The principle of preference for the specific
Times of great joy,
I’m in the middle of studying the book on the physico-theological view, and I came across a question.
It is explained there that there is a contradiction between two assumptions: A. A. A. being in infinite regression. on. Every complex thing has a designer, and this should include God Himself (who is also complex, otherwise He could not design our complex world).
And you explained that the choice to qualify the second premise and exclude God stems from the principle of preference for the specific, which says that it is better to qualify the broader rule so that both rules remain meaningful (even if qualified).
But I couldn’t understand why this is true here. Even if we exclude the issue of infinite regression with respect to the design of complex things, we will still have two rules that have (qualified) significance, since we have remained with assumption B in full, and we will also apply assumption A in all other places where we encounter infinite regression.
I would appreciate it if you could explain to me where I am wrong, thank you.
Sorry for the delay, for some reason I missed this question.
I don’t remember what was written there. I don’t see a contradiction between these two assumptions. On the contrary, both are correct, and therefore it is clear that there is a primary object that has no designer. Perhaps it is not complex, or it is not the type of object in our experience.
But still, with respect to these two assumptions, it is correct in my opinion to prefer to qualify the second, because the exception is explained (an entity that is not in our experience or is not complex). On the other hand, why qualify the rule that rules out infinite regression. What distinguishes our case in which it is legitimate?
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