The paradox of weakness of will
Hello Rabbi,
I remember you mentioning in one of the last lessons that when a person sins, he usually chooses interests over moral considerations. I wanted to ask whether this mechanism somehow resolves the paradox of weakness of will, or whether it also stems from weakness of will. In other words, the reason a person chooses interests over moral considerations stems from the fact that he is too weak to adhere to his moral values? Or is it that from his perspective, morality simply doesn’t interest him, and is there perhaps a sin here in opinions?
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Is there a problem with basing the entire model of free choice on choosing positions rather than strengthening one's will? That is, if we assume there was no such thing as weakness of will, would that change anything in our perception of the process of answering or the demand for an answer?
Yes. If the whole problem was in the positions themselves, then a person cannot be required to make a proactive response. If it happens that his positions have changed - fine. But if his positions are X, how can you require him to change them to Y. After all, he holds positions X.
From what I understand, there are people who hold positions that they are aware are wrong, and yet choose to continue to hold them. For example, a person who holds the position that he prefers to enjoy easy money while stealing and deceiving other people. He is aware that this position is immoral, and he still holds it. Why can't such a person be required to change his position proactively? This reminds me a bit of the discussion about preparing him until he says I want to, when the beatings are intended to change the position of the person who refuses a divorce.
I discussed this in detail in column 172. A position for our purposes is the totality of considerations, values, and interests alike.
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