mind. Moreover, each sense is different in a qualitative and essential sense from one another, not just quantitatively.

I meant that the distinct advantage of the five senses over the mind and thinking is that I feel and experience the senses in an immediate way, as they reflect and receive information from the reality outside me. In contrast to the mind and thinking, which I experience only as the ability to analyze information from the senses and not as a cognitive tool for external, ethereal reality.

P. S
And this is the question I asked the Rabbi here. Is it right to accept his position when I do not experience in my mind the power of consciousness?
I do not disagree with the advantages and conclusion of the method as saving the world of science.
I ask whether it is right to accept it when we do not feel in our minds this ability.

I have no answer to that. If you think all your feelings are illusions, what do you want me to say? Why should you accept what I say? There is no real way to deal with skepticism.

I don't understand how you came to this conclusion from what I said?
My argument is exactly the opposite! Because I trust my feelings – for example, that the eyes do indeed reflect what is going on in the external environment. And I don't feel the feeling that the brain (proper) has cognitive potential, so isn't it worth relying on the fact that the brain does not have cognitive potential?!
(Even at the cost of giving up some of the conclusions that are simple to us.)

"Your feelings" In my words, do not focus on your senses, but on whatever you feel is right (intuition).

Do you mean towards the sense of intuition in certain beliefs such as analogy, laws of nature, etc.?
So as we know, intuition is not a 100% reliable tool (we all agree on that) so regarding those things we have not been able to prove, it turns out to claim that intuition was wrong. I am sure that you also come to this conclusion many times, that what you felt was right turned out to be wrong.

So why should we abandon the other beliefs, it is because we do not have any “intuition” (a feeling) that is in the power of intuition to observe and look outside.
But I am not sure that I understood the Rabbi's answer, so I would really appreciate it if the Rabbi would extend his short and concise words a little longer. It feels to me that we are treading water following a text that is too short for me to get to the end of his meaning.

Shabbat Shalom!
Eli

Do you reject every intuition that you haven't been able to prove? That's ridiculous, since you can't prove anything. On the contrary, it's true that intuition isn't 100 percent reliable, but in my opinion, to reject intuition you need good evidence (though not proof in the strict sense).
I don't see what more I can say. For me, intuition is correct unless there are good arguments or evidence against it.

The problem is (as the Rabbi also explicitly writes in his book) that we do not have intuition, that ”intuition” is a tool of cognition. Rather, we perceive it as a purely thinking tool.
Certainly not as a weakling who sees ideas in a Platonic world through ‘transparent’ objects.

Anyway, I don't understand what intuition I'm rejecting here? If only I was completely coherent in my approach.

Can you give a little more detail on what you call ‘cognition’ and why ‘thinking’? (I understand that this is one of the main arguments in your books, and I'm not sure I understand its meaning).
I assume that ‘thinking’ here also does not refer to the feelings/desires of the person, which are subjective, and therefore I do not really understand the division between ‘cognition’ and ’thinking’, after all, the recognition of reality is carried out through the mind and the senses, both of which can be insisted on and the validity of the information they provide can be challenged, and whether this information (both tangible and intellectual) has a hold on real, existing reality or not, but rather it is purely about our thoughts (there is no existing reality outside of us).

Although this cannot be proven, we assume that both the information provided by the senses and the information provided by the mind have a hold on real, existing reality, and therefore I do not understand the distinction between ‘thinking’ and ’cognition’ (even if for some reason we have more confidence in seeing tangible information as representing existing reality than intellectual information).

In a pure way, the information provided by the senses and the mind is ‘thoughts’, and we tend, for all sorts of reasons (intuition?), to see it as ‘cognition’ of reality, so what is the difference between them?

I have written books on this, so I can only briefly describe it here.
It is customary to divide thinking into cognition and cognition. Cognition is done through the senses, and thinking takes cognitive data and processes them. Alternatively, thinking can create claims from it (like the claims of mathematics, according to certain interpretations).
The principle of causality, for example, is not drawn from the senses (as David Hume showed). Therefore, the conclusion is that it is a product of our thinking. However, if it is indeed not a product of the senses but of the thinking that is done inside me, there is no reason to assume that it is appropriate for external reality, that is, that in external reality everything does indeed have a cause. Therefore, Hume argued that the principle of causality is only a form of our observation and not a claim about the world itself.
On the other hand, I argue that the distinction between thinking and cognition is not sharp, and therefore we have the capacity for “cognitive thinking”. This is recognition not through the senses but through some intellectual faculty (not the intellect, in Maimonides' language, or iditic vision in Husserl's language, or auditory thinking in the language of the hermit Rabbi). My argument is that the principle of causality and other assumptions of reason are not products of pure thinking but products of cognitive thinking. Therefore, this principle and its like do make a claim about reality and not just about us and our way of perceiving reality.

Thanks for the explanation.
What is still not clear to me is why to make a distinction between sensory and intellectual information in the first place, since even sensory data can be challenged and claimed to not represent an existing reality (as Descartes did in Logic and Russell in Problems of Philosophy), and in fact it is not possible to absolutely prove the existence of tangible reality, and yet that is what we do, so the data of the mind are on the same level as the data of the senses.
In other words, the data of the senses are also thinking, because for one reason or another we see them as cognition. To the same extent, the data of the mind, even if they are thinking, can be seen as cognition, so why separate them?

Is our excess confidence in the data of the senses compared to the data of the mind a mere gut feeling (intuition)? I think that every person has certain logical imperatives of one kind or another that he is ten times more certain of than the data of the senses. So again, where did the division/preference between sensory data and intellectual data come from?

And another question, did David Hume and Kant really see all their forms of thinking as only human forms of thinking that have no anchoring in reality? Or are you explaining that this is their method, that it is not about human private forms of thinking, but rather those that have an anchoring in reality.

True, and yet they are two different mechanisms. People treat the senses as something inherently more reliable, and I argue exactly what you say.
As far as I understand, both saw some of the fundamental forms of thought as fictions of the mind. Constraints of our way of thinking. With Kant it is a bit more complex because there are several different categories.