The ontological view

A. Regarding what you mentioned that the reason for the error of the evidence is that perfection is not a criterion for realization seems extremely weak to me. It still follows from your words that finally evidence that does not assume assumptions that we accept from the outside is valid in the objective world.
And according to your words, this evidence can still be presented - we will simply define God like this:
Definition – God is the being X/Y/X (let's say the most perfect), and so he necessarily exists.
Claim – If he does not exist, then this is a contradiction to his definition – he necessarily exists.
Hence the proof that God necessarily exists.

And so you can define God2, and so on God3.
B. What you mentioned that every being that you prove in this way is the perfect being is completely unclear, after all, there may be several creations with the same identical properties… there is a real entity behind the set of properties, as is known.

You repeat what I myself wrote in my words there (which indeed have the achievement of an ontological proof in their words). But as I wrote here, the proof itself for the existence of God has failed because you can not accept the assumption that realization is a criterion for completeness. In short, neither weak nor weak.
Then you brought up the non-existent objection that I already mentioned here.
And finally, according to your third claim, everything is possible. But when you prove something, the burden of proof is on you. You did not prove the existence of several beings.

I think there is a misunderstanding between us.
I am not talking about a refutation of Anselm Diege's ontological view (in which the greatest island challenge will not attack him, realization is not a property of perfection). Rather, I am talking about a new ontological view (in which we say more towards Descartes but not exactly either).

In the view *there* I say in which we assume that there is some entity no matter what its properties - not even the most perfect entity! And we add to it the property of necessary existence and thus the aforementioned entity will be created in the way of wonder and wonder.

For example, we will define ”Michael Abraham” as having the properties xyz and also having the property “necessarily exists”. In any case, it is proven from this that ”Michael Abraham” exists in reality.

In any case, it will be possible to create an infinite number of “gods” of different degrees.
And also to create a devil who is equivalent to the degree of God.

PS, I wanted to raise a problem here on the site, that it is not possible to write long comments through the ’Pla’ so we have to split them into several small ones. (As if the “Reply” button disappeared at the bottom)

The question of whether necessary existence is compatible with imperfect entities. Maybe this is proof that it is not. Only a perfect entity can have a necessary existence. And again we have repeated that all these entities are one.

On the computer there is a solution for this. Press Tab and again until you reach the “back” key. On mobile I don't know what to do.

Finally, even if a fundamentally temporary entity cannot be the necessity of reality. I think that to conclude from this that only a perfect (one) entity could hold this crown seems to me too big a leap.
Why not assume that Satan is not one of the events of the ontological view?! I don't think I need to explain to you that there is a huge difference between God (basically good) and Satan (basically evil). And here we have proven Satan and God – two entities that are not subject to matter that come from the view.
So again the objection you raised is only local but not essential.

I know this trick on the computer, I thought there was something else in the miracle too.

B. In Chapter 14, the Rabbi also mentions Kant's criticism that he claimed that it is not possible to conclude from an analytic claim that something exists in the world. And he wrote that this understanding of Kant is also baseless and assumes the desired. (After all, it does not show where Anselm made a flaw in the logical process, or indicate that the definition is inconsistent)
But I wanted to ask, why it would indeed not be possible to assume the desired in this matter, and define the concept of "existence" and the distinction whether something exists in reality or not, only when we have the possibility in reality to examine it or not as a procedure of inference that stemmed from a synthetic-a priori theorem. As soon as we assume the desired in this sense, the entire ontological argument will encounter a definitional barrier from the very definition of the concept of existence.

I wrote this by pointing out that the evidence is based on an assumption (even if not empirical). Once this is the case, one can of course assume the opposite assumption and negate the conclusion.
Although Kant's words imply that he found an error in Anselm and not that he is merely posing a possible alternative.

A. I didn't understand what you mentioned with the assumption. Could you point me to where it is written in the notebook or mention it. (Like what did you mean by if there is an assumption then you can assume an opposite assumption and negate the conclusion, what assumption are you talking about)
B. Okay finally even if this is a possible alternative it seems strong enough to me to rule out the evidence as more likely.

The assumption that existence is a criterion for completeness (there are other assumptions).
We have exhausted.

Okay, thank you very much for the answer so far, you're the boss here… I didn't understand exactly, but let's say.
I mean 😉 I didn't understand why you always want to unite the arguments of the proof only into a description of perfection alone.
And not assume an entity that simply has several properties, for example-
A. Also perfect
B. Also separately* has the property of necessarily existing
Z”A not as a consequence of the property of perfection but accompanying the property of perfection.

If you see it this way, then again there will always be no such basic premises in view because you will split them into other parts with independent sub-arguments.

I have already mentioned that this is the meaning of the separation from the existing island.

Yes, but in the end, the island that exists cannot be a solution,
because it is derived from our eyes that can deceive us and hide it. While it is logically proven to exist.
Therefore, all these absurd arguments - which produce an infinite number of necessary beings, reality seems to me to be weak compared to the essence of the argument, whether it is possible to derive the existence of a thing from an Amza definition.

Of course not. I just said that there is no new argument here. I don't have time to go into all these details over and over again, and I also don't remember what is written in the notebook here on the site (it is a relatively old version). I am copying here a more updated version that I wrote that deals with these objections, and perhaps it will be more useful to you. 18. Gaunillo on the existing/complete lost island Introduction The next criticism that we will deal with is ancient. Already during Anselm's lifetime, he received a response from the monk Gaunillo of Marmottier, under the title “In the name of the villain”, in which he made several objections to various parts of his argument. The best known of these is the objection to the existing island. This is an objection of a similar nature to Kant's first objection, since it does not attack the logical inference head-on nor any of the assumptions underlying it, but rather points to an absurdity that arises if we adopt such a pattern of argument. In this context, it is important to recall what we saw above in Chapter 11 regarding Kant's a priori appeal. The fact that some argument pattern seems to us a priori absurd is not enough to reject it. At most, this motivates us to look for a flaw in the argument. But as long as we have not found such a flaw, the argument remains intact. Initial formulation A simplistic formulation of Gaonillo's appeal is the following. Let us define the concept of the "existing island". Now let us assume for the sake of discussion that it does not exist, and this will lead us to a contradiction. If so, by the way of negation we have necessarily come to the conclusion that this island does exist. In this way we can of course prove the existence of the existing lion, the existing star or thousands and billions of existing stars, the existing Flying Spaghetti Monster, the existing fairy with the one-eyed and winged hawk, and so on. This is a generator that produces crazy and delusional entities at will in an uncontrolled manner and without any logical or physical limitation. We throw definitions into the air and they, by their very nature, become entities that exist in our world, which makes the structure of Anselm's argument absurd. It should be noted that there is still no indication here of a flaw in the argument, but only of the absurdity of this method of reasoning. I have already noted that in order to refute an argument, one must point out the problematic point in the reasoning itself. Some raise this flaw against the accepted religious view that God is one, and show that in this way it is possible to prove the existence of as many gods as we wish. But this is not a flaw either, since the ontological evidence is not bound by any religious conceptions. It proves the existence of some being and calls it God. Its identification with God in any religious conceptions can be right or wrong, but it is certainly not related to our argument. Rejecting this formulation of the appeal Even if I think of the existing island, it can certainly not exist in reality. Just as I can think of a triangle even if there was no triangular object in the world at all. There is no reason to think of things that do not exist and even to think of them as existing. If this island that I thought of does not exist in reality, then at most it turned out that I imagined a concept that does not really exist. That is all. Where is the contradiction here? Let's look for a moment at the opposite definition: the island that does not exist. Suppose it turns out that this island does indeed exist. This only means that the island that exists is not the island that I thought of but another island. It is impossible for the same island, one of whose properties is that it does not exist, to exist. But this is an empty sentence. Clearly, this will not be the same island itself, but this is not because of the contradiction to its definition but because there is a defined identity between objects and not between a concept and an object in the world (in what sense is the island that exists exactly the same island that I thought of? It may resemble it, but it is certainly not itself. Just as a triangle that exists is not the triangle that I thought of even if they are identical in their properties). If so, it is also the same in the opposite direction: if I think of an existing island, then it is impossible to say that it itself does not exist. But not because of the contradiction, but because it is impossible to speak of these two as the same island. At most, one can say that there is no island at all that meets the description of the "existing island" and I simply imagined it. Therefore, the appeal in this formulation is a mere illusion. I will recall that at the end of Chapter 15 I argued about the difference between thinking about a concept in the sense of conceiving it (imagining) and reaching the conclusion that some claim about it is true. Conceiving a non-existent concept as existing is certainly possible. But when I stand before it, I understand that it exists (and not just conjures up the existing being as a concept). The existing island can be imagined, but that does not mean that I really think that it exists. Beyond that, we saw that Anselm began his course from a definition of a concept: the greatest being that can be conceived. Is the "existing island" Can it also be considered a definition of a concept? It seems not. It actually hides an argument within it. A definition includes within it properties of the concept but not its existence. It is true that in a certain sense this itself is a refutation of Anselm's assumption that existence is an adjective or characteristic, but at least it can be seen that there is no further refutation here. Beyond that, Anselm did not include existence in the definition of God. The definition is the perfect being. Although he assumes that existence is a criterion for completeness, this is another (and problematic) assumption that we have already discussed. This is not his definition itself. This is a more reasonable procedure than the appeal of the island of existence, which brings a blatant categorical mix-up to the table. Although we have seen that there is no obstacle to imagining that there is a fiction as existing. But defining a concept in such a way that existence is part of its definition is not a definition. We are presenting an argument under the guise of a definition. In other words, here the villain could certainly claim that he does not understand this definition, that is, that he cannot conceive of it, and then the discussion with him gets stuck right at the beginning. It is not for nothing that Anselm does not present a caricature of an argument that proves the existence of the “existent God” from a direct contradiction that arises if he does not exist. As we have seen here, this is a null argument. Anselm is talking about the being than which a greater cannot be conceived, and not simply about an existing being. As we have seen, Anselm's method of deduction is based on this precise definition and proceeds from it to the conclusion in a much more careful manner. Gaonillo's appeal A more precise formulation of Gaonillo's appeal seemingly puts his island into the pattern of Anselm's argument. Originally Gaonillo did not speak of the existing island, but defined the greatest lost island (aeg”b), and if we want to be precise: the greatest lost island that can be conceived. Now insert this concept in place of God in Anselm's argument, and the conclusion that will be reached is that the Aeg”b of course exists. Note that it is a lost island, meaning that no one knows about its existence. Here we have proven the existence of an island that is not yet known (and probably never will be known) to anyone. This is a non-trivial factual conclusion, since we now all know that there is at least one island in the world that no one knows about its existence. It is important to see the difference from the previous formulation. Here you do not introduce existence into the definition but take an indirect route, and talk about a property of completeness or being the largest. As mentioned, this is already more similar to Anselm's original argument. Possible Rejection Gaonillo's appeal can perhaps be rejected this way. The Aeg”b is not only the largest physically among the lost islands, but the most complete among them (otherwise existence would certainly not be a criterion for the size of Aeg”bs). But unlike with God, with lost islands, existence is not necessarily a criterion for completeness. The assumption that existence is one of the completenesses was made with regard to God because He is complete in all completenesses, but in the marriages that threaten lost islands, it is not certain that existence is one of the marriages, and therefore it is not one of the completenesses by which the greatness of one lost island is measured against other lost islands. Let us recall here that in the previous chapter we saw that Anselm actually implicitly assumes a very specific meaning for the term “greater than”, in a way that includes existence (existence is a criterion for greatness). We also saw there that this definition must also be included in the definition of the concept of God (since size also appears there: the greatest conceivable). We have made it difficult there that this is apparently an assumption of what is sought, since defining it as existing results in the conclusion that it exists. We explained there that there is no required assumption here, since it is possible that no other entity exists, or at least cannot be conceived as existing, and then God is the greatest that can be conceived as existing. Although with regard to God, we ultimately proved that he exists, since he is examined in his completeness (greatness) against all beings in the world, and if we are not skeptical, then it is clear that some beings exist in the world. But with regard to the island, the situation is different. After all, the island is measured only against other lost islands (it is the largest of them), and it is possible that there are no lost islands in the world at all. In such a situation, the largest of them could also be a non-existent island. Therefore, with regard to the island, this is a simple required assumption, while with regard to God, this is not necessarily the case. Anselm's response Following Gaonillo's criticisms, Anselm wrote his book Reply to Gaonillo. Regarding the argument from the island, Anselm argued that Gaonillo missed a very fundamental point in the ontological argument. There, Anselm repeats his distinction in Chapter 3 of the Proslogion (see our third section on this) between two types of entities: a necessary entity and a contingent entity. The existence of a necessary entity is not conditioned by any other entity, and it is necessary for its own sake. A contingent entity exists by chance (because another entity or another mechanism created it). A necessary entity cannot fail to exist (because its existence does not depend on any circumstances), while a contingent entity does (when the reasons for its existence disappear). In his response, Anselm argues that God is a necessary being (see third section). In contrast, the largest lost island, even if it exists, does not necessarily exist, but probably exists by chance. Its existence depends on circumstances (the sea around it, or the physical mechanism that created it). It seems that his intention is to say that the non-existence of God is a logical contradiction, and from this it follows by way of negation that God exists (God does not exist is an oxymoron). But the non-existence of the AJB is not a logical contradiction but at most contradicts a contingent fact that we know (that it exists, or that it is the greatest). A contradiction to the laws of nature or to a contingent (non-necessary) fact that we know cannot constitute a logical argument. Even if this is perhaps evidence for its existence, it is certainly not an ontological argument, since ontological arguments are of a purely logical nature, or at least without factual assumptions. In another formulation (following the distinction at the end of Chapter 15), it can be said that it is indeed possible to conceive of an AJB, but not to think that an AJB exists. Only if its existence is necessary does an identity arise between conceiving and actual existence. If I thought of a being whose existence is necessary, then it will also exist in the world. This follows from its concept. But I thought of an existing being whose existence is not necessary, there is no reason why it would not exist in the world. At most, I imagined an being who does not exist. Furthermore, if it were established to us that the existence of the Aēb is necessary and follows from its concept, then it ceased to be an E. E is a material entity that we know how it is created, and therefore we know that the existence of an E is not necessary. As soon as we found an E whose existence is necessary, it ceased to be an E. But a non-necessary (contingent) existence cannot be proven by an ontological argument. Therefore, at most, the Aēb is God himself, and here Gaonillo simply repeated the ontological proof in slightly different terminology. It is important to understand that it is impossible to prove the necessity of the existence of an E in the course of Chapter 3 that Anselm used to prove the necessity of the existence of God. Therefore, the necessity discussed here in relation to the Aēb is a logical necessity (we have proof of the existence of the island) but not an ontic necessity (its existence is not necessary for its own sake, and is not independent of external beings or mechanisms). Anselm himself makes another argument there. We will try to make this island larger and larger. If it is not the largest, then it will not be the largest lost island imaginable, since it is possible to imagine an Aēb larger than it. If so, its area (and in fact its volume) is infinite. But starting from a certain size, it ceases to be an island (and it also cannot exist in the world, because there are other objects in the world). Ostensibly, this is a technical argument. But I think there is a fundamental argument behind it. Think about who is greater: God or the Aēb? Of course, God, since He possesses all perfections and is the greatest of all beings that can come to our mind, including the Aga, while the Aga is the greatest only among the group of lost islands. If so, by definition He cannot be infinite (not necessarily in His size but in all His qualities). He can only exist if He Himself is God, and then we have simply proven the existence of God again. In another formulation, we can say that any being whose completeness is inconceivable is God. We cannot speak of the complete island or the complete lion, because if He is completely complete, then He Himself is God. In these arguments, we only prove the existence of God over and over again. Conclusion In the third part, we argued that the necessity of God's existence is intrinsically linked to the ability to prove it with an ontological argument. The "miracle" of proving a fact on the basis of logical argument without observational assumptions, repeatedly returns to the point of the necessity of existence. It is not for nothing that Anselm devoted Chapter 3 of his book to this point, since the entire proof rests on it. Kant is right that the existence of things cannot be proven through ontological arguments, but his words are relevant only to ordinary beings who have an ordinary existence. God is an exception in that his existence is necessary. For such objects, and only for them, is it possible to find an ontological proof of their existence. We will return to this point in the next chapter.

A. I wanted to write that there is a spelling error – “לטנוך” (instead of “לטנוך”) If you search, you will see it in the paragraph that begins “I will remind you that at the end of chapter 11”.
B. You mentioned in the above paragraph that defining a concept so that existence is part of its definition is not a definition but an argument, and here the opponent can already claim that he does not understand the definition.
I) I did not understand how he could argue this, after all, it was deduced logically from the premise, there is no contradiction, incoherence or anything. – This is a basic point. I would be happy if you could explain.
II) Every proof must derive the conclusion from the premises, otherwise it is not valid. So at this point you have also eliminated the evidence that derives from the concept of “perfection” about “existence”, I think accusing the island of making a blatant categorical mix-up on the table is pretty stupid.
III) Although I do accept that thinking about the greatest thing that cannot be conceived is no longer derived from the assumption.

C. You mentioned in the AJB argument, you claimed that at a certain point it already ceases to be an island and is nullified, but a moment before it becomes so, then for the answer it is already considered the greatest that can be conceived. And in any case it will exist. Because existence is a greater expression of it.
(And as for the question you asked about the fact that great does not exist with regard to perfection, the definition of whole can also be added to this island, and then in any case your claim proves the existence of the island.).
D. I still don't understand how you reject the most complete and greatest argument of Satan imaginable. In contrast to God who is the best. Satan is the most complete and worst.

I forgot to add that thank you very much for sharing with us quotes from the new book! ✌ッ✌ ♫ ♪✌

A. Thank you.
B.
1. I didn't really understand the claim. When you say the island that exists, you claim something (and don't define). But you didn't define the concept about which you claim what you claim. It's impossible for its definition to be just that it exists. On the other hand, the definition of the complete being is a definition for all intents and purposes and is understandable.
2. I didn't understand.
C. You're inserting a letter for the purpose of explaining mathematics. There is no number that is the largest in the open segment (0,1). When the island is the most complete, it will become God, as I wrote there at the end.
D. The most complete devil is not a devil or is not complete. Part of perfection is goodness. If there is something good and it is the most complete, it is God. We're back to what I wrote at the end.

Please.

1. There are many definitions of an island and existence is one of them. What is the problem?
2. I meant that the conclusion contains the assumption of existence anyway, so what if I shorten processes and define it separately.
C. Is there a point at which the island ceases to be called an island? If so (as you wrote), then a moment before that it is the largest island. It is simply natural.
D. I did not mean the most perfect devil in all the perfections. I meant the most perfect devil in all the perfections except for the perfection of goodness, where he is actually the greatest evil.

1. I wrote that existence is a claim and not a definition. Therefore, when you write “the island that exists” it is not clear what you are talking about?
2. It lies in the assumption and not in the definition. When you hide an assumption within a definition, you have turned the definition into a claim.
3. No.
4. When you list completenesses, you are actually shortening a list that includes existence, and existence is not part of the definition. If you say the most complete in general, that is a definition.
I think that is enough for us. The arguments I have raised seem satisfactory to me, and if we do not agree, then no.

I want to understand if I understood what you meant,
It seems from your words that sometimes a definition of an entity can be interpreted as a hidden argument disguised as an assumption, and sometimes not, and indeed it is an assumption of a definition.
When I define something as existence, then I am actually *claiming* that it exists, not defining it. And so it is with the example of completeness – Sometimes the phrase sequence “X is the most complete entity” will be interpreted as an argument and sometimes as a definition.
When is this and when is that? When we see the concept of completeness “as a whole” then it is a complete definition. For example “X has all completeness” but sometimes the concept “completeness” will be interpreted only as an abbreviated list, a kind of code word that includes many definitions.
This happens when I cancel and limit the full definition of ‘completeness’ for example when I claim that ”X has all completenesses **except** for being good” – so when I limited the total completeness then it actually showed that I was presenting the rest of the completenesses as a comprehensive list.
And so when it is split, then arguments are also hidden in it and not just definitions. Like ‘existence’ – which when presented separately is actually a claim and not a premise!

I would like to know first of all whether I understood these divisions as necessary?
If so, then later it will finally open a window for me to understand why you do not accept a tautological argument as correct. And when do you see something as a definition and when as a claim.

Indeed. As mentioned, the matter is further expanded in the first book in the trilogy (an updated version by the author).

Where do I get the trilogy? (This notebook does not write all these divisions in my opinion, it may be so, but not clearly and distinctly).
B. If so, I still do not understand why you do not see a tautological argument as correct? After all, a contradiction of it will always be considered a contradiction.
C. When do you see a definition as an argument disguised as a premise, and when do you see it as a true premise? For example, why, even in Descartes' view, would you not say that there is a hidden premise behind it.

I would be happy if you could enlighten my understanding of this. 🙂

A. The trilogy hasn't been released yet.
B. A tautological argument is always true. I didn't understand the question.
C. There is a mix-up of concepts here. An argument is a deduction from premises to a conclusion. A claim is a sentence that claims something (both the premises and the conclusion are claims). A definition is a presentation of the meaning of a concept, and therefore it is neither a claim nor an argument.
What I wrote is that the ”existing island” is not a definition but an argument disguised as a definition. On the other hand, “the northernmost island in the Mediterranean”, or “the island on which three trees grow” are definitions.
“The most complete being imaginable” is also a reasonable definition and not an argument. Although according to Anselm it is possible to deduce from it that this being also exists, it is a derivation through an additional assumption (that existence is a criterion for completeness).
With your permission, I'll end here. I'm really tired of the discussion.

First, I apologize for the great trouble I am causing the Rabbi, although I do not intend to ask in order to make things difficult for the Rabbi and create a polemical discussion, but my questions are to understand the Rabbi's words.
Thank you very much for clarifying the concepts.
I would only be happy to clarify, some final nitpicking. For those questions that I have tried to ask from the beginning until now, and now thanks to the explanation I can perhaps ask them through the presentation of the concepts you presented.
A. Since when do I see a sentence as a definition and when will I see it as an argument. Is this such a vague estimate? For example, I can say that for me, the sentence “the island that necessarily exists” is also a definition and not just an argument. Or is there a clear limit to this.
B. What distinguishes a claim/argument that I can object to. For example, according to you, I can object to someone who claims to me “there is an invisible sorcerer near you” And although if I try to deny his claim and tell him “there is no invisible sorcerer” I will contradict his premise, and in any case I must assume that such a sorcerer does exist.
In contrast to an argument that comes from a definitional analysis, I cannot claim that your definition is unacceptable to me. For example, because it is drawn from our experience and intuitions.

I would really appreciate it if you could answer that, this is the question that is actually the whole idea here. …

A. When is a sentence a command and when is it a description? Is it just a rough estimate? When it contains a command, it is a command, and when it contains a description, it is a description. The same is true of the subject under discussion: if it defines something and claims nothing, then it is a definition. It is not judged in terms of right and wrong. And if it claims something, it is a claim. What I wrote is that the definition “the island that exists” is not a definition as it is supposed to be, but rather hides a claim within it. Definitions include only characteristics, and existence is not a characteristic of the thing.
B. There is real confusion here. What do I care about his assumptions? I object to him according to my assumptions. A person will tell me that I have a chair. If I think I don't, I tell him that he is wrong.
There is no way to do this with a definition – because a definition claims nothing. So what will you argue about? It is not because it is drawn from our experience and intuitions. You are repeatedly mixing up a claim with a true claim. There are also incorrect claims, and they still belong to the category of claim because they claim something.

Thank you very much!
A. If so, there may be intermediate situations, for example, “the most perfect devil in peace except for the perfection of the good in which he is the greatest evil”, there will be people who will indeed perceive the existence that lies in perfection as a definition and not as an argument hidden in a sequence of definitions.
A2. In any case, the claim of existence under the guise of a definition is only found in the definitions of ordinary existence, but anything that is claimed to necessarily exist is defined as something new. After all, there is a fundamental difference between an object that necessarily exists and an object that does not necessarily exist. So it is possible to define “a table that necessarily exists and does not have to comply with the laws of nature” this is a fundamentally different definition.
B. Ah, I understand, an argument is actually a kind of “claimed” sentence, a kind of new assumption. In contrast to the definition, which is just a description of something. If

Thank you very much for clarifying things.

I know that the Rabbi was already exhausted from the discussion, but after a comprehensive reading of the subject I think I understood the subject better, thanks to the explanations here that the Rabbi made, today I reread the things (both in the notebook and on other English websites) and I understood their meaning better. So thank you very much!!!

There are only two questions with the same basis that I still do not understand, it is a bit difficult for me sometimes to determine whether a certain definition will be considered a true definition or not. For example, if we define Satan – as the most evil, powerful entity, etc.’ and that it is the necessity of reality, truly “perfect” for evil..
I know that you see this definition as an argument, I just did not quite understand why, after all, there is a fundamental difference between a Satan entity that is the necessity of reality and a Satan that is contingent. Why can't there be an entity that is, although not completely perfect, but would still be considered in its definition as the necessity of reality.
B. I have a question (similar to chapter 19), if I accept the understanding that indeed the idea of something existing is necessarily greater and more complete than the idea of something non-existing. Can I still argue that this idea does not have to have actual existence in the world? And the idea will remain only as a conceptual thought. After all, existence is not a subject. So it has no validity in the world.

And a final question only in yes and no,
Can I accept as a basic intuition that one cannot learn from an analytical claim about the existence of something in the world. Will I encounter a logical contradiction due to the ontological inference or not?

Really appreciate it if you could answer!!
I would see this as a question that comes as a result of understanding the subject much better now, as a new answer..

My friends, have you decided not to finish until you have finally destroyed me? 🙂

A. I don't know what a true definition is. Do you mean a definition and not an argument? I wrote that any perfection that is not in all parameters is suspected of being an argument in the guise of a definition. Therefore, the perfect devil is like the perfect island.

There can certainly be an entity that is not completely perfect and is the necessity of reality. The question is not whether it can exist but whether being perfect in terms of existence and not in other respects is not an argument but a definition. I argue that it is an argument and not a definition like the existing island. Therefore, even if it exists, we can only conclude about its existence if we observe it. Ontological evidence will not prove its existence because what you proposed is not a definition but an argument (see the previous paragraph).

B. This is indeed a significant objection, the difference between imagining something that exists and thinking that something exists. I addressed this briefly in the chapter I posted here (and in more detail in other chapters).

Regarding the last question – I think so. But only after we have actually refuted the ontological argument or at least its ontological nature (showed that it depends on assumptions).

That's it. Please spare me 🙂

Thank you very much for the words! The strong can spare the weak, but how can the weak spare the strong? So please spare me.

A. Thank you very much, first you presented the words as a certain claim, not as a doubt claim (perfections that are not in all parameters only suspected of being a claim).

B. Thank you very much! We will wait for the book to be published.

C. What kind of assumptions did you mean, the assumption at the heart of the argument -
The assumption that it is possible to have an ontological argument that proves a fact from a conceptual analysis.? But if I come with an intuition and a basic understanding that this is fundamentally wrong and can only be understood by synthetic-a priori sentences, is this still a logical contradiction? Or is it no longer a logical contradiction. After all, I don't get the concept of these arguments.
(I mean even though I accept all the sub-assumptions of the argument, for example, existence of necessity is indeed an aspect of perfection in an idea, etc., etc.)

Thank you!

I understand that your opening was an explanation of why you didn't spare me and continue to ask… 🙂
I didn't understand your question. In my words, I meant the assumptions that Anselm does make at the foundation of his argument (even though he believes there are no assumptions there). I detailed them in the notebook and even more so in the version in the book.

Yes, I understood that, the question is, your words are intended to assume things like that an idea of the perfection of existence is greater than an ordinary idea, etc. And after we see that there are basic assumptions in the argument, then we can add more assumptions of the ways of human understanding.
Or, even if I accept that all these assumptions (at the hypothetical level) are not assumptions but basic logical definitions, as long as I assume that it is not possible to conclude from a purely conceptual analysis about the existence of an object. The ontological view does not rise.

I mean, after all, the understanding that existence can be derived from an analysis of a definition is also a type of assumption and human understanding. So if I assume that it is not possible, that is enough to ‘prevent’ the view from rising beyond the idea.

Indeed, this is one of the assumptions. There are more.
But there is no such thing as “can be added”. Either the argument has additional assumptions or it doesn't.
Even if you assume that an ontological inference cannot be made (as Kant assumes), that is not enough. You must point out a flaw in the argument itself, otherwise your assumption has been refuted. Of course, if the argument has additional assumptions, you can always waive them in order to leave the assumption that an ontological inference is not possible intact.
The argument does not assume that existence can be derived from a definition, but does so in practice. This is not an assumption of the argument, but its conclusion. Therefore, even if you object to this assumption, it will not help you. The argument proves you wrong. Unless you take the path I described above.

But whoever does accept the premises of the discussion - and they seem to him to be reasonable overall - assumes that existence is necessarily a definition of God as part of a whole. And so do the other claims. But it seems to him that the conclusion is completely absurd. And contradicts other premises. How can he decide between the understandings and premises?

He must decide which is stronger in his opinion. It is impossible to have both. Whenever a contradiction arises in the combination of several claims, you must choose which one to abandon. There is no algorithm here. You need to examine what is the least strong in your opinion. There are auxiliary rules, such as lex specialis, for example (it is better to qualify a general assumption than to waive a specific assumption). For example, there is a prohibition on murder and an obligation to kill a Sabbath desecrator. What do we do with the contradiction? It is clear that waiving the obligation empties the verses that command it of their content. On the other hand, if we qualify the prohibition on murder and determine that it does not apply to capital punishments, we are left with both the obligation and the prohibition (albeit a qualified one). This is a very useful principle in such decisions, but it can also be argued about.

Okay thanks, yes I assumed you would use your favorite rule lex specialis. Almost a quarter of the messages mention it here naturally :-||
I didn't see that you mentioned Kant's first argument, what do you think about it?
He says that the most that can be said about our definition of entities that necessarily exist is only if we add a condition that will be inferred before them, for example when we say “that a triangle has 3 sides” then it is true only in the case that such a triangle does exist. And the same goes for the definition of God that “if X exists – then he necessarily exists”. (And anyway, once we reject the entire definition of God, we don't run into a contradiction because we also reject the predicates of him)

Do a search and you'll be surprised.
His argument is irrelevant. As I explained, critiques of Anselm's argument should point out a flaw in his argument and not state alternative statements.
Okay, I'm done with that, and this time for real (no pun intended).