The Physico-Theological View. Column 144 and notebook. Understanding the topic and questions
In the SD
I know that the rabbi has exhausted the matter. And I also know that he is discouraged by these questions. But I think I understood the entire course of your words and I wanted to raise a few questions that I don’t remember being discussed properly. So on the one hand, be careful, but I really hope that we don’t fall on deaf ears in the discussion.
——-
Following the fact that I remembered one of the questions here about the physio-theological perspective, I said that perhaps after Pesach the redemption will come for understanding the matter.
Since there are many who do not understand the view at all, as can be seen at length in column 144 and also in Y there, I will write how I understand that the rabbi understands it in a little more detail. And I will raise a number of questions about the rabbi’s form of view.
As far as I understand, the rabbi makes two unclear assumptions for the evidence:
- First, the rabbi believes that complexity is an objective attribute.
- Second, the Rabbi believes that every complex thing has a sufficient reason for why it is the way it is and not otherwise.
I assume that assumption 2 cannot be made without assumption 1. Because even if we accept the “simple” principle of sufficient reason, that everything is distilled from sufficient reason, we will still be screwed later and will have to assume the nature of the rational agent, since this is a non-objective attribute.
In any case, by assumption 2, you enable the discussion and try to draw us into an infinite regression of questions about any entity that would certainly cause a world to be created, why is it like this and not otherwise? After all, that entity has special properties in itself to create a special world.
And thus, you are trying to conclude that there are *only* two hypotheses (at least that we are able to think of), either it is an intelligent entity with free will that chose to create a world. Or it is a random generator of universes. (For emphasis, if we assume a third possibility that it is an entity that was “forced” to create a world like a primordial big bang, then we will go back and ask why it is this way and not otherwise).
But I have two questions about that,
A. It seems possible to ask how we have the hypothesis of a random universe generator. If it operates on a certain probabilistic calculation that favors such a world, we immediately ask why the probability is this way and not another. And if it is a completely random generator, we also ask why it has the properties to lead to the creation of a world.
Apparently the same question can be asked about the initial intelligent agent, why does it even have free will? Or why is it strong by X units of force and not otherwise? I agree that a regression breaker is needed, but why don’t these two things in particular make enough sense!? Just because they are different from what we know? But we could also say that the big bang that we know was caused by a type 2 “primordial big bang”, which was forced to create a world. And we got a necessary entity that we simply don’t know about!
Moreover, once you defined one possibility in this column that would create a world with a probability of 1, and another possibility of epsilon. You intentionally did not assume what the nature of the first entity was, and if so, it is not necessarily voluntary. And in fact we have hardly proven anything, we have only accepted the conclusion that if we have the ability to interpret that the world did not just randomly create it had a reason. Great.
In other words, at this point it is important to emphasize that Christians have very beautiful developments towards this part of the extended principle of sufficient reason, which are related to the definition of simplicity and Occam’s razor, which is found either in an entity with 0 units of force or with infinite RPK. But the Rabbi did not use them here.
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on. I wanted to focus on assumption 2, I think that even if we accept that complexity is an objective property that can describe uniqueness, there is still no reason for it to cause the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), since there is nothing in a unique event that “forces” a cause. But only to the extent that we actually have a cosmological principle of PSR that precedes the understanding of the concept of entropy. We can start to complicate things, and then the question will really intensify following a unique world.
That is, only if we found a stone inside a glass ball in the forest would we assume that it had sufficient meaning. In such a case, if we found the Earth inside a glass ball, then indeed, this would require much more explanation. But if we were not satisfied with the stone, there is no reason why we would be satisfied with the Earth and the Universe.
third. The thing that comes out of my words so far is that if we don’t have PSR but only simple material causality, then there is no reason to accept the evidence! And we can stay with a primeval Big Bang 1 or 2.
D. What does the rabbi think is more basic to human understanding, PSR or the regular principle of causality (of the Kalam)? Atheists tend to argue like B, but believe like A.
- -Perhaps this can be attributed to someone who believes in free will, even though he does not accept determinism (even though there is no connection between objects and events), being forced to accept PSR to some extent in order to remain “sane.”
- -And perhaps we can attribute this to quantum mechanics, which allows for probabilities in the world, and if that is the case, the Kalmian causal principle is apparently much more “rigid”, and therefore it is not entirely appropriate.
- -And also, to the extent that physics allows for the spontaneous(?) formation of particles, there is still a law of conservation of charge behind it to take care of it. And here the PSR also seems more appropriate.
- Likewise, it can be argued that everyone follows their own method, since to the extent that the world is a brute fact, there is no reason to accept the PSR, which itself opposes brute fact by its very nature. In contrast to the believer who accepts it, and is therefore willing to be much more open and flexible in his thinking.
What does the rabbi think? On the one hand, the principle of sufficient reason is very intuitive, on the other hand, almost everything I know can also be explained with the principle of causality. So why do we need it? And conversely, precisely because the PSR is so inclusive and “big-headed” it feels like it’s not really right and will sometimes make mistakes.
——
I now wanted to ask about assumption 1, that complexity is an objective property, which, for example, can be measured by entropy, and complexity would be a subfield of entropy.
I understand the main reason you claim that complexity is an objective property is because the physical world can be described by entropy, for example from light as a physical quantity. So even though I don’t understand it, it still feels wrong to me.
the. Since this is a property that is essentially probabilistic, there is no need to think that it is a property of a part of the objective world itself (a real physical quantity), but rather it is more a way of looking at the world. It is clear that because there are enough possibilities within our “container”, the probability of any situation is zero – everything is rare. And so, even if the special is *only* from our point of view, we can still explain these things well. So even if it would be a skeptical claim to claim this against ordinary laws of nature, here it fits well. Why would we think that complexity would be an objective property that is not obvious? And as I said, many really do not understand this point?
—-
I wanted to ask a small, unrelated question, to end the topic.
and. If we accept that we have free choice, as subjects, our most natural thing is the “I”. So it is clear that there will be a tendency to personify unknown things. And especially for the one who created the world and us, who is supposed to have the ability to bring about the attribute of free choice. Just as they once believed that the sun has consciousness, it is clear why they thought that! I am not sure that they were wrong in their thinking, they simply lived in a state of uncertainty and thought of an explanation.
Same thing here, I don’t think it’s problematic here to “assume what is wanted” and prefer the hypothesis that the one who created the world is an intelligent being, because that’s the clearest and most intuitive analogy in the world, right from me.
Sorry for the length !
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I will try to write later, in any case, I completely agree that this evidence is doomed to be tired here for the sake of tiredness.
I also assume that you have some clear evidence “in the head”, but my feeling as a reader from the side that in general almost most of the discussions on this matter, all of them almost repeated themselves and neither side managed to express their words properly. And understand what the other wants. (As quoted by the endless ad-humanists from various scholars in column 144, each side took its own method and more throughout the many discussions).
The reason for this, as I understand it, is that the rabbi did not define the concepts well. For example, when you use the principle of sufficient reason, it is not enough to say its name. Rather, it has many formulations, which one exactly do you mean? Each such formulation causes different evidence and conclusions. Different understandings of the whole matter. Why is it valid, etc. Usually all these things
were discussed in a very unsystematic way for each sub-view. Many times it was simply references to ideas that were discussed in another view. For example, you refer to the regression stop of the view from complexity to the regression stop of the kalam. But there are a lot of sub-things that are not related to the things.
For example, from what I managed to glean in my searches yesterday, you divide between a sufficient reason for the cosmological view of why there is something and nothing? And a sufficient reason for complex things. While the first sufficient reason according to you is weak, the sufficient reason for a complex thing is much stronger, because the event before us is unique and rare. In my opinion, to the extent that you do not accept the sufficient reason, there is no reason to accept it for a complex thing. After all, the fact that something is rare has no intrinsic connection to its having an explanation. It can of course be said that this is an axiom, but it sounds quite ad hoc for the sake of the argument.
For example, this can be solved by claiming that the principle of sufficient reason that you use is not related to a complex or non-complex thing. But to the question of how much a state of affairs exists before us in this way and not another. When we mean the latter, we are talking about a well-defined state of affairs, for example a world with a slightly different electromagnetic force constant, etc. (But not why something exists and nothing). Only from here, so that we do not assume the nature of the cause, we use a complex thing (according to the objective definition that must also be discussed). But it is not part of the cosmological engine of the discussion.
Now we can continue to discuss whether this cosmological principle is consistent with all our understandings of the world and the answer is no, after all, if we accept the possibility that events in the world can be created probabilistically as in quantum theory, then we do not have sufficient reason why a certain thing exists in this way and not another. So we probably need to refine this principle a little more, etc. Maybe something like the existence of everything that can be thought of as to why it is the way it is and not otherwise would provide an explanation. But all of these things feel very lacking to me.
What I didn't elaborate on is either because I didn't think about it or because I don't think it's important. In many cases, all sorts of divisions of philosophers or theologians are irrelevant in my opinion, for example, like the ones you brought up here.
To your questions here:
I myself wrote that these are two applications of the principle of sufficient reason. I didn't understand your comment on that.
You make different divisions between different formulations of the principle of sufficient reason, all of which can be argued in the same way. I don't see why it's even relevant. If you don't see logic in this principle, then no. Every argument assumes some assumptions, and whoever doesn't accept them of course won't accept the conclusion either.
I didn't expect such an answer, what with all the value of well-defined definitions of concepts? Especially since there are many formulations that are not really correct and require corrections and sometimes only subtle ones. We are talking about issues that depend on many other issues.
It is always possible to accept all sorts of ad hoc axioms that will be useful. But the question is whether they are reasonable.
If defining a concept like the relationship between war and the innocent can be discussed for hours, then it is probably appropriate to distill these concepts that are supposed to be valid for all science and thinking.
I agree that there are all sorts of intuitions in the ideas you express, but they need to be developed.
If I were to be a psychologist, perhaps such theological arguments in the "basis" feel too anachronistic to you for too long to dwell on them. Rather, it is enough to group the main points of the matter into a few notebooks.
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