The one who brings a divorce on a ship
In Gittin, page 7: Conflicting baraitas are cited regarding the one who brings a get on a ship, in the context of the law of saying in the pen and in the pen – one baraita says that it is a foreign country and therefore does not need to be said, and a second baraita says that it is a foreign country.
Rabbi Jeremiah and Abaye explain that this refers to a ship on the rivers of Judah, and the ruling depends on the disagreement of the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda Gabi regarding the obligation to pay tithe on a ship that does not sail on the rivers of Judah.
Simply put, the dispute over the conditions is over suction/connection to the ground (it seems to be a dispute among the first: Meiri, attributed to Ritva and Rashi).
And here the son asks – why would the borders of the legitimate Land of Israel (i.e. where there is a shadow in the P’n and where there is no shadow) depend on whether the ship is anchored (or anchored in the land)? After all, the statement in the P’n depends, simply, on the borders of the legal Land of Israel that was sanctified (perhaps with minor changes – the disagreement between R’t and R’y in the Toddah ‘Ashkelon’ on page 2) – and the rivers of the Land of Israel are the legal Land of Israel (which is far from saying that indeed R’ Yehuda is prohibited from embarking on a ship that does not violate the law prohibiting departure abroad). And it seems that R’ Yehuda interprets this as the reason why R’ Neb’i refrains from this explanation, but what would R’ Jeremiah answer? And it seems that this is a question for R’ Yehuda, but it seems that the excuse for the question he asks is in the Toddah Atzitz, but I did not understand his answer.
I would be happy for the rabbi to clarify the issue.
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Why did the Sages decide to determine according to borders in the matter of the obligation of giving?
After all, the reason in the Land of Israel is not necessary to say is because it is common and common, and after all, within the boundaries of the holiness of the Land, it is common and common (perhaps except for places that are at the end of the border and far from the yeshivas - the method of the Rabbi on page 2), and so why did they not determine according to the boundaries of holiness that include more (such as in the case of a ship that is not afloat - which is outside the Land of Israel for the purpose of giving, but within the Holy Land of Israel) than the borders of the land for the purpose of giving? After all, it is certain that in a place that is outside the borders of the land for the purpose of giving, but is within the borders of the Holy Land - the people are common and common to the same extent as other places within the Land!
As I wrote, in any case there is no connection between these borders and the law written before me. Therefore, some arbitrary halakhic boundary of the Land of Israel had to be chosen. I see no advantage in choosing one or the other.
The boundary is not completely arbitrary - there is a reason for it, as I wrote, because within these boundaries it is usually common and limited (as explained in the appendix on page 2). Indeed, not all places within these boundaries are necessarily common and limited, and yet these places were considered legitimate Land of Israel - so that there would be clear and known boundaries.
But why did they choose the borders for the purpose of donation? After all, the boundaries of the Holy Land include more places, and from a perspective of understanding, these places should also be included as Land of Israel, and so why not correct according to these boundaries? Why be strict without any reason?
I have exhausted the discussion.
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