The principle of

שו”ת › Category: philosophy › The principle of

nav asked 9 years ago

peace!
In several places in your various books, you brought up the ‘principle of individuation’ established by Aristotle, according to which there may be two objects that are equal in all their properties and yet they will be two different objects.
You also brought up Leibniz’s words, which disputed Aristotle’s famous ‘principle of the identity of incorporeal things’.
In all these places you held Aristotle’s position. In one place you even wrote that Leibniz’s position is absurd.
Although, I didn’t find that you explained (even briefly!) why you hold that view (at most, you refuted Leibniz’s ‘proof’ following Bergman)? Is this really just intuition? Aren’t there any arguments, probabilities, and various claims about this? Has nothing been written about this in the philosophical literature?
I would love to hear from you about that.
Have a good week!
And here is the place to thank you for the wonderful site! Thank you! And much success!

Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

Leave a ReplyCancel reply

0 Answers

0 Vote Up Vote Down

מיכי Staff answered 9 years ago

Hello. I think I explained this in two carts. As for the matter itself, I don’t think there’s any need for an explanation. After all, the starting point is that Aristotle is right, since it’s clear that if you distinguish between the thing and its attributes, then identity in attributes does not entail identity between the objects. Why would identity in attributes make the two objects one? What is the connection between difference in attributes and separation in individuation? What remains is Leibniz’s proof, which seemingly forces us to give up this intuition. And so, once the proof was refuted, we returned to the Aristotelian starting point. I assume this has been written about in philosophical literature, but I’m not familiar with it. I assume you could search philosophical databases or ask experts in the field.

Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

nav replied 9 years ago

Thanks for the answer.

In Two Carts, you indeed only distinguish between the thing and its properties. But this point is the point of contention. Leibniz claims that the thing itself is the collection of all its properties. This assumption has not been refuted at all.

I asked: Do you have a logical or even convincing argument for Leibniz's assumption?
Indeed, your entire foundation in this matter is rooted in intuition alone (and I do not at all underestimate the power of intuition, but what can I do, I do not have such a strong intuition in this matter)?

מיכי Staff replied 9 years ago

As I explained there, the roots of the dispute always lie in the basic assumptions, that is, in the initial intuitions. Unless someone has a simple logical error (which usually doesn't happen).
I find it hard to believe that this intuition is not obvious to you. You have two drops of water. Now compare all their properties one by one. Have they become one? Alternatively, do you think there is nothing in the chair beyond the sum of its properties? After all, there is something that carries all these properties (i.e., these are its properties), right?
If this is not obvious to you, I have no better arguments. Although, see also the passage I cited there from Borges's fictions, which shows the ridiculousness created by the conventionalist assumption. Perhaps it will convince you. Borges shows that according to conventionalism, a collection of unrelated properties can also be combined into one concept (the tone of the bird's voice screaming in the distance, the color of the cloud in Australia, and the strength of the wind in Scandinavia). If there is no object that carries all these properties, there is no reason to define these three properties as an object. See there for an ingenious description of the implications of conventionalism.

nav replied 9 years ago

Thank you very much, I will check it out.