The Principle of Sufficient Reason, Rabbi Michi’s Version

Certainly there is a connection between the phenomenon and the noumena.
But if so, you also agree that it is not possible to project understandings that are not of sensory and empirical origin onto the noumena. Rather, all of them are based on the phenomenon, for example, the principle of bitness and induction, etc. If so, why does the principle of sufficient reason for complex objects not suffer from these problems?

Punkt Prakrt. I actually claim that it is possible to discard, including induction and causality. My entire argument is truly unstable and in two carts and with what is there is against the day. I claim that his doubt is correct from an empiricist point of view, and therefore offer syntheticity (the blurring between cognition and thinking) as the only possible option in order not to be skeptical, and in order to justify induction and causality (and thus the principle of sufficient reason).

You say that everything you wrote in these books is just to answer David Hume's method, but are you even a rationalist? ????
Or are you claiming that this principle of sufficient reason is also rational?

Everything is true except for the ”but” (and the ”in general”): All I wrote was to answer David Hume, since I am a rationalist.
My argument is that the distinction between cognition and thinking is not sharp, since we have intellectual cognition (a part of the mind that knows and not just thinks), through which we perceive things not like facts that are perceived through the senses directly. This is called rationalism, and every empiricist must admit this. This is the essence of Spray, and not a side note of clarification.
In this sense, the principle of sufficient reason is “I knew” (we perceive through the knowing mind), like any other rationalist (correct) idea. There are of course also hallucinations, but that is something else. There are such cognitions that are hidden from facts – and we should not insist on them either. But there are certainly insights that are not based on facts (=sensory, empirical) and it is right to rely on them.

Thank you very much! I calmed down… haha

I just wanted to know if I understood your argument correctly so far, because otherwise it would be a shame to argue about the assumptions through a discourse of the deaf (and especially after arguments about understanding the depth of your words with other people). And especially since it seems to the majority of the comments on the site that many people have not been able to get to the bottom of your thoughts on the subject. And in the meantime, I hope that this time I discovered the depth of things.
As I understand it, there are two hidden assumptions in your method:
P1. A complex thing has a sufficient taste.
P2. Complexity is an objective property and is completely non-subjective (compared to Y in column 144), but in order for us to continue the physico-theological argument, we only need to check a side condition to see if the complex event is also statistically rare. If so, we will look for an explanation for this (as a continuation! of section 1) but if not, then we have no reason to assume another explanation for the complex event.

If this is indeed what I say, then it explains a lot of the difficulties that arise in reading your words.
A. Why, according to you, a being that is not endowed with the properties of recognizing complexity is mistaken when it sees something complex and does not establish its cause.
B. Also, it explains why we have no reason to assume that there is a component in a random sequence because it does not at all refine experience into taste (P1).
C. This explains why we must posit at the head of the chain of tastes either a being that acts randomly (to avoid 1P) or assume that there is an intelligent/voluntary being. But it is not appropriate to assume a being that will necessarily act in complexity because your assumption is wrong.
D. This explains why you repeatedly emphasize that you do not assume anything about the nature of the generating agent. (Because otherwise we would be somewhat in the realm of assuming the desired thing).
E. Also, it explains why there is no reason to ask Dawkins' famous question: Who created God? Because of both sections together. (1. God is taste itself 2. God is defined as unitary and simple and it is not clear that this is a definite discussion if it is also statistically rare).

I would appreciate your response,
K

I sign every word (I just didn't understand the B).
I'll just say again that this is not a clarification. This is the whole essence of my spray, and I'm a little surprised that those who read them didn't understand them this way. It makes me think sadly about my ability to explain.

First of all, who is a pioneer like our Rabbi who opened the channels of wisdom and thinking to every human being. And a lot of teaching knowledge to the common people and a curator will sift chaff from a bar for us.
In assumption P2, I indeed failed to express it as stated, but in fact it is divided into an assumption and on which there is an argument:
It seems that you repeat many times both in the third notebook and in column 144 that you perceive the concept of “complexity” as having an objective meaning, it is not just a subjective concept that pleases us as humans but a concept that really exists and has a realization in reality just like good and evil.
And if this is how it explains, for example, why a creature that is not endowed with the ability to distinguish between a complex thing and nothing, is mistaken in that it will not conclude that a complex thing is something that requires a designer.
Also, there is a condition for this assumption: When is it claimed that a complex thing is distilled from a component? Only when the chance of this is low. But when the chance of this is high (for example, there are not many alternative options), then we do not claim this. And from here begins the words of column 144. Although in the background there is another assumption P1. But in order to ignore it, you assume that the world was created (but as I wrote in the comments, this was not true enough because you also evaded the possibility of explaining the creation of the world by a non-rational/voluntary natural factor).

1. A being who does not perceive complexity will not need an explanation for something complex, whether I am right or not. That is, even if complexity is not objective (except that in that case I am also wrong in requiring an explanation).
2. Something complex means by definition that there are many alternatives. This is the objective definition of complexity (via entropy).
Well, I think we have exhausted it.

Interesting,
If complexity is not objective, don't you see a problem with the principle of sufficient reason for a complex thing (p1)? And you wrote to Hadiya there, not like here, and I will quote
“But if it only appears to him,
then at least from his perspective there is really no indication that it has an intelligent cause. He thinks there is none, and rightly so from the
data in front of him, but he is wrong. I likened it to a blind man who thinks there is no wall in front of him,
but I, as a sighted man, know that there is a wall. That creature is blind to the uniqueness of the phenomenon and therefore does not draw any
conclusions from it. He is right from his perspective but wrong in relation to the world.”
2. Agree, it was just to break the ear. And perhaps it is possible to make a okumata in the complex of paws and sleep 😉

Clearly I see a problem. After all, that's exactly what I wrote: in non-objective complexity, the one who doesn't notice the complexity won't need a reason (of course), but in such a situation, even the one who needs a reason is wrong.

After a good week of fresh and wet garden with the consent of both parties, revealing all your hidden assumptions that were stated in the matter, I would be happy to ask about your actual assumptions.
Consequently, “that the principle of sufficient reason for a thing to be complex” sounds ad hoc, but in your opinion, the tangible cannot be denied. I will try to dispel the second assumption (P2) here because you also agreed that it is a hanging one.
You claimed that complexity is an objective property. But this sounds very puzzling in my opinion:
1. It is not right to claim that complexity is an objective property? Even if we can quantify it in some way, like ethnography, since when do we assume that objective concepts assume this only when there is not much choice, like “good and evil” But not just like that.. Is the Greek language also an objective language? And after all, a script written in it is kosher and orderly by all accounts, but we have no doubt that it was created and does not deserve the name “objective”. Also, beauty is, as we know, a subjective attribute, even though it causes us admiration, as in complexity. And as the poet said, there is no arguing about taste and smell.

Secondly, even if complexity is an objective attribute, you will probably argue that there are many more objective attributes such as height, width, weight, color, curvature, concavity, ties, etc. Then it sounds strange to argue that this attribute, of all the other attributes, is precisely what distills taste and not just a reason but a rational reason. Why don't we assume that something that is very heavy will need taste? Or very beautiful/low/curved/convex/colored/round, etc., etc., will need taste?
And I already mentioned this in the column itself, which claims that something that is good has a voluntary reason behind it, as the ancient Greeks claimed that the only thing that can arouse will in its own way is morality. But a complex thing is not a prescriptive attribute, but rather a descriptive one, like all the other attributes that exist!!
This will be answered as clearly and simply as the light of the sun is seven times as bright as the morning light.

And
Ode to God, a searching heart
Brother, together with the morning stars
“

First, there was no hidden assumption here. Everything was as clear as morning light.
Second, I did not claim that complexity is objective because it can be quantified. I claimed that it is objective because the quantified quantity is a quantity in physics (entropy), and it is active and operates in the laws of physics. If this were only our way of looking at it, there is no logic in it appearing in the laws of physics, unless you say that the laws of physics are also subjective to us.
I see no point in distinguishing between perspicacious and descriptive London Didan. There are several types of things that require a source, including: moral laws and complex fact. Perhaps there are other properties that require it. So what? Any other property that requires a reason could also serve as the basis for a physico-theological argument, and then you would have another proof for the existence of God. Does this contradict this proof?

I am not a scientist, but as far as I can see from reading Wikipedia, there is no direct connection between entropy and complexity. And even if it does exist, it is still not clear to me what makes this property a distillation of explanation.
Perhaps you will argue that in our world the concept of “speed” exists and it appears in physics, so a fast thing is distilled from an explanation. Of course, there is no connection between something appearing in physics and it needing an explanation. Likewise, sometimes directions like left and right also appear in physics… and we do not assume that the right-handed rule is distilled from an explanation. But of course the laws of physics are descriptions in our language of a reflection that exists in objective reality.

The question is why assume that a property like complexity is distilled from a taste, and the fact that you have not found other properties that are distilled from a taste. (Good is distilled from a taste because the concept of good itself has a divine origin)

I don't know what Wikipedia says, but entropy is the measure of uniqueness, and uniqueness requires explanation. Complexity is a type of uniqueness.
Regarding the appearance in the world, I keep explaining over and over again and you just don't understand. My explanations are probably flawed but I don't know how to improve them any further. I'll try one last time.
Complexity begs for explanation. But that's only for objective complexity. Complexity that is not objective does not beg for explanation (because it's an illusion). Entropy is objective complexity because it is a physical quantity (physics doesn't deal with our illusions). The appearance of complexity in physics is not the reason why it begs for explanation, but because it is objective. What does this have to do with speed?
I haven't found any more properties that need an explanation because I haven't looked and I don't see a need to look. But from a frozen perspective, I would say that everything that needs an explanation is a type of complexity. There is something unique about it and therefore it needs an explanation.
That's it, I'm sorry, but I'm tired and exhausted.

I will try to clarify my meaning,
Why wouldn't you claim that speed or acceleration requires an explanation? After all, it is measured in relation to position per unit time, so it is an objective property, and the formulas of physics also show that it is not subjective.
Of course, I don't think that because it appears in physics it requires an explanation, but I am only showing that it is an objective property.
But why wouldn't you assume that a very fast body would require an explanation? In particular, most bodies will not be very fast, so a very fast body is also unique.

You're not giving up? 🙂
Very fast is not special/complex. Just as a certain series of results from a thousand dice rolls is not special, while a thousand times 6 is special. The probability of any such series of results is very small, but every thousand rolls will give some (special) result. The difference is not in chance but in entropy. But this has been explained dozens of times on the site and in notebooks.
That's it. A power failure.

May it last, Rabbi Nachman “shouted in his holy voice, Givaud! Zeit Aiykh Nit is very desperate and very painful, Givaud, to teach and to remind everyone for generations, that they should not despair of anything in the world, even if something happens to them”
I will try to find another suitable dog.

Rabbi Nachman himself despaired of despairing.