The ontological view

Your final appeal is in the third paragraph on p. 143. “There is a subtle point here that is easy to miss and yet I see no way around it”.
Regarding Kant's division between the existence of an attribute and its realization on p. 123.
Regarding your appeal to Kant between existence and the existence of the necessity of reality on p. 127.

On p. 143, that is not what I wrote. I challenged the very assumption that it can be conceived as existing, and emphasized that according to the scoundrel, the difficulty is greater.
On p. 123, I bring Kant's division that says that the realization of a thing is not its subject. What you brought is Anselm's argument and has nothing to do with Kant. In any case, I see no connection with the above rejection.
And on p. 127, I added that the necessity of existence is perhaps a subject, as distinct from the very existence itself. Again, I see no connection with the above rejection.

Indeed, I ask because you challenged Kant's words (127). So we are left with the only challenge that is valid from your point of view, and that is on p. 143.
The same challenge challenges what Anselm presents as being conceivable.
But it does not challenge the evidence that God is perfect and one of the attributes that is perfect is necessary existence (127), and therefore He exists.

I don't understand the question. Please phrase it clearly here.

There are, as I understand it, two ontological proofs for God that are identical:
Anselm's proof of the greatest conceivable being.
And Descartes' proof of the most complete being.
When you claim that the villain cannot conceive of God, you are attacking Anselm's proof.
But Descartes' proof remains, because it does not speak of our cognitive ability, but of the very definition of the concept: the most complete being.
There it is customary to argue, like Kant, that existence is not a property (completeness) but rather a placement of the concept in reality. But you argue against him that he is right only with regard to contingent beings, but with regard to the necessity of reality, this is not valid, because the necessity of reality already entails "different" properties.
In any case, why do you reject the fact that God is the most complete being - an existence necessarily more complete than its being exists and hence it exists.

First of all, I was dealing with Anselm's formulation and not Descartes'. Anselm is more precise, and I explained this throughout the conversation.
Beyond that, existence is not a property, its necessity is a property. Therefore, even in a necessary existence, existence is not a property.
Bottom line, my main argument was that the argument is not ontological. The question of whether its conclusion is true or not is, of course, true. As for the question of whether the argument is valid when the additional assumptions are completed, it certainly is. But the additional assumptions I listed along the way can be disputed.

Interestingly, you say that even if necessity is a property, the existence and realization of the concept is not related to the argument.
For example, it is possible to say that God does not exist, which is a contradiction, but on the level of the concept and not the objective one?

If it exists then it necessarily does. But it is still possible that it does not exist (because existence is not an attribute/predicate). Therefore, saying that it exists is not necessarily a contradiction, but saying that it does not exist is not a contradiction.